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Building  resilience  to multiple  shocks is  one  of  the most pressing contemporary 
development challenges faced by Asia and the Pacific.  Economic crises and natural 
disasters are on the rise and know no boundaries; they straddle wide geographic 
areas, spread across all sectors of economic activity, and endanger our communities. 
For communities still living in fragile and conflict-affected States, each shock erodes 
their capacity to cope with the next disaster or crisis on the horizon.  They are twice as 
likely to be undernourished and their children three times as likely to be out of school, 
while they receive less than half the amount that Governments in other countries 
spend on education, health and security. These communities are stuck in life-long 
vulnerability traps from which it is very difficult to break out.  
Five years ago, global economies plunged into deep crises as they struggled under 
the weight of the most severe economic slowdown since the 1930s.  in Asia and the 
Pacific, the financial crisis converged with the food and fuel crises, which compounded 
the damage inflicted on the livelihoods of millions of people across the region. 
Furthermore, in the past few years devastating earthquakes, floods, typhoons, 
droughts and other natural disasters have wreaked havoc throughout the region, 
causing enormous loss of lives, and widespread damage to livelihoods, property and 
local economies.  in its wake, climate change has the potential to result in even more 
disasters among our most vulnerable communities. 
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increased connectivity and interdependence through trade and financial flows, dense 
transport networks and speed of communications, while creating unprecedented 
opportunities, have also amplified the effects of these multiple shocks.  Floods in 
Thailand, for example, triggered supply chain disruptions across the region, and severe 
droughts that covered large swathes of China and Central Asia led to higher food 
prices for millions of people. Meanwhile, turmoil in major financial markets continued 
to adversely affect people living in far-flung villages in our region who have never even 
visited a bank.    
Although most economies in the region have been fortunate enough to recover 
relatively quickly from recent economic crises and stabilize towards long-term growth 
rates, this seemingly visible evidence of economic resilience masks the underlying 
vulnerabilities of poor and disadvantaged communities. For poor families who 
struggle daily under the reality of permanently higher food and fuel prices, who are 
unable to replace the loss of income from jobs that have disappeared and who have 
inadequate access to systems of social protection, the crises and disasters of years 
past are not distant memories.  The lasting legacy of multiple shocks - food insecurity 
and rising maternal and child malnutrition, reduced public expenditures on health and 
education, compromised livelihood opportunities and underemployment - all affect 
the quality of human development long after GDP growth rates and per capita income 
have regained their footing.  The gap between visible resilience and hidden forms of 
vulnerability among the “bottom billion” remains very large.  
The lessons of the past five years have led to this new normal.  The global financial 
crisis, food and fuel crises, and the consequences of natural disasters may seem to be 
unrelated, but they are the result of shocks applied to complex systems that interlink 
social, economic and environmental factors. They highlight the increasing interrelation 
of economies that have been brought together by globalization, which binds systems 
and economic activities in locations that were previously unconnected.
Experiences from the region and around the world have proven that disaster 
prevention and preparedness is far more effective and less costly than recovery and 
relief efforts.  Despite this fact, policymakers are largely in uncharted territory when 
it comes to integrating crisis mitigation and disaster risk reduction measures into 
macroeconomic policy planning. As policymakers turn to building resilience as a key 
pillar of sustainable development for the Asia-Pacific century, they must factor in the 
impacts of natural disasters, balance short-term macroeconomic stability with long-
term development and build capacity across all sectors and levels of government, 
if they are to successfully manage simultaneous shocks of unknown origin and 
vmagnitude. These are not easy tasks. They call for systems thinking, applying new 
and more sophisticated decision-making tools and above all, overcoming inherent 
limitations in addressing risks and uncertainties.      
it is my hope that this report will provide a significant contribution to the regional 
policy dialogue that addresses the pressing question of how people, organizations, 
institutions and policymakers can work together to weave resilience into the everyday 
fabric of our social and economic lives.  A range of complex factors have impacts on 
levels of resilience and risks sown by economic crises and natural disasters, including 
health and education levels, political conflict and the legacy of violence in conflict-
affected States.  The focus on resilience is crucial in the current environment because 
multiple shocks are increasingly becoming the new normal for the region.  The 
threats of tomorrow will come at anytime, from anywhere, without warning, and with 
increasing frequency.  Countries that build systems of resilience to withstand, adapt 
to, and recover from major economic crises and natural disasters are investing in the 
security of our region’s most valuable resource – its people. 
Noeleen Heyzer
Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and
Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
APRiL 2013
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ExPLANATORy NOTES
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication 
do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United 
Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or 
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the maps in this publication do not 
imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Mention of firm names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of the United 
Nations.
The term “ESCAP region” in this publication refers to the group of countries and territories/areas 
comprising: Afghanistan; American Samoa; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; 
Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; China; Cook Islands; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Fiji; 
French Polynesia; Georgia; Guam; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Iran (Islamic Republic of); 
Japan; Kazakhstan; Kiribati; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Macao, China; Malaysia; 
Maldives; Marshall Islands; Micronesia (Federated States of); Mongolia; Myanmar; Nauru; Nepal; 
New Caledonia; New Zealand; Niue; Northern Mariana Islands; Pakistan; Palau; Papua New Guinea; 
Philippines; Republic of Korea; Russian Federation; Samoa; Singapore; Solomon Islands; Sri Lanka; 
Tajikistan; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Tonga; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; and 
Viet Nam.
The term “developing ESCAP region” in this publication excludes Australia, Japan, New Zealand and 
North and Central Asian economies from the above-mentioned grouping. Non-regional members of 
ESCAP are France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America.
The term “East and North-East Asia” in this publication refers collectively to: China; Hong Kong, 
China; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Japan; Macao, China; Mongolia; and Republic of Korea.
The term “North and Central Asia” in this publication refers collectively to Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uz-
bekistan.
The term “Central Asian countries” in this publication refers collectively to Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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The term “Pacific” in this publication refers collectively to American Samoa, Australia, 
Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federat-
ed States of), Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
The term “South and South-West Asia” in this publication refers collectively to Afghanistan, Ban-
gladesh, Bhutan, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Turkey.
The term “South-East Asia” in this publication refers collectively to Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam.
The term “countries with special needs” in this publication refers collectively to least 
developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States in the 
Asia-Pacific region as indicated below.
13 least developed countries:
Afghanistan,* Bangladesh, Bhutan,* Cambodia, Kiribati,** Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic,* Myanmar, Nepal,* Samoa,** Solomon Islands,** Timor-Leste,
** Tuvalu** and Vanuatu**
(*also a landlocked developing country, **also a small island developing State);
12 landlocked developing countries:
Afghanistan,* Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan,* Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic,* Mongolia, Nepal,* Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
(*also a least developed country)
16 small island developing States:
Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati,* Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated
States of ), Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,* Solomon Islands,*
Timor-Leste,* Tonga, Tuvalu* and Vanuatu.*
(*also a least developed country)
Values are in United States dollars unless specified otherwise.
The term “billion” signifies a thousand million. The term “trillion” signifies a million million.
Reference to “tons” indicates metric tons.
In the tables, two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported, a dash 
(–) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible, and a blank indicates that the item is not applicable.
In dates, a hyphen (-) is used to signify the full period involved, including the beginning and end 
years, and a stroke (/) indicates a crop year, fiscal year or plan year.
Bibliographical and other references have, wherever possible, been verified. The United Nations 
bears no responsibility for the functioning of links to uniform resource locators (URLs) contained in 
bibliographical or other references to the work of external organizations.
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AN ERA OF OVERLAPPING SHOCKS
A COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND ECONOMIC CRISES 
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
The Asia-Pacific region has been battered in recent years by a relentless series of shocks. 
Some have been related to natural disasters, such as earthquakes or droughts or floods. 
Others, such as the 2008 financial crisis, have been caused by convulsions in global markets. 
Still others, such as rocketing food and energy prices, have been the result of a complex 
combination of shocks.
The traditional approach has been to consider such events individually. This is increasingly 
unrealistic. Governments across the region often find themselves dealing with overlapping 
shocks that demand a more comprehensive and systemic approach to building resilience. 
Resilience in this sense means the capacity of countries to withstand, adapt to, and recover 
from natural disasters and major economic crises – so that their people can continue to 
lead the kind of life they value.
For many policymakers this is new territory: they are more accustomed to focusing on 
problems in particular economic or social sectors rather than treating them as systemic 
wholes. Even more difficult, they have to take decisive action now about events that may 
or may not take place. By definition, this is a step into the unknown. On the whole, human 
beings are not very good at assessing the likelihood of what might happen in the future. 
Moreover, politicians know that they will be blamed for any such decisions that work out 
badly while receiving little credit for low-key actions that quietly avert disaster.
The risks they find easiest to identify are those from events that occur fairly regularly. 
Bangladesh, for example, is accustomed to coping with floods and cyclones and has 
invested in disaster risk reduction – in flood monitoring, for example, and forecasting and 
early warning systems. Other natural hazards, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, are far 
less predictable. Economic shocks may also come as a bolt out of the blue: the collapse of a 
united States investment bank that helped trigger the 2008 global financial crisis had been 
considered highly improbable.
ExECuTivE SuMMARy
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To add to the uncertainty, a single event that, in isolation, might seem manageable within national 
borders can nevertheless provoke multiple and interrelated global shocks. The 2010 floods in 
Pakistan and the droughts in the Russian Federation were together translated by global financial 
and trade systems into higher food prices. And massive floods in Thailand in 2011 triggered a 
cascade of failures – bringing production to a halt in factories around the world.
These possibilities are of increasing concern in Asia and the Pacific because of the rising 
number of natural disasters. This is the world’s most disaster-prone region: in the past 
decade, about 2.5 million people in Asia and the Pacific have been affected by disasters 
and almost 800,000 have been killed. At the same time, the economic damage caused by 
disasters has grown.
The countries that are most at risk to both natural disasters and economic crises are the 
small island developing States including Solomon islands, Tonga and vanuatu.  Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, for example, also face high risks 
of natural disasters,  while landlocked developing countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, and Tajikistan, are highly susceptible to economic crises.
But not all are equally vulnerable. For example, a hazard only triggers a disaster when it 
encounters exposed and vulnerable communities. Thus, Bangladesh, Japan, indonesia and 
the Philippines, even though highly exposed to disasters, have taken positive steps to 
mitigate the adverse effects. 
For people living in fragile and conflict-affected States, the journey from fragility to resilience 
is often both long and arduous. With the additional threats to lives and livelihoods posed 
by climate change, natural disasters and economic crises, establishing human security is 
the most fundamental requirement of development. While this issue is not taken up in 
this report, what matters most for fragile States is good governance, strong institutions, 
accountable management of natural, human and financial resources and, above all, 
enlightened leadership.
THE MACROECONOMICS OF RESILIENCE
Despite the frequency of simultaneous shocks, economic literature offers little guidance 
on how to respond. Should countries faced with multiple crises maintain conventional 
macroeconomic stabilization objectives and targets – on inflation or fiscal deficits, or on 
liquidity norms or debt sustainability? And faced with the prospect of slower growth should 
they uphold their central bank’s objective of low inflation?
From the macroeconomic perspective, a natural disaster generally reduces output and 
employment. Disasters can also affect trade balances, fiscal balances and public debt. But 
these outcomes are not automatic; much will depend on government policies, and private 
sector expectations and responses. Also critical is the nature of the shock. While a natural 
disaster can deliver a supply shock that increases inflation, an economic crisis can deliver a 
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demand shock that is likely to be deflationary. Natural disasters and economic crises that 
occur together can thus mitigate each other’s impact on the price level. So getting policies 
right will mean considering both impacts. 
pre-disaster risk management
When preparing for disaster, Governments need to identify risks and social vulnerabilities 
and take steps to mitigate them – strengthening building codes, for example, or retrofitting 
existing buildings, while ensuring that they have systems of social protection that they can 
scale up to meet emergency needs. But it is also important to make financial preparations, 
by accumulating savings and foreign reserves, for example, or by transferring some risks 
through commercial insurance.
All these measures require up-front investments. Some governments may not consider this 
worthwhile. Moreover, there are risks of moral hazard: low-income countries, for example, 
may be tempted to underinvest in prevention if they believe they will always be rescued by 
foreign aid. Today’s policymakers may therefore prefer to defer expenditure until a disaster 
happens, preferably on someone else’s watch.
Even the most conscientious policymaker, however, will struggle to make a rigorous cost-
benefit analysis if there are too many unknown factors. For assistance, they might turn 
to emerging sophisticated decision-making tools and methodologies based on scenario 
analysis, which can help them analyse unpredictable events for which there is very little 
information. Arriving at the best solution will always be difficult, but ultimately these are 
issues of public choice, so determining public priorities in disaster risk reduction will benefit 
from extensive stakeholder participation.
post-disaster response: financing versus adjustment
Faced with the cost of a natural disaster, governments can draw on reserves or seek new 
finance – or embark on a programme of macroeconomic adjustment. indeed, a well-accepted 
tenet in macromanagement of disasters is: “Finance if you can, adjust if you must”.
Where can the finance come from? Some countries will be able to draw on reserves, or they 
may be able to pay the costs out of current budgets. They can also establish with lenders 
“contingent” credit lines that would enable them to borrow in the event of a disaster. The 
poorer developing countries should be able to rely on concessional aid or grants from 
international donors. in addition, they might assume that workers’ remittances to families 
would increase in times of distress.
Governments and private individuals and corporations can also take out insurance. 
Governments can also become involved in insurance themselves, either providing it directly 
or working with the private sector. For some small island economies in the Pacific, disasters 
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could be on such a scale as to overwhelm the economy – yet, insurance would be prohibitively 
expensive. in this case, it might be possible to pool the risk with other countries that find 
themselves in similar positions.
in principle, the Government could also increase commercial borrowing. But this may be 
difficult. Even countries that have access to international capital markets will find foreign 
borrowing expensive, especially after a disaster. if so, they may have to adjust through fiscal 
policy – by redirecting funding from planned projects, by cutting discretionary expenditure 
or by raising taxes on high-income earners. The choices will depend on the current state 
of the economy: if it is overheated with a risk of inflation, the Government might impose a 
temporary tax on high-income citizens in the form of a reconstruction levy.
Monetary policy after a natural disaster presents a classic dilemma: how to use the same 
policy to reconcile two competing objectives – maintaining price stability while restoring pre-
disaster levels of output and employment. Some policymakers would give priority to price 
stability and therefore tighten the money supply, but this could worsen unemployment and 
poverty. in fact, many economies are operating far below optimum levels of output, so fears 
of inflation may be unfounded.
Generally speaking, the midst of a crisis or disaster is not the best time to mechanically 
pursue prudential norms of macroeconomic stabilization. instead, the overarching aim 
should be to arrest the spread of the shock to the real economy, to labour markets and, 
above all, to the poorest and most vulnerable. Moreover, even in “good times”, there is no 
unique threshold of stability for each macroeconomic variable – growth, inflation, the fiscal 
deficit, the current account deficit, or the level of public debt. Rather, there is a continuum 
of thresholds for various combinations of these key variables. Developing countries should 
thus not have an overly mechanical interpretation of macroeconomic prudence. While 
maintaining short-run stability, they should instead be guided by the goals of long-run 
economic development and poverty reduction. This will require striking a balance between 
development and stability.
BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES
Those most exposed to economic crises and disasters are the poor. Without savings 
and living in precarious circumstances, they have few buffers against shocks. Already 
disadvantaged by social and economic imbalances, they can thus be further marginalized 
into vicious cycles of chronic hardship, sometimes for generations. 
The poor tend to be more exposed to natural disasters because they tend to live on hazardous 
land - on earthquake fault lines, floodplains, or coastal areas that are highly exposed to 
cyclones and typhoons. The poor are also likely to be hardest hit by an economic crisis: most 
will be low-skilled, casual, seasonal or contract labourers with precarious or irregular work 
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and low earnings. And among the poor, the most vulnerable to disasters are “excluded” 
individuals – those who are outside many societal bonds and relationships. Among these 
are older persons, ethnic minorities and those with disabilities or living with Hiv and AiDS. 
They have less access to networks and fewer relationships of support that they can turn to. 
They can also be disadvantaged when it comes to emergency relief.
Nevertheless, people facing disasters are rarely passive victims. Most will try to cope by 
drawing on all their economic, social and natural resources. unfortunately, under pressure, 
they can also be forced into “erosive” strategies that lead to a vicious cycle of poverty. They 
might sell their livestock or agricultural or fishing equipment. Or they may take out high-
interest loans. They can also reduce the quantity or quality of food, forego medical treatment, 
or overexploit natural resources. As a last resort, they may withdraw children from school. All 
these measures can perpetuate poverty and reduce the welfare of future generations.
The more resilient groups or households, on the other hand, can respond with “non-erosive” 
strategies that do not endanger their future livelihoods. They might be able to draw on their 
savings, sell non-essential possessions, or consume less expensive food. They could also 
seek additional work, either locally or by migrating to a nearby city. in addition, they might 
draw on family or social solidarity networks for food supplies or informal loans, or engage 
in reciprocal labour exchange.
Governments can support these forms of community resilience in a number of ways. 
They can, for example, strengthen systems of social protection – including old age and 
disability pensions, unemployment pay, maternity and child benefits, and universal access 
to essential health care. it is crucial to provide a basic social protection floor based on the 
understanding that all citizens have the right to benefits and that the State has a vital role 
in ensuring access, if not in the actual delivery of programmes. These systems cannot be set 
up overnight, and crises and disaster interventions should build on existing mechanisms. it 
is important, therefore, to ensure that the financing systems are sufficiently flexible so that 
they can be scaled up for episodic shocks. ideally, the strategy should be one of “adaptive 
social protection” – integrating social protection with disaster risk reduction and climate 
change adaptation.
in the absence of formal social protection, most people rely on traditional or informal 
protection systems within households, groups and social networks. Generally, in many 
developing countries, social protection is likely to involve a combination of informal and 
formal channels – taking advantage of informal connections and systems but supporting 
these with formal mechanisms where appropriate.
Governments can also help communities with various forms of risk transfer. While richer 
individuals can take out their own insurance, poorer households cannot afford such 
coverage. An alternative is “microinsurance” which pools the risks and resources of whole 
groups. Some of the most effective microinsurance schemes are index based – for example, 
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assessing the exposure of a group of farmers within a specific area to extreme weather 
events and compensating them for the associated loss of income without their having to 
make individual claims.
Some of the most effective public support, especially for more frequent disasters, is likely to 
come from local governments. They can support community responses, engage vulnerable 
groups in decision-making and help them become more resilient. To do so, they need 
to involve those groups in every step of the development process – from vision setting, 
planning, and implementation to monitoring and evaluation. An important contribution to 
greater local resilience is effective decentralization which can improve the delivery of key 
public services. However, decentralization can only be effective if local governments have 
the necessary capacity, resources, accountability and transparency. in the absence of these 
conditions, decentralization can lead to rent seeking and capture by local elites.
Responding rapidly to a disaster requires timely and reliable data. The starting point should 
be extensive pre-disaster vulnerability assessments. until recently, governments and 
development partners would have been daunted by this prospect, feeling that they lacked 
the necessary resources or skills. Nowadays, however, they can take advantage of new 
technologies. A number of governments, including indonesia and the Philippines, have, for 
example, been using satellite-based data and geographic information systems to produce 
multi-hazard maps showing where the poor are at greatest risk.
During the crisis, both governments and community leaders will need to produce accurate 
up-to-date information and disseminate it quickly. Fortunately, they can now do this 
effectively in a variety of ways – print, radio, television, the internet and mobile phones. 
Social media platforms are also proving invaluable.
THE LAND, WATER, ENERGY NEXUS – AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
Rapidly rising production and consumption of goods and services could push countries of 
Asia and the Pacific towards a catastrophic ecosystem collapse. Though natural systems 
have large absorption capacities, once tipping points are reached, they could suddenly crash, 
with devastating consequences for other economic and social systems. Building resilience 
will mean addressing this nexus of converging threats.
Land for agricultural production is becoming ever scarcer. Of the world’s remaining arable 
land that could be used for cultivation, most is in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. 
There is also some in East and South-East Asia, but virtually none to spare in South and 
West Asia. Moreover, in South Asia, about 45 per cent of land with crop production potential 
is currently used for human settlements; and urban areas could encroach on the remainder. 
in addition, much of the land currently under cultivation in the region is becoming degraded: 
Asia has the largest amount of land affected by desertification, and when land is no longer 
productive, those cultivating it are often pushed into ecologically fragile areas, such as forests 
and wetlands.
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Freshwater systems are also coming under increasing pressure as a result of over-
exploitation and pollution. Most of this is due to cultivation. unless water is used more 
efficiently, the world will need, by 2050, 40 per cent more than will be available. in Asia and 
the Pacific, only about 9 per cent of water withdrawal is for domestic consumption. Even 
so, about 380 million people in the region do not have access to clean water. About 12 per 
cent of water is used for industrial production and a number of enterprises are becoming 
concerned about supplies. Water is also needed for the production of energy – as well as 
for transport and processing of primary fuels: in 2010, about 15 per cent of the world’s total 
water withdrawals were for energy purposes. 
All these processes will be exacerbated by climate change, which is already reducing crop 
yields in some places and adding to water stress. However, the impact will vary according 
to location, with some areas suffering more droughts and others experiencing more floods.
Rising consumption is also leading to greater use of energy, whether for industrial processes, 
transport, or households for cooking and heating. Some energy sources, such as coal, are still 
relatively abundant, and other fossil fuel reserves, shale oil and gas, seem to be increasing. 
But these new reserves are more difficult to exploit – demanding significant amounts of 
energy for extraction. using more fossil fuels will also increase CO2 emissions, with serious 
implications for climate change.
Another concern is the future availability of minerals, some of which are becoming uneconomical 
to extract. These include the “rare earth” elements that are critical for many industries: electronic 
equipment, vehicle parts and batteries as well as renewable energy technologies.
Governments and societies that recognize the limits to the natural resource base can take 
some incremental steps to use resources more efficiently, but ultimately they will have to 
adapt and diversify their systems of production. The best results will come from involving 
stakeholders and communities who often have extensive knowledge of how to make the 
best use of scarce resources. it will also be important to place a true value on natural 
resources, for, if not properly priced and regulated, these are likely to be inefficiently used 
and rapidly exhausted.
A good starting point for making better use of energy is to remove fuel subsidies. But there 
are also many options for boosting water and energy efficiency. Good land use planning can 
reduce the initial and ongoing costs of resource consumption. The way a city is designed 
and built locks the population into consumption and production patterns for generations. 
Good urban planning therefore allows for sustainable city growth – considering the needs of 
its inhabitants yet also allowing more efficient use of resources. Likewise, sustainable land 
management, particularly for agriculture, will help reduce land degradation and strengthen 
food security, while also protecting against some natural disasters, such as floods and drought.
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All of this will require strong policies that integrate national development priorities in a 
cross-sectoral manner, recognizing the true value of natural resources. They can only be 
effective if supported by strong and effective administration, monitoring and enforcement.
PROTECTING CRITICAL SECTORS
All sectors of the economy need to become more resilient to external shocks, but it is 
especially important to strengthen certain critical sectors for which any failure is likely to 
cascade across the whole society. Principal among these are the financial sector, and parts 
of the physical and social infrastructure.
financial infrastructure
There are four main types of financial shock: banking crises; the bursting of speculative 
bubbles; currency or exchange rate crises; and sovereign debt defaults. in reality, financial 
crises often mutate from one type to another or show multiple symptoms. Banking crises 
typically result from a loss in confidence in one or two banks. in some cases, this can 
be contained, but, if not, the shock soon cascades to the real economy in the form of a 
widespread credit crunch. Speculative bubbles, however, are often consequences of herd 
behaviour and are particularly dangerous if they affect commodities, such as food or fuel, 
whose prices are of major significance to vulnerable people.
Governments and financial regulators have taken measures to make financial markets 
more stable and reduce the potential for future crises. They have, for example, increased 
surveillance by regulatory authorities, and reinstated controls on the riskiest behaviour, 
notably taming large-scale, speculative capital flows. in doing so, they need to strike a 
fine balance: on the one hand, they want to make the financial system less volatile and 
vulnerable; on the other hand, they do not want to excessively limit the capacity of capital 
markets to allocate funds to finance legitimate risk-taking that encourages innovation and 
productivity, and boosts economic growth.
As a result of the experience of the 1997 crisis, many countries in the region have aimed 
to become more resilient by building up large foreign-exchange reserves. However, they 
have effectively parked much of this in united States Treasury bonds with very low yields. 
They could use these funds more productively by investing them in the region. One option, 
recommended by ESCAP, would be to establish a fund to finance cross-border infrastructure 
projects and other regional public goods.
Another concern is that governments and investors find it difficult to assess risk exposure 
– hampered by a lack of transparency, poor accounting standards and weak understanding 
of financial instruments. This underlines the importance of better market surveillance 
– with accurate data on international financial interconnections, and assessments of the 
vulnerability of domestic economies. The Asia-Pacific region has already made progress in this 
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direction. in 2011, ASEAN established the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). 
A truly Asia-Pacific system of resilience would mean expanding AMRO’s membership and 
the scope of its surveillance. Overall, one of the most important principles should be global 
harmonization of banking and financial market regulations. unless similar regulations apply 
everywhere, the more footloose institutions will be tempted to migrate to laxer jurisdictions.
Many Asia-Pacific developing countries, in particular the least developed countries, depend 
on exports of a small number of commodities while also relying on commodity imports, 
especially of food and fuel. All countries are thus concerned about the recent volatility of 
commodity prices. A number of measures have been proposed to dampen price volatility. 
One way to address this would be by taxing the trade in commodity derivatives to reduce 
the number and speed of speculative transactions.
critical infrastructure
Even infrastructure that is well designed, constructed and maintained will not always 
withstand natural disasters. Governments will therefore need to identify “critical 
infrastructure” for which they need higher than usual margins of safety. Critical infrastructure 
includes not just “hard” infrastructure in terms of buildings or networks, but also the “soft” 
infrastructure that supports this – the institutions, users, regulations and legislation. Taken 
together, they should constitute a resilient system.
As regards social infrastructure, the greatest damage is typically to housing, schools and 
hospitals. Planning authorities generally try to ensure that high-rise “engineered” buildings 
follow stringent building codes – as a result, they often survive earthquakes. Those planning 
authorities now need to pay greater attention to houses and other non-engineered buildings 
using an interdisciplinary approach that includes both engineering and social sciences. They 
also need to ensure that builders and homeowners comply with these codes.
it is particularly important to secure school buildings. Over recent decades, the death toll of 
schoolchildren from natural disasters has increased significantly. Had their schools been built 
to be more resilient, the losses could have been substantially reduced. This means not just 
building safer structures but also preparing for emergencies and instilling a general culture of 
safety. Many schools can also serve as disaster shelters, but people living in vulnerable areas 
may need other forms of dedicated shelters integrated with early warning systems.
Storms, cyclones, floods and earthquakes frequently disrupt community power supplies 
and cause tremendous damage to transport infrastructure, telecommunications, 
wastewater and water supplies. Moreover, the various forms of infrastructure are becoming 
increasingly interdependent, so that a fault in one system can significantly affect many 
others – triggering a cascade of failures. it has been argued that “lifeline” systems, including 
power, water, wastewater, communication and transportation, need to be restored within 
four hours to support emergency response operations. improving overall resilience thus 
involves recognizing and managing these interdependencies.
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All these forms of infrastructure can be made more resilient. Power transmission lines can, 
in some cases, be moved underground, and coastal sections of roads and railways can be 
moved to higher ground or given protective walls or embankments. And in mountainous 
areas, roadside slopes can be made more stable through bioengineering. To keep transport 
links open for disaster relief operations, planners should incorporate some redundancy – 
building extra routes in case one is damaged. Similarly for iCT systems, submarine data 
cables can be complemented with terrestrial cables and communication satellites.
Making infrastructure more resilient requires significant investment. Although governments 
in most developing countries are aware of the benefits of disaster risk reduction, they 
may not feel able to justify such measures. if so, they can consider using some emerging 
methodologies to evaluate potential benefits and integrate disaster risk reduction and 
adaptation in planning processes. Adapting high design standards for critical infrastructure 
increases serviceability and lifespan of costly structures.
in some cases, Governments should be able to seek support from international financing 
institutions, such as the multilateral development banks. Many banks already incorporate 
disaster risk reduction into project assessment cycles and are often involved in financing 
rehabilitation and reconstruction after a disaster.
Some shocks themselves present financing opportunities. in normal circumstances, strict 
budgetary regulations preclude a high level of investment in new infrastructure. But these 
restrictions can be relaxed during a financial crisis, opening up opportunities for building 
more resilient facilities through economic stimulus packages. Another potential source of 
financing could be the private sector – via public-private partnerships (PPPs); engaging the 
private sector in infrastructure development should not only provide extra resources but 
also help improve project design.
Developing resilient infrastructure will demand coordination among many sectors and 
levels of administration. The focus should be not only on physical infrastructure but also on 
the associated policies, guidelines and by-laws. it is also imperative to engage communities 
and different stakeholders: the community can identify the necessary infrastructure while 
engineers can come up with solutions.
STRENGTHENING SUPPLY CHAINS
As well as protecting physical and social infrastructure, countries will also want to make 
their supply chains more resilient. Many goods are now provided through complex global 
chains of production and distribution. An increasing proportion of this trade is South-South. 
China in particular has now emerged as a “global assembly centre”.
A similar trend is evident in agriculture. Modern agricultural supply chains increasingly 
rely on imports and multi-tiered systems of supply management. Such chains encompass 
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inputs, production, post-harvest, storage, processing, marketing and distribution, as well as 
retailing and final consumption.
While these systems can be very efficient, they are also vulnerable to external shocks. if just 
one node is damaged the whole chain can be broken. Particularly exposed are enterprises 
that rely on inputs or intermediate goods from a single source – one which might be located 
on a tectonic fault line or in an area subject to frequent storms and hurricanes. Supply 
chains are also vulnerable to sudden changes in demand: faced with an economic downturn 
or recession in a major market, a highly complex supply chain might find it difficult and 
costly to react.
Most vulnerable are the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Generally, they work 
as subcontractors, supplying basic services or labour-intensive parts and components. Few 
SMEs are prepared for natural disasters. Typically, they lack insurance and do not carry out 
risk assessments or have business continuity plans. This makes it difficult to recover from 
disasters and heightens supply chain disruption.
Enterprises that want to build in greater resilience to natural disasters can take a number 
of measures. They can: (a) invest more in each location to enhance resilience to natural 
disasters; (b) spatially diversify the locations of both production and supply; (c) hold larger 
inventories or stocks; and (d) consider acquiring proper insurance. All these options incur 
extra costs. in addition to facing direct costs, enterprises building greater redundancy into 
their systems may also have to forego some economies of scale or opportunities for lower 
factor costs.
Devising the optimal strategy is not easy, particularly when allowing for rare events. 
Nevertheless, firms will need to assess risks and find ways to control them – and ensure 
that they have robust business continuity plans. Particularly important in this are the global 
value chain (GvC) anchors, the transnational corporations around which these chains work; 
they can help their smaller business partners become more resilient and, if necessary, help 
with reconstruction.
Governments can also support these efforts – improving the overall regulatory framework, 
providing better risk information and modelling systems and subsidizing private insurance. 
They can also foster the development of business continuity plans, for example by imposing 
legal requirements for such plans or by offering tax incentives or providing technical 
support. Governments can also temporarily relax labour movement restrictions to enable 
GvC anchors to send in people to assist in overseas subsidiaries.
MUTUAL SUPPORT THROUGH REGIONAL COOPERATION
Many of today’s shocks are transboundary, so they will need transnational responses. By 
working together, Asia-Pacific governments can produce solutions that are greater than 
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the sum of individual country responses. The Asia-Pacific region has some regional 
cooperation mechanisms that deal with natural disasters and economic shocks. However, 
they are at various stages of development and, in most cases, do not have resilience built in.
What is needed now is a new regional framework for resilience-building – one that 
rebalances economic, social and environmental systems. The regional framework proposed 
in this report consists of three pillars, three enablers and an integrator.
pillars
Coordinated economic management – in fiscal policy, for example, countries can work 
together to prioritize public investments in regional infrastructure, improving disaster 
preparedness, and adapting to climate change. Countries can also coordinate monetary 
and exchange rate policies and harmonize their banking and financial market regulations, 
while strengthening regional monetary and financial monitoring and surveillance. At the 
same time, Asia-Pacific economies can rationalize their preferential trading agreements to 
facilitate regional trade.
Coordinated investment in social protection and inclusive development – inclusive 
development will involve greater investment in social infrastructure, particularly in education 
and health services. Similarly, all countries need to establish social protection floors – not 
as a handout but as an investment in building resilience. if countries cooperate on these 
issues, they can build synergies in the planning, coordination and tracking of such systems, 
which could ultimately lead to the establishment of a regional social protection fund. Such 
a fund, built on the principles of regional solidarity, could go a long way towards building 
resilience, especially for least developed countries, which have the largest portions of the 
population vulnerable to multiple shocks. Apart from the political groundswell that builds 
up from regional solidarity, there are numerous synergies from enhanced economic and 
social security, not least of which is the mitigation of push factors in economic migration 
and the huge expenditures of high-income countries on border protection. ESCAP could 
provide the platform for a further dialogue on this issue.
Cooperation on food security and sustainable resource management – Governments need 
to strengthen existing integrated river basin management frameworks by tapping into the 
new dynamism of South-South cooperation. Comprehensive frameworks can help countries 
sustainably manage shared water, energy and land resources – all of which are critical for 
food security.
enablers
investing in technological innovation – Governments need to manage the overall impacts 
of innovation – ensuring that the benefits spread to everyone, especially vulnerable 
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groups, while also taking measures to minimize potential risks, both for people and the 
environment. This will require collaboration between the public and private sectors both 
within and between countries.
Monitoring and early warning – Governments should continue to strengthen regional 
monetary and financial monitoring and surveillance. Similarly, in disaster-prone areas, they 
will need to generate and share people-centred risk knowledge, and strengthen regional 
multi-hazard monitoring and early warning systems. For this, they can work more effectively 
through regional cooperation – which would enable them to pool scientific knowledge and 
technical expertise and take advantage of economies of scale.
Pooling resources for better preparedness – For this purpose, ESCAP could serve as a 
bridge – bringing together regional cooperative mechanisms that have similar expertise and 
mandates. Cooperative mechanisms, such as RESAP and Sentinel Asia, for example, can 
provide satellite-based data and products. Supply chains could also be made more resilient 
through joint regional supply chain risk assessments.
the integrator
Synergizing regional efforts – All these pillars and enablers would need to be integrated 
into a comprehensive whole. For this purpose, ESCAP, as the main economic and social 
development centre of the united Nations system for the Asian and Pacific region, can 
provide the regional platform for mutual cooperation, sharing experience and building the 
region’s resilience to withstand, adapt to, and recover from overlapping shocks.
The Asia-Pacific region has become the driving force in the global economy and 
has made significant progress in reducing poverty. Nevertheless, the region still 
faces considerable risks – most countries are regularly exposed to shocks that 
could jeopardize future economic and social progress. Countries across the region 
need, therefore, to work together to consolidate and extend their achievements by 
ensuring that their economic and social systems are sufficiently robust, flexible and 
resilient to deal with what lies ahead.
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2Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises
CHAPTER 1
In early 2011, the people of Dhamuirhat, a 
rural community in Bangladesh, were taken by 
surprise by high food prices. The shop prices 
of key items such as rice, flour, soybean oil and 
chicken were 30 per cent higher than a couple 
of months earlier. As one agricultural worker 
said: “I am often afraid to ask the price.” 1 
The people of Dhamuirhat did not  know  that 
these high prices had their origins in distant plac-
es. In the Russian Federation, for example, in 
June 2010, an abnormal heat wave had hit the 
wheat fields, causing fires and leading to the worst 
drought in nearly 40 years. Added to this were his-
torically severe floods in Pakistan. These and other 
events were restricting global food supplies.
News of such shortages was transmitted 
instantly to the trading floor of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange where buyers and 
sellers match orders and haggle over futures and 
options contracts for agricultural commodities. 
Tight global supply coupled with financializa-
tion of commodity markets drove prices up. By 
February 2011, the global prices of wheat and 
other cereals had soared to record highs – which 
were soon reflected in local markets around the 
world. This was the beginning of a ‘new normal’ 
of high food prices.
This would have been difficult enough to 
cope with on its own. But people were 
already under pressure from another shock: the 
2008 global financial crisis. The collapse of the 
American investment bank Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 had eventually triggered a 
freeze in the global financial system. In Asia 
and the Pacific, this was felt primarily through 
a dramatic decline in trade. Within a couple of 
months, Asia-Pacific exports had collapsed – 
threatening the jobs of millions of workers. 
“Why should something that happens ten 
thousand miles away affect me?” asked a female 
worker in the India state of Karnataka, as jobs 
started to disappear in early 2009. She had 
lost her employment in a small-scale business 
exporting handmade dolls.2   
In an increasingly globalized economy, natural 
disasters can also be linked to employment in 
more oblique ways. In the Compostela Valley 
in the southern island of Mindanao in the 
Philippines, for example, small-scale gold 
miners had benefited from the high price of gold 
– an attractive alternative investment in times of 
uncertainty. Between 2008 and 2012, the price 
more than doubled. This, combined with the 
discovery of rich deposits, had lured thousands 
RESILIENCE TO SHOCKS
The world has been subject to a series of shocks – from economic crises in rich 
countries, to natural disasters in developing countries, along with floods or droughts 
in key food producing regions. In a complex global economy, these crises have 
become increasingly interrelated. If the countries of Asia and the Pacific are to 
become more resilient to these regular, overlapping shocks, they will need to 
address them in a more comprehensive and systemic manner.
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of poor migrants from other islands to try their 
luck in the mountainous and landslide-prone 
sites in the Compostela Valley. That all came to 
an end at 4:45 am on 4 December 2012, when 
Typhoon Pablo made landfall in Mindanao.3 
The effect was catastrophic. But here too 
survivors would have found it hard to link that 
destruction with the global economic crisis. 
All these crises are the result of shocks 
applied to complex interlinked systems. And 
globalization is binding these systems ever more 
closely together – and demanding that countries 
move aggressively towards comprehensive risk 
management. One of the most pressing 
development challenges is to build resilience to 
such combined crises (Box I-1).
Box I-1
Resilience within the United Nations development agenda 
The crucial need to build resilience was recognized in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA): 
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. This was adopted at the United Nations 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan, in 2005 – only days after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
earthquake.4 The HFA was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/195 on the 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 
The ESCAP Commission in 2008 requested the Executive Secretary to continue to assist member countries 
in building their capacity to make appropriate policy responses that mitigate the impact of the economic 
crises, restore growth and avoid future global shocks – in resolution 65/1 on the implementation of the 
Bali Outcome Document in addressing the food, fuel and financial crises. Subsequently, a report of the 
Secretary-General emphasized that reducing disaster and other social and economic risks would be crucial 
for accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.5
The Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, in adopting the Programme of 
Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020, identified ‘multiple crises and other 
emerging challenges’ as one of the eight interlinked priority areas for the sustainable development of the 
least developed countries.6  
In 2012, the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability brought out the report 
‘Resilient People, Resilient Planet – A Future Worth Choosing’. It outlines a vision towards sustainable 
development through inclusive economic growth, environmental development and social equity. It also 
emphasizes a strategy for empowering people to make sustainable choices during a period of global volatility 
and uncertainty. 
Some contemporary thoughts on resilience have been captured in the Rio+20 outcome document, ‘The Future 
We Want’, which emphasizes the need for building resilience in several economic, social and environmental 
spheres. In particular, the outcome document calls for “disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience 
to disasters to be addressed with a renewed sense of urgency in the context of sustainable development and 
poverty eradication, and as appropriate, to be integrated into policies, plans, programmes and budgets at all 
levels and considered within relevant future frameworks.” And it further invites “governments at all levels, 
as well as relevant subregional, regional and international organizations , to commit to adequate, timely and 
predictable resources for disaster risk reduction in order to enhance the resilience of cities and communities 
to disasters, according to their own circumstances and capacities.” 7 
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Why have they not done so already? There are 
many reasons – some of which are common 
to many human activities. One is that human 
beings are not very good at assessing risks, 
relying more on immediate instinctive 
responses rather than rational analysis (Box I-2). 
And generally policymakers are more 
accustomed to breaking down complex issues 
into supposedly distinct parts than 
dealing with a systemic whole.
Box I-2
Policymaker blind spots 
Most policymakers agree that prevention is better than cure. Faced with multiple and increasingly frequent 
shocks, why do they not then invest more in risk prevention and preparedness? There are many factors at 
play. Some will be linked to immediate political problems and budget pressures. But research on behavioural 
economics, notably the work of Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman, suggests that when it comes to 
evaluating risks there are basic limitations in the human mind.8 
People are, for example, likely to be more concerned about an event that has recently happened. Thus, 
immediately after an earthquake, they will take more anti-earthquake precautions by building up emergency 
food supplies, but then become steadily less diligent as the memory fades – though clearly the risk is 
unchanged. On the other hand, people overestimate the probability of unlikely events and underestimate 
the probability of relatively common risks. One US study found, for example, that tornados were thought to 
kill more people than asthma – which actually causes 20 times more deaths.
Then there is myopic behaviour – simple short-sightedness. Thus people tend to postpone buying insurance 
or building up savings for old age. And when taking decisions they seldom give sufficient weight to the needs 
of future generations.9  
Individual decisions are also easily swayed by the ways in which issues are framed. A patient who is asked 
whether they want to risk surgery is likely to be encouraged by the statement “the one-month survival rate 
is 90 per cent” but discouraged by the statement “there is 10 per cent mortality in the first month”, though 
they both say the same thing. 
And in general people tend to underestimate the extent of their ignorance and the uncertainty of the world 
in which they live. They thus assume they understand what happened in the past, and are overconfident in 
their ability to predict the future. 
Policymakers in particular are likely to fall victim to the wisdom of hindsight. They know they will be blamed 
for decisions that work out badly, but get little credit for successful outcomes. As a result they tend to be 
reluctant to take risks, or are likely to underestimate them. They are thus likely to produce plans and forecasts 
that are unrealistically close to best-case scenarios, overestimating benefits and underestimating costs. 
How can these constraints be overcome? First, policymakers need to be conscious of the potential illusions 
of the human mind and their consequent decision-making blind spots. Second, they need to know more 
about risks and how to measure them. For this purpose they can take advantage of more sophisticated 
decision-making methodologies. For example, for assessing the likely outcomes of risky projects they might 
use ‘reference class forecasting’ – using large databases that have information on both plans and outcomes 
of hundreds of similar projects all over the world.10  
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
  
1
5
DefiNiNG resilieNce
Resilience is usually associated with recovering 
from shocks. The form that this resilience 
takes will depend on the system that suffers 
the shock and the functions that need to recover. 
However, a common element of the different 
definitions is the idea that recovery in a changing 
environment requires the capacity to withstand, 
absorb and adapt to shocks (Box I-3). 
Box I-3
Definitions of resilience
“The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and 
recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.” 12
“A measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still 
maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables.” 13
“The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure 
and ways of functioning, the capacity for self organization and the capacity to adapt to stress and change.” 14
“The ability to absorb disturbances, to be changed and then to re-organize and still have the same identity 
(retain the same basic structure and ways of functioning). It includes the ability to learn from the disturbance. 
” 15
“The ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover 
from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.” 16
“The ability to deal with change and continue to develop.” 17
“Disaster resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining 
or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses - such as earthquakes, drought or violent 
conflict – without compromising their long-term prospects.” 18
“The working definition of a resilient country (…) is (…) one that has the capability to 1) adapt to changing 
contexts, 2) withstand sudden shocks and 3) recover to a desired equilibrium, either the previous one or a 
new one, while preserving the continuity of its operations.” 19
For low-probability, high-impact catastrophes which are difficult to assess using the traditional cost-benefit 
analysis they might instead use scenario analysis.11 This will consider future events based on a range of 
alternative outcomes and favour solutions that are flexible, adaptive and hence can be used to safeguard from 
multiple shocks. Integrating risk-based methodologies into cost-benefit analysis can enable policymakers to 
quantify the consequences of climate change disasters and risks. 
When taking decisions it is also crucial to involve those that may be most affected. As they experience these 
risks directly, they may be in a better position to understand them – and have fewer cognitive illusions. 
6Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises
preDictable aND  
UNpreDictable sHocks 
If countries are to be resilient to multiple shocks 
they need to deal with them as they arise. In 
some cases the risks are predictable and the 
forms of mitigation and response are fairly well 
developed. Bangladesh, for example, is regularly 
exposed to floods and cyclones and, as a result, 
has invested in disaster risk reduction – in flood 
monitoring, for example, and forecasting and 
early warning systems, all of which have proved 
effective in the aftermath of the two most 
recent cyclones Sidr in 2007 and Alia in 2009.20 
Other recent shocks in the region have been 
more surprising and unexpected. Of the natural 
disasters, earthquakes are less common, 
especially when combined with tsunamis. 
Economic crises too are less predictable. For 
example, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
one of the biggest United States investment 
banks, which helped trigger the 2008 global 
financial crisis, would have been considered 
highly improbable.  
This report concerns resilience of countries 
to multiple crises.  Ultimately, what matters, 
however, is the effect of such shocks on people’s 
lives – both in current and future generations. 
Therefore, the working definition of resilience 
in this report is: 
The capacity of countries to withstand, adapt 
to, and recover from natural disasters and 
major economic crises  – so that their people can 
continue to lead the kind of life they value.
Building resilience to a wide range of potential 
shocks is a complex task involving a large 
number of interconnected systems: economic, 
social and environmental. It demands that 
people, organizations and institutions develop 
the ability to reconfigure and redesign their 
systems to be able to cope with multiple shocks 
(Figure I-1). Although there are a number 
of measures of exposure and vulnerability to 
either economic crises or natural disasters, 
there are only a few tentative measures of 
resilience. One suggestion on how such a 
measure of the combined effects of these 
shocks is shown in Appendix 1.
FIgure I-1
What is resilience?
Quickly bounce back and 
restore a stable equilibrium 
after stresses, ensuring 
reduced risks and  
disturbances from shocks.
Mitigate disruption and 
reconfigure from shocks so 
as to maintain a functioning 
system.
Resilience is the ability to
Objects Systems Complex systems
Reorganize and transform in 
order to respond to crises, 
absorb their impact and 
maintain the system’s core 
purpose.
Source: ESCAP based on Breen and Anderies, 2011.
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Moreover, one event that in isolation might 
not seem catastrophic can nevertheless provoke 
multiple and interrelated shocks. This makes it 
hard to envisage all the possible scenarios and 
assess potential responses. For example, natural 
disasters such as the 2010 floods in Pakistan and 
droughts in the Russian Federation triggered 
complex crises, which were transmitted by the 
financial and trade systems. The damage can 
then be amplified by the interactions of fallible 
and sometimes confused agents. 
In other cases, a complex crisis has emerged 
because the natural disaster is on such a scale 
that it causes a cascade of system failures. This 
happened following the earthquake in Japan 
in 2011, followed by a 10-metre high tsunami 
that hit north-eastern Japan and damaged the 
Fukushima power plant, triggering a third crisis, 
a nuclear accident. Even when countries have 
prepared for individual crises, they may find it 
difficult to cope with multiple overlapping events.
When the result is a large systemic crisis, one 
of the main challenges is to anticipate how all 
participants of the system are likely to act. This 
is true even in market systems: in principle with 
information conveyed by prices, markets should 
be self-correcting; in practice markets are 
often highly imperfect. As a result, as argued 
by Joseph Stiglitz following the 2008 global 
financial crisis: “(...)even if banks perfectly 
assessed their own risk, there would be no 
assurance that the system as a whole was stable.” 21
 
It is particularly difficult to address shocks that 
cross-cut multiple geographical, temporal and 
jurisdictional scales (Figure I-2). This presents 
three challenges: 
1. Recognizing potential interactions – as 
between the price of gold and increased 
exposure of miners to disasters.
2.  Dealing with different levels of interactions 
– as with natural disasters triggering sudden 
price moves in commodity markets.
3.  Addressing different perceptions and values – 
as with climate change when different countries 
have different interests and views. 22
WHY resilieNce is importaNt 
Resilience is crucial because Asia and the Pacific 
is regularly suffering simultaneous, multiple 
shocks, particularly economic crises and 
natural disasters.
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Contagion from financial crisis
The Asia-Pacific region has been affected in 
recent years by a number of financial crises. 
However, most of these have originated outside 
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Figure 1-3
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012)
Indicator : Financial crises frequency (Asia Pacific and other regions)
Asia and the Pacific. Indeed over the past 
40 years only one crisis in four started in the 
region; and none in the five years preceding the 
2008 global financial crisis (Figure I-3). 
FIgure I-2
Different scales and levels
FIgure I-3
Number of financial crises starting in a given year, 1971-2012
Source: ESCAP based on Cash and others, 2001.
Source: ESCAP based on data from Laeven and Valencia, 2012. 
Note: Financial crises include systemic banking crises, currency crises, and sovereign debt crises.
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The most severe external event was the global 
economic crisis in 2008. The region’s emerging 
economies felt the first round of this through 
falling exports – which in some cases reduced 
growth by more than one quarter. Nevertheless, 
by 2010 the developing countries of the region 
had managed a V-shaped recovery – though 
this tailed off as a result of spillovers from 
the euro zone debt crisis and the uncertain 
economic outlook in the United States. In 2012, 
growth in developing Asia was only 5.7 per 
cent, the lowest rate for a decade (Figure I-4). 23
Financial integration increases risk of  
cross-border transmission of shocks
The contagion from the 2008 crisis illustrated 
the extent to which financial systems are 
integrated. Such integration increases the 
potential risks of cross-border transmission of 
shocks caused by sudden stops of capital flows. 
The impact of volatility will depend, however, 
on a range of factors, including GDP growth, 
the degree of trade openness and the stock 
market capitalization.
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FIgure I-4
Growth of GDP and exports of developing Asia-Pacific economies, 2006-2012
FIgure I-5
Capital inflows to selected Asia-Pacific economies, 2005-2011
Sources: ESCAP, 2012c and 2012d ESCAP annual core indicators online database. Available from: www.unescap.org/stat/data/
index (accessed November 2012).
Source: ESCAP based on IMF International Financial Statistics. Available from http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
(accessed January 2013). 
Note: Selected Asia-Pacific economies include: Australia; Bangladesh; Hong Kong, China; Georgia; India; Indonesia; Japan; 
Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Pakistan; Philippines; Russian Federation; Singapore; Thailand and Turkey.
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Emerging Asian economies account for over 
70 per cent of the total portfolio investment 
inflows in emerging markets.24 Asian emerging 
markets attract a significant share of shorter 
term and more volatile investment. This is 
illustrated in Figure I-5 which shows a sharp 
drop in portfolio flows during the 2008 
financial crisis. 
Interconnected financial markets create the  
potential for systemic failures
Financial systems based on a large number 
of competing banks should in principle be 
buffered against shocks: if one bank fails, others 
can take over the released demand and continue 
to supply the market with credit. But much will 
depend on the structure, or “topology” of the 
banking network.25 If these banks are closely 
interconnected they may be susceptible to 
financial contagion.26 The United States for 
example, has a few hub banks, while most banks 
deal   only    with   a  few  other banks.27   Such 
networks are more robust to random failures.28 
If  a non-hub bank fails at random, this will 
have only a small effect on the system as a 
whole. 
These networks are, however, still vulnerable 
to failures of hub banks, or to targeted attacks. 
And they may also suffer contagion from other 
networks.29 For example, political and social 
networks can spread rumours that lead to herd 
behaviour in networks that otherwise might 
have been unaffected. Indeed the risks of 
economic and financial shocks increase when 
people believe they are likely to happen – 
self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, investors 
around the world now believe global shocks are 
all too plausible and may want to reduce their 
risk exposure at the same time. Since 2007, 
these ‘risk-off ’ episodes have become more 
frequent.30 Analysing a single network may 
thus miss a broader systemic risk.
Systemic banking crises can result in major 
losses and fiscal distress. In the developed 
countries these usually take the form of large 
losses in output and increases in public debt. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, which 
have weak institutional capacity and limited 
access to global markets, tend to experience 
higher fiscal costs associated with financial 
sector restructuring. Over the past four decades, 
Asia-Pacific economies have experienced 24 
episodes of systemic banking crises. On average, 
these have resulted in losses amounting to a quarter 
of the country’s GDP, and 10 per cent increases in 
both fiscal costs and public debt (Figure I- 6).
Source: ESCAP based on Laeven and Valencia, 2012.
FIgure I-6
Share and average relative costs from systemic banking crises in Asia and the Pacific, 
1970-2011
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High and volatile commodity prices
Tight global supply coupled with financial 
speculation has led to high and volatile 
commodity prices (Figure I-7). In addition, 
some food commodity prices have recently been 
coupled with energy prices (Figure I-8). This is 
understandable since high fuel prices drive up 
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet)
Indicator : monthly series - Commodity prices (food and energy)
Figure 1-7
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Source: Based on data from World Bank Commodity Markets available from http//go.worldbank.org/4ROCCIEQ50 
(accessed January 2013)
the costs of production and transportation, as 
well as the prices of agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizers. But it may also be that speculative 
investments have shifted some commodity 
prices away from the fundamentals.31 This is 
suggested by the extent of co-movements 
among those commodities for which there are 
futures markets; those without futures markets 
seem unrelated.
FIgure I-7
High and volatile prices of commodities, 1981-2012
Source: Based on data from World Bank Commodity Markets, available from http//go.worldbank.org/4ROCCIEQ50 
(accessed January 2013)
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from sharp drops in oil and mineral prices 
resulting in a decline in output.34 In 2008, the 
plunge of oil prices helped trigger banking 
crises in Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation 
and a currency crisis in Turkmenistan. The least 
developed countries are particularly vulnerable 
to declining terms of trade and external demand 
shocks. Between 2007 and 2009, in countries 
such as Bhutan and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, GDP growth was reduced by more 
than 10 percentage points.35 
Increased interconnection of trade, while  
promoting economic growth, makes the region 
vulnerable to external shocks
Another hallmark of the current wave of 
globalization is the increasing movement of 
goods and services across borders. In the past 
10 years, world trade has almost tripled,37 and 
the majority of this growth was driven by the 
emergence of developing countries. This higher 
High prices of food and fuel threaten food 
security, increase inflation and slow the rate 
of poverty reduction. In countries that are net 
importers, high prices of food and fuel can also 
put pressure on the exchange rate, leading to 
higher prices for other imports. Some local 
food producers may gain, but high food prices 
generally hurt the poor who are net buyers 
of food thus have less to spend on other 
priorities including health and education 
(Box I-4). In 2010,  across Asia and the 
Pacific the combination of high prices 
of food and oil is thought to have 
prevented some 15.6 million people escaping 
from poverty and pushed another 3.7 million 
below the poverty line.32    
Sudden price moves can also cause a 
deterioration in the terms of trade, with high 
output losses.33 For example, in the aftermath 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, commodity 
exporters in North and Central Asia suffered 
Box I-4
Disasters triggering high commodity prices 
In Pakistan in 2010, the monsoon rains caused massive floods which killed nearly two thousand 
people, affected more than 20 million and made at least 7.8 million people food insecure. There 
was also serious economic damage. Agriculture accounts for 21 per cent of Pakistan’s GDP, 45 per 
cent of employment and 60 per cent of exports. This disaster resulted in a loss of 7.5 million tons of 
sugarcane, 2.5 million tons of rice, 0.7 million tons of cotton and 0.3 million tons of maize.36 
The floods also damaged infrastructure, destroyed storage facilities, roads and constrained food 
access for many communities – in a country where almost 20 per cent of the total population were already 
undernourished. The wheat price increased about 10 per cent in the three months following the disaster. 
According to the World Food Programme, between July and August 2010, the wheat price increased 82 per 
cent in one local market in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa mountainous area. The floods impacted livelihoods and 
income-generating opportunities for the poor including farmers and unskilled labourers. 
The floods reduced food production and generated rises in international prices. Between July and 
December 2010 the rice price increased from 465.8 to 563.8 rupees, and between 2009 and 2010 reduced rice 
exports from 13 to 9 per cent.
Sources: Pakistan, NDMA 2010; FAO, 2011b; WFP, 2010a.
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1993 2010Source: ESCAP based on COMTRADE. Available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (accessed November 2012). 
Note: Each small circle represents a country that is part of the group responsible for the top 75 per cent in value of all the world’s 
bilateral trade. The links between nodes represent bilateral trade, and the thicker the link the higher the value traded.
Figure I-9
Higher bilateral trade-value partners participating in 75 per cent of global trade
value of trade was also more interconnected. 
Between 1993 and 2010, the number of 
countries that were responsible for the top 75 
per cent in value of all the world’s bilateral trade 
increased from 53 to 74 (Figure I-9). Over the 
same period, the average number of bilateral 
trade relations within that group increased from 
six to eight. Previously the main hubs, which 
had trade links with many other countries, were 
the United States, Japan, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and France. But by 2010 these had 
been joined by other countries in Europe 
and emerging countries such as China, India, 
Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Singapore.
 
Exporters that have more trading partners 
should be less exposed to any crisis in export 
demand. But they will have less protection if 
the economic cycles of their trading partners are 
correlated.38 This is currently the case as a result 
of low economic growth and export demand in 
the main trading hubs in the West. Increasing 
the number of trade partners has thus not 
necessarily reduced exposure to demand shocks.
Disasters disrupt supply chains
Not only are countries trading with more 
partners, they are integrating their production 
networks. Nowadays, a high proportion of trade 
in Asia and the Pacific is in intermediate goods 
used in global supply chains for the production 
of final capital and consumption goods. 
Between 2002 and 2010, the total trade in 
14
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intermediate goods in current terms increased 
from about $3.2 trillion to more than $7.5 
trillion. This increasing integration of trade in 
parts and components has helped boost output, 
but can also make the system more vulnerable 
to disasters: when one node collapses, the entire 
supply chain succumbs (Figure I-10).
Natural disasters have indeed been disrupting 
production and supply chains. In March 
2011, following the earthquake, Japanese 
automobile production fell by 47.7 per cent 
and electrical component production by 8.3 
per cent. The effects were soon felt elsewhere. 
Between April and May 2011, the production 
of automobiles and electrical goods slowed 
significantly in Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. There were similar 
effects following the 2011 floods in Thailand 
which disrupted production not only in Thailand 
but also in other countries, notably Japan 
where electrical component production fell 
3.7 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2011. 
Thailand’s flooding also reduced the region’s 
agricultural production.39
Asia and the Pacific is the world most  
disaster-prone region
Over the past three decades, the incidence of 
natural disasters has increased globally but 
the sharpest increase has been in Asia and the 
Pacific (Figure I-11).40 In the past decade, 
a person living in Asia and the Pacific was 
almost twice as likely to be affected by a 
natural disaster as a person living in Africa; 
almost six times more likely than someone in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and almost 
30 times more likely than a person living in 
North America or Europe. In total, during 
that period, around 2.5 million people in Asia 
and the Pacific were affected by disasters and 
almost 800,000 were killed (Figure I-12). 
FIgure I-10
Increasing share of trade in intermediate goods, 1998-2010
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
tri
lli
on
s 
of
 U
S
 d
ol
la
rs
World exports of merchandise goods 
capital goods consumption goods intermediate goods other goods
Source: ESCAP based on Basu and others 2013 and COMTRADE. Available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx 
(accessed November 2012). 
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FIgure I-11
The number of reported natural disasters has increased, particularly in Asia and 
the Pacific, 1980-2011 
Source: ESCAP based on data from EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. Available from 
http://www.emdat.be/ (accessed November 2012).
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Risks of being killed or being affected by natural disasters, 2000-2012
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Source: ESCAP based on data from EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 
Available from http://www.emdat.be/ (accessed November 2012). 
Notes: Labels in the figure show major disasters that contributed to high damage and loss in selected years. 
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Losses and damage have been rising
At the same time disasters have been causing 
greater economic damage. And over the past 20 
years the pattern of losses has been dominated 
by the increasing frequency of large events 
(Figure I-13). In absolute terms, disasters 
may cause greater economic damage in richer 
countries that have more developed infrastructure.
 
But in relative terms the low-income countries 
are much harder hit. 41 In Asia and the Pacific, 
in the past five years, the average annual impact 
of disasters as a percentage of GDP was almost 
twice as high in low-income countries as in 
lower middle-income countries, and more than 
10 times higher than in upper middle-income 
and high-income countries (Figure I-14). 
The impact can be particularly severe in small 
island countries, in many cases causing damage 
and losses that represent multiples of the 
country’s total annual output (Figure I-15). 
FIgure I-13
Global economic losses and damage are on the rise, 1980-2010
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
  
1
17
Source: ESCAP based on data from EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database.
Available from http://www.emdat.be/ (accessed February 2013). 
Source: ESCAP based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators available from http://data.worldbamk.org/data-cata-
log/world-development-indicators (accessed January 2013) and EM-DAT: the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 
Available from http://www.emdat.be/ (accessed January 2013). 
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FIgure I-15
Small island countries, economic damage as a percentage of GDP
FIgure I-14
Impact is higher in poorer countries: 
Asia-Pacific average annual impact by income classification, 2006-2010
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Large shocks can cause permanent economic loss 
Severe shocks can also knock countries off their 
growth trajectories and lead to a permanent 
loss in output. For example, a banking crisis 
in developing and emerging economies may 
reduce total output by 4.5 per cent after eight 
years.42  As a result of the 2008 crisis, GDP 
FIgure I-16
Samoa, real GDP growth percentage, 1983 – 2011
Shocks make growth volatile 
Developing economies, and the small ones in 
particular, are also vulnerable to natural and 
other disasters because of structural weaknesses. 
Often they do not have very diverse exports 
and can be highly dependent on primary 
commodities. They can also be quite remote 
and have high concentrations of poverty. As a 
result they have less capacity to absorb shocks 
and their economic growth is likely to be more 
volatile. This is evident in Samoa, for example 
which in 1990 was hit by major storm Val and 
in 2009 by a tsunami, both of which caused 
significant losses in output (Figure I-16). 
growth in many least developed countries is 
still below the pre-crisis trend.43  In low-income 
countries, droughts, floods, storms and extreme 
temperature events can lead to declines in real per 
capita GDP of around 2 per cent. 44
A major disaster causes suffering and loss of 
life, but in a poor country it also damages the 
limited stock of capital goods and can lead to 
a long-term decline in productive capacity. As 
economic activity declines, fiscal revenues also 
shrink. The sudden and large demand for cash 
and foreign currency adds to the macroeconomic 
challenges. Likewise, financial and economic 
crises generate output losses that result in 
economic slowdowns, create unemployment 
and threaten poverty reduction. All this distress 
can easily derail the economy and send it to a 
lower path of growth. 
If a country suffers a series of shocks this can 
also have a cumulative effect, as illustrated by 
the 2003 cyclone Ami in Fiji and the 2004 
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Source: ESCAP based on Annual core indicators online database. Available from www.unescap.org/stat/data/statdb/DataExplorer.
aspx (accessed January 2013)
Note: For more details see Laeven and Valencia, 2012.
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.7
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
G
D
P
 (
co
ns
ta
nt
 2
00
5 
$ 
B
ill
io
n)
Fiji
2003: 
Tropical Cyclone
1997: Asian Crisis
2008:
Global Financial Crisis
0.55
0.70
0.85
1.00
1.15
1.30
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
G
D
P
 (
co
ns
ta
nt
 2
00
5 
$ 
B
ill
io
n)
Maldives
2004: 
Indian Ocean Tsunami
1997: Asian Crisis
2008:
Global Financial Crisis
Actual GDP
Pre-crisis trend
Actual GDP
Pre-crisis trend
FIgure I-17
Persistent losses caused by shocks 
Indian Ocean tsunami in Maldives, both of 
which were coupled with the 2008 global 
financial crisis (Figure I-17). 
In addition to the permanent losses in output, 
large shocks also affect the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals. In Pakistan, 
for example, the 2005 earthquake, the 2007 
cyclone and the 2010 floods all affected net 
primary school enrolment. These events 
damaged education facilities – reducing the 
quantity and quality of education. 45
WHo is most VUlNerable to 
mUltiple sHocks?
The countries most vulnerable to economic 
crises and natural disasters can be highlighted 
using two indices. The first is the ESCAP 
vulnerability index which assesses each 
country’s exposure and capacity to cope with 
economic crises, and has been computed for 37 
countries.46 The second is the world risk index 
which assesses the risk to natural disasters using 
four indicators: exposure, susceptibility, coping 
and adaptive capacity.47 Figure I-18 plots these 
two indices against each other. The countries 
most vulnerable to both types of shock lie in the 
top-right quadrant. These are the small island 
developing States including the Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu – which have 
populations concentrated in low-lying coastal 
areas and do not have very diverse economies.
As a proportion of GDP, the countries that 
lose most as a result of natural disasters are the 
developing countries, which globally 
lose 2 to 15 per cent of GDP annually.48 
Among these, the most vulnerable are 
the least developed countries, landlocked 
developing countries and small island 
developing States. 
A similar trend emerges in the Asia-Pacific 
region where the most vulnerable are the least 
developed  countries and  small   islands 
developing States. Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
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Papua New Guinea, the Philippines,  Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu are the most at 
risk to natural disasters due to their high 
exposure and susceptibility to damage. The 
landlocked developing countries such as 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic are the most 
susceptible to economic shocks; these countries, 
being relatively more dependent on primary 
products, suffer most from commodity market 
volatility. 
However, not all are equally vulnerable. A hazard 
only becomes a disaster when it encounters 
exposed and vulnerable communities. 
Vulnerability is also determined therefore 
by social, economic and environmental 
factors as well as the capacity to respond. 
Countries such as Bangladesh, Japan, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, even though 
at relatively higher risk have taken positive 
steps to mitigate the adverse effects. 
 
The map of vulnerability in Asia-Pacific follows, 
to a great extent, the contours of the region’s 
poverty map which shows the most vulnerable 
people to be those living in the most populous 
least developed countries. 
From fragility to resilience
For people living in fragile and conflict-affected 
States, the journey from fragility to resilience is 
often both long and arduous. One quarter of 
the people in the world still live in areas plagued 
by high levels of criminal and political violence. 
They are twice as likely to be undernourished 
and their children three times as likely to be 
out of school.49 With the additional threats to 
lives and livelihoods of climate change, natural 
FIgure I-18
Mapping vulnerability to economic crises and natural disasters
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disasters, and economic crises, establishing 
human security is the most fundamental 
requirement of development. While this 
issue is not taken up in this report, for fragile 
states, good governance, strong institutions, 
accountable management of natural, human 
and financial resources, and above all, 
enlightened leadership matter the most. 
sYstemic respoNses 
In future, it is clear that many countries will 
need to build their resilience to adapt and 
thrive in an unpredictable and shock-prone 
environment. To achieve this they will need 
to make policy in a different way. Rather 
than dealing with problems in the economy, 
environment and society separately, they will 
have to be addressed as parts of an overall system. 
In pursuing these policies, policymakers of the 
region face key challenges when dealing with 
multiple crises. Subsequent chapters of this 
consider how they might address them: 
 Chapter 2 – The macroeconomics of resilience 
Confronted with an already weakened 
macroeconomic environment as a result of an 
economic slowdown, policymakers face the 
dilemma of how to handle the added challenge 
of natural disasters using the limited number 
of macroeconomic instruments they have. This 
is particularly difficult in the least developed 
countries and in small and less diversified 
economies. 
 Chapter 3 – Building resilient communities 
Economic crises and disasters hurt poor and 
vulnerable people the most. It is important 
therefore to support the most vulnerable 
communities, so that they can learn from 
past adversities and bounce back stronger 
and better-prepared for future shocks. This, 
however, requires a better understanding of the 
measures needed at national, provincial and 
local government levels to build community 
resilience. 
 Chapter 4 – The land, water, energy nexus: 
avoiding catastrophic failure
Building resilience involves using environmental 
resources as efficiently as possible. In particular 
this will mean diversifying economic activities 
so as to reduce dependence on individual 
environmental resources and limit the impacts 
on these systems in the event of an ecosystem 
failure. This will not be easy. Policymakers 
have to facilitate ecosystem conservation, 
regeneration and restoration while promoting 
sustained, inclusive and equitable economic 
growth.
 Chapter 5 – Protecting critical sectors 
Some sectors are inherently vulnerable and 
can either cause a crisis or act as transmitters 
of a localized crisis to a larger system. For 
example, the financial sector is sensitive to 
shocks and prone to systemic crisis. It is also 
important to safeguard critical social infrastructure, 
such as schools, hospitals and community 
buildings, major supply roads, bridges, power, 
water systems and crucial communication lines, 
so that they do not fail during natural disasters. 
This will mean designing legal, regulatory, and 
governance structures that minimize their 
exposure and vulnerability.
 Chapter 6 – Strengthening supply chains 
Integration into global value chains has enabled 
many Asia-Pacific economies to establish 
strong manufacturing bases and benefit from 
increased exports. However, this also increases 
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their vulnerability, directly and indirectly, to 
natural disasters. Policymakers also therefore 
need to devise mechanisms for boosting 
resilience throughout the chains.
  Chapter 7 – Mutual support through regional 
cooperation 
Countries are increasingly faced with economic 
crises and natural disasters that have cross-
border impacts. They can benefit, therefore, 
from mutually reinforcing strategies to 
build resilience, and share lessons, practical 
knowledge and experience across countries and 
subregions. The Asia-Pacific region has some 
regional cooperation mechanisms that deal 
with natural disasters and economic shocks. 
However, they are at different stages of 
development and, in most cases, they do not 
incorporate resilience. How to build on these 
mechanisms and fill up the gaps in regional 
cooperation is a key question for the 
governments of the region.
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appeNDiX
measUriNG resilieNce
While there are a number of measures of 
exposure, vulnerability and risk to economic 
crises and disasters, thus far there have been 
fewer efforts to measure resilience to these 
combined shocks. This appendix makes an 
initial attempt to do so for each country based 
on characteristics of both the economy and the 
society. The focus is on the intrinsic resilience of 
countries to adapt to shocks, which is defined 
here as the resilience that emerges from intrinsic 
characteristics of the economy and the society 
that creates the environment for people to 
withstand, absorb and adapt to shocks. 
It considers therefore whether the economy 
can adapt  to  changed circumstances and  self-
organize to continue functioning at times
of crises. And it considers whether people are 
sufficiently empowered to be better able to 
absorb and adapt to shocks. Another set of 
characteristics that might be used are those 
related to the environment, but it is not possible 
to investigate this at present due to a scarcity of 
relevant data.
Resilient economies – This measure is based on 
the assumption that a country will be more 
resilient if it has a complex and diversified 
economy which will offer greater opportunities 
for recombining its productive capabilities to 
keep the economy functioning and generate 
productive jobs after a shock. To assess the 
complexity of its production structure this 
report uses a measure based on the characteristics 
of its exports (see technical annex). 
Resilient societies – People will be more resilient 
in more equitable societies that empower them 
to be better able to absorb and adapt to shocks. 
One way of measuring these is through levels of 
achievement in five Millennium Development 
Goals related to gender and children. The focus 
on women and children reflects their persistent 
vulnerability to shocks and the assumption that 
people will be in a stronger position to develop 
the capabilities needed to respond to disasters, 
if they live in societies that empower women 
and protect their children (see technical annex). 
The result of this analysis is illustrated in 
Figure A-1. The vertical axis registers the 
economic component; the horizontal axis 
registers its social component. The figure is 
divided into four quadrants based on the global 
averages of each component. Countries in 
the upper-right quadrant are above the global 
average in both measures, so are more 
intrinsically resilient. In Asia and the Pacific 
these include Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, 
as well as emerging economies such as China, 
Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand 
(Table A-1). They have diversified economies 
and are responsible for a large share of the 
region’s total output. These countries also 
have relatively high achievement in the social 
indicators related to the inclusiveness of 
development. However, it should be noted that 
this is a national average and there is likely to 
be variation between regions in each economy: 
some regions may be better prepared to adapt 
to change and even benefit from it, while 
others may suffer dramatic loss and never recover.
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 (social context index)  
Higher resilience
Moderate resilience
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Lower resilience
Higher
ENEA  China, Japan, Republic of Korea
NCA  Russian Federation
PAC  Australia, New Zealand
SEA  Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam
SSWA  Sri Lanka, Turkey
Moderate
Higher social component 
ENEA  Mongolia
NCA  Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
PAC  Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu
SEA  Brunei Darussalam
SSWA  Maldives
Higher economic component 
SEA  Indonesia
SSWA  India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan
Lower 
NCA  Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
PAC  Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu
SEA  Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Timor-Leste
SSWA  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal  
FIgure A-1
Intrinsic resilience, 2010
tABle A-1
Intrinsic resilience of Asia-Pacific countries, 2010
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Countries in the lower-left quadrant of the 
chart have a lower combined resilience. These 
include some of the region’s least developed 
countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal 
and Timor-Leste. Afghanistan, for example, 
despite progress in many social and economic 
indicators in recent years still has a low 
capacity to adapt to sudden and major shocks. 
Timor-Leste has also been involved in a 
difficult process of nation building and still has 
a relatively lower intrinsic resilience. In general, 
the economies that are least resilient are the 
smaller ones which are less diversified and have 
fewer productive capacities. 
Countries in the upper-left quadrant have 
moderate resilience – with above-average 
economic resilience but below-average social 
resilience. These include Pakistan, and also 
India which, although it has made rapid 
economic progress, is still relatively unequal 
when considering the welfare of women and 
children. On these measures, Indonesia and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran are borderline. 
Countries in the lower-right quadrant also have 
moderate resilience, but in this case with above-
average social resilience and below-average 
economic resilience. Most are small island 
countries; typically they have strong community 
links which bolster their intrinsic social resilience, 
but often have narrowly based economies making 
it too difficult for them to reorganize and adapt 
in case of a major shock – whether caused by an 
economic or natural disaster. 
A composite index of resilience
The economic and social components can be 
combined with equal weights to produce a 
composite index. The results for Asia and the 
Pacific as a whole are shown in Figure A-2. 
This shows the region’s intrinsic resilience to be 
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FIgure A-2
Overall resilience index, selected global regions, 1993-2010
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similar to the global average but lower than in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, West Asia 
or the transition countries in Europe. Moreover, 
the region has made scarcely any progress, and 
the gap with some other regions has widened. 
The regional average hides differences in 
performance across and within Asia-Pacific 
subregions. This is illustrated in Figure A-3 
which shows the resilience to be greatest in the 
East and North-East subregions. Resilience is 
lower in other subregions but has been rising, 
in North and Central Asia, for example, and 
particularly in South and South-West Asia. 
The Pacific, on the other hand, has become less 
resilient over the years, even when considering 
the relatively higher resilience of its developed 
countries, Australia and New Zealand. 
Overall, the higher resilience is generally found 
in countries with higher per capita income. 
Resilience is also greater in countries that are 
more urbanized. Cities concentrate the largest 
share of the economic complexity of countries 
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and, in the aftermath of shocks, new connections 
are more likely to be established in the network 
of business and resources located in cities than 
in rural areas.  
Higher resilience also goes hand in hand with 
better standards of governance – this would 
include better public services and a high quality 
civil service that is independent of political 
pressures. Also important is the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and 
the government’s commitment to such policies 
including those that promote private-sector 
development – which contributes to a dynamic 
economy that is more likely to self-organize 
and heal itself in the aftermath of a crisis. 
kNoWN risks aND VUlNerabilities
The analysis of the relationship between 
resilience and the vulnerabilities associated to 
known risks provide important information 
about the challenges that countries face in 
dealing with more predictable crises. 
FIgure A-3
Index of intrinsic resilience, Asia-Pacific subregions ,1993-2010
Source: Based on data from COMTRADE available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (accessed November 2012) 
and MDG Indicators Databse available from http://mdgs.un.org/mdg/Default.aspx (accessed November 2012).
Notes: In the graph, zero marks the global average. The standard deviation of the global distribution of the index of overall 
intrinsic resilience is equal to 1.
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This is illustrated in Figure A-4, which compares 
the resilience index with the economic 
vulnerability index (EVI). The EVI is a United 
Nations index which measures the risk of a 
country’s economic development being affected 
by exogenous and unexpected shocks. The EVI 
is calculated by combining equally weighted 
indices of exposure, which include size, location, 
economic structure and environmental factors, 
and the effects of previous shocks, including 
trade shocks and natural disasters.50 
Figure A-4 shows that the intrinsic resilience 
index has an inverse association with the EVI: 
the higher the vulnerability, the lower the 
resilience. The red lines on the chart mark the 
global averages of the index of resilience and 
EVI. The countries in the top-left quadrant have 
high resilience and lower values of economic 
vulnerability. People in these countries are less 
likely to be affected by crises, and more likely 
to adapt and recover from them. On the other 
hand, countries in the bottom-right quadrant 
have lower resilience and are more vulnerable 
to external shocks. This quadrant includes the 
least developed countries of the region, and the 
small island countries. Most at risk on this basis 
are Kiribati, Tonga and Tuvalu. 
Similarly, countries can be classified according 
to their intrinsic resilience and the risks of 
natural disaster. The risk of disasters is estimated 
using the world risk index (WRI) developed 
by the United Nations University and the 
Alliance Development Works. The WRI has four 
components related to known disasters: exposure, 
Source: Based on data from COMTRADE avalable from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (accessed November 2012) and 
MDG Indicators Database available from http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx (accessed November 2012).
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Association between intrinsic resilience and the economic vulnerability index
Econ mic Vulnerability Index
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susceptibility, coping capacities and adaptive 
capacities. The exposure component refers to the 
physical exposure to earthquakes, storms, floods 
and droughts. The susceptibility component 
includes indicators of public infrastructure, 
economic capacity, distribution of income, 
poverty, dependency ratios of youth and of 
elderly, and nutrition. The coping capacity 
element assesses the capacity of government 
and authorities, medical services and material 
coverage or insurances, while the adaptive 
capacity element covers education and research, 
gender equity, environmental status and 
investment.  
As indicated in Figure A–5, the intrinsic 
resilience index shows a less pronounced linkage 
with the WRI. The two red lines mark the 
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global averages of the index of resilience and 
the WRI. Globally, among the countries with 
high levels of resilience, Japan is the country 
that faces the higher risk of natural disasters. 
The resilience of those that face lower risk 
varies from low levels as in the case of Kiribati, 
Mongolia, Nepal, and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, to high resilience such as for Australia 
and the Republic of Korea. On the other hand, 
except for the Philippines, countries that face 
higher risk are associated with lower resilience.
 
The countries that are particularly at risk are 
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. These 
small island countries face many structural 
and geographical challenges in increasing 
resilience. Their small populations may create the 
conditions for more equitable societies but 
FIgure A-5
High risk countries are also less resilient
Source: Based on data from COMTRADE available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (accessed November 2012) 
and MDG Indicators Database available from http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx (accessed November 2012).
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limit the development of diverse economies 
that can adapt to shocks. The best way for these 
economies to safeguard their development is 
to take disaster risk reduction measures that 
reduce their exposure and sensitivity to natural 
disasters – to prevent hazards becoming disasters. 
resilieNce to ecoNomic crises
Countries in 2008 with higher scores on the 
intrinsic resilience index recovered best in 2009 
after the global economic crisis (Figure A–6). 
The association is statistically significant and 
the index alone explains 18 per cent of the 
variation of the differences between the 2008 
and 2009 GDP growth rates of 171 economies. 
Similarly, Asia-Pacific countries in 1997 with 
higher scores for the intrinsic resilience index 
presented better economic performance in 
the midst of the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
(Figure A–7). Again, the association is 
statistically significant and the index alone 
explains 15 per cent of the variation of the 
differences between the 1997 and 1998 GDP 
growth rates of 42 economies of the region. 
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FIgure A-6
Global economic crisis, 2008-2009
Source: Based on data from COMTRADE available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (accessed November 2012) 
and MDG Indicators Database available from http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx (accessed November 2012) and 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators available from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-in-
dicators (accessed November 2012).
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Intrinsic resilience index, 1997 
Data is data from United Nations COMTRADE 
using SITC rev2 (5-digit level). The value 
traded is not used in the analysis, only the unit 
value is considered to further classify products 
by price range.
The method represents the network connecting 
countries to products using the adjacent matrix 
Mcp, where Mcp is 1 if the country produces the 
product and 0 otherwise. The method is defined 
as the recursive set of observables:
FIgure A-7
Asian financial crisis
tecHNical aNNeX
ecoNomic compleXitY iNDeX
The analysis presented in this Study applies 
the method of reflections proposed by Hidalgo 
and Hausmann51 to quantify the set of 
productive capabilities available in a country’s 
economy based on the structure of a bipartite 
network connecting countries to the products 
that they export. The method of reflections 
assumes that products require specific 
combinations of capabilities to be produced; 
countries have some capabilities but not others; 
and countries will produce goods as long as 
they have all the required capabilities.52 This 
analysis infers the set of capabilities available in 
the countries by analysing the association and 
implied relationships that connect countries to 
products. The method uses trade data to infer 
the products that the country is able to produce. 
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and
Source: Based on data from COMTRADE available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (accessed November 2012) 
and MDG Indicators Database available from http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx (accessed November 2012) and 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators available from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-in-
dicators (accessed November 2012).
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For N ≥ 0 , with Kc,0 representing the number 
of products exported by country c and Kp,0 
representing the number of countries that export 
product p. The method of reflections thus 
produces, for each country c, a vector represent 
ing the complexity of productive structure 
of the country in terms of the diversification 
and ubiquity of its product-mix, which can be 
identified with an ordered list of N real numbers 
(Kc,0,Kc,1,Kc,2, … , Kc,N), where N is the number 
of iterations of the method of reflections. As the 
number N of iterations of the method increases, 
the higher order variables tend to converge 
to the same number. There is, therefore, a 
limit to the number of iterations that result 
in relevant values to produce the ranking. The 
value of such limit number (NL) depends on 
the structure of the network (i.e. the number 
of countries, products, and how they are 
connected). Since the method converges quickly, 
however, this report approximates the limit by 
Kc,12. The measure is normalized by subtracting 
its mean and dividing by the standard deviation. 
social coNteXt iNDeX 
This report creates a quantitative measure of 
intrinsic social resilience for each country by 
applying the method of reflections to information 
on the attainment of five Millennium 
MDG Indicator
Promote gender equality and empower women
Reduce child mortality
Gender Parity Index in secondary level enrolment
Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector
Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births
Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births
Children 1 year old immunized against measles, percentage
tABle A-2
List of MDG indicators considered to calculate the social resilience component
Development Goal (MDGs) indicators 
related to gender and children (Table A–2). 
Similarly with the estimation of economic 
complexity, the method represents the network 
connecting countries to products using the 
adjacent matrix Mcp, where Mcp is 1 if the 
country produces the product and 0 otherwise. 
The assumption is that more challenging 
levels of attainment are less likely to be 
achieved by a larger number of countries, and 
that more socially equitable countries are more 
likely to reach a large number of goals. Data on 
each indicator is disaggregated by taking each 
percentage point in the level of attainment as 
a different MDG product. Missing values on 
the MDG dataset of a country between two 
reporting years were imputed using simple 
interpolation method and missing data in 
years before the earliest or after the latest data 
available were imputed by replacing them with 
the nearest available data/year for the country. 
For indicators such as infant and under-5 
mortality, the scale is reversed to reflect the fact 
that the lower number represents the highest 
level of attainment. The measure is normalized 
by subtracting its mean and dividing by the 
standard deviation. 
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CHAPTER 2
tHe macroecoNomics of resilieNce
Countries in Asia and the Pacific regularly face multiple shocks – from both economic 
crises and natural disasters. As well as causing human suffering, these shocks also 
affect national economies. Policymakers now have to respond with careful choices 
that address inflationary pressures, fiscal deficits and the prospect of rising debt.
Countries in the Asia-Pacific region are 
vulnerable to many kinds of shock – resulting 
from financial crises, for example, or declines in 
the terms of trade, as well as political or social 
upheaval, health pandemics, or natural disasters. 
And many of these shocks may be experienced 
at the same time: indeed in Asia and the Pacific 
simultaneous multiple shocks have become the 
‘new normal’ – particularly the combination of 
natural disasters and economic crises. 
Despite the frequency of simultaneous crises, 
the economic literature offers little guidance 
on how to respond. To what extent should 
countries faced with multiple shocks, uphold 
conventional macroeconomic stabilization 
objectives and targets – on inflation or fiscal 
deficits, or on liquidity norms or debt 
sustainability? And faced with the prospects of 
slower growth should they uphold the central 
bank’s objective of low inflation?
There are also unanswered questions on how 
to prepare for disasters. Conventional wisdom 
will argue for investing in risk reduction – in 
order to reduce subsequent expenditure on 
relief and rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the 
economic literature offers little guidance 
on how to integrate disaster risk reduction 
into macroeconomic policymaking.
It is also important to consider the inter-
connections between policy choices made before 
and after disasters. The options for restoring the 
economy to its long-run, pre-disaster growth 
will depend to a certain extent on previous 
policy choices on prevention and preparedness.
This chapter attempts to shed light on some 
of these unresolved issues, and puts forward 
some pragmatic general principles for a 
macroeconomic framework that promotes 
resilience to both economic shocks and natural 
disasters – helping countries mitigate their 
inherent vulnerability to shocks while 
enhancing their ability to recover.
impact of NatUral Disasters oN 
tHe ecoNomY
Natural disasters not only lead to loss of life 
and human suffering, they also destroy private 
and public capital – productive assets, property 
and infrastructure. This soon affects the 
overall economy – slowing down manufacturing 
and agricultural production and increasing the 
prices of essential goods. 
At the same time disasters erode human capa-
bilities. Households faced with rising prices can 
suffer from hunger and malnutrition and may 
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have a diminished capacity to work – problems 
which are compounded if governments under 
even greater fiscal pressure reduce expenditure 
on the social sectors. This general environment 
of scarcity can also have broader effects on 
the society and lead to increases in crime and 
violence. 
Natural disasters lead to an immediate, short-
term contraction in economic output. One 
survey of 35 events for which median damage 
was 3 per cent of GDP found that in 28 cases 
GDP growth fell in that year, with a median 
reduction of 1.7 percentage points.1 Another 
study looked at 21 major disasters and found 
that same-year GDP growth fell by an average 
of 3.1 percentage points.2 Other studies have 
estimated that disasters produce an average 0.7 
percentage-point drop in GDP growth in the 
first year.3 
There are also long-term implications. This is a 
particular risk for low-income countries where 
a series of disasters is likely to reduce fiscal 
space and increase debt, while eroding people’s 
coping capacities. Box II-1 shows how natural 
disasters might have reduced growth in 
Pakistan.  For the long-term effects there is less 
empirical cross-country evidence, but one study 
has found that countries that had a natural 
disaster followed by political upheaval then 
suffered long-term declines in growth.4  
Box II-1
Impact of natural disasters on economic growth in Pakistan 
In recent years the country has been hit by a series of natural disasters. In October 2005, there was a 7.6 
magnitude earthquake. And in 2010 and 2011, there was severe flooding. The disasters had a massive 
cumulative effect on the economy. The figure below shows what growth might otherwise have been, 
indicating an overall dampening effect on the economy.
Source: ESCAP and UNISDR, 2012.
It should be emphasized, however, that these projections are only illustrative and do not take into account 
factors other than natural disasters that might have affected growth rates.
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Variations between Pakistan’s actual observed GDP and projected GDP
without disasters, 2004-2011
RGDP: Observed GDP  
GDP2: Projected GDP in the event of two disasters (Sep_2005 and May_2007) 
NGDP: Projected GDP in the case of no disaster 
GDP1: Projected GDP in the event of one disaster (Sep_2005) 
Projected GDP in the event of three disasters (Sep_2005, May 2007 and June_2010)
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The long-run impact of a disaster on any country 
will depend on the economic, social and 
institutional conditions – and the subsequent 
response. Sometimes the outcome can be 
positive. The May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, 
China, for example, resulted in a wholesale 
capital stock replacement which helped boost 
productivity and growth (Box II-2). 
macroecoNomic traNsmissioN 
cHaNNels of NatUral Disasters
From the macroeconomic perspective, a natural 
disaster delivers a shock to the aggregate supply 
curve, resulting in a decline in real output and 
employment. This supply shock is transmitted 
to the real sector through a number of channels.
  External sector – Natural disasters usually 
lead to a sharp deterioration in the trade 
balance. Import bills rise for food, raw materials 
and reconstruction materials, while exports tend 
to decline due to the destruction of productive 
capacity and market infrastructure or the 
reallocation of labour to disaster relief and 
rehabilitation. One study for Latin America and 
the Caribbean, for example, considered 42 large 
natural disasters and found that these were, on 
average, associated with a deterioration in the 
balance of payments by an amount equal to 
one-third of the estimated damage.5 Another 
Sources: New York Times, 2008. China Daily, 2012.
Box II-2
Creative destruction in Sichuan, China 
The earthquake that struck Sichuan Province in May 2008 left behind scenes of almost apocalyptic 
devastation: mountaintops sheared off into valleys, cities reduced to rubble and dust, cracked dams, 
collapsed bridges and at least 80,000 dead. 
But the earthquake also did something else: it helped the Chinese economy. A little over a month after 
the quake, the State Information Centre, a Chinese Government research body, announced that the 
massive rebuilding effort, and the billions of dollars it would pump into the Chinese economy, would 
far outweigh the economic losses from the quake. The benefits, the centre said, would be enough to 
raise national economic growth by 0.3 per cent, a small but not insignificant part of a growth rate 
for 2008. 
Rebuilding efforts provide a short-term boost by attracting resources to the region, economists say. 
By destroying old factories and roads, airports and bridges, the disasters allowed new and more 
efficient infrastructure to be built, forcing the transition to a sleeker, more productive economy in 
the long term. In this instance, a disaster performed the economic service of clearing out outdated 
infrastructure to make way for more efficient replacements. It might be seen as Mother Nature’s 
contribution to what the Austrian-born Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter famously called 
capitalism’s “creative destruction.” 
As the recent evidence suggests, the Sichuan economy has actually become more productive than 
before, as was predicted by many economists. With rebuilding nearly complete, there has been an 
on-going economic boom in Sichuan. In the last four years, its income has doubled, with per capita GDP 
exceeding $4,000; in economic terms, it now ranks number one among provinces in Western China. It 
has also attracted a large volume of foreign investments, and now hosts 200 of the Fortune 500 firms.
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study found that 21 major natural disasters led 
to an average worsening of the trade balance, 
owing to an increase in import growth and, to 
a lesser extent, a reduction in exports.6 Another 
review concluded that an important indicator 
of the deterioration in the trade balance was the 
country’s dependence on agricultural exports.7
 
  Foreign aid – It might be thought that 
natural disasters would result in a surge in 
foreign aid. But not necessarily. Some studies 
have concluded that only a large-scale natural 
disaster causes an observable increase in 
foreign assistance.8 And others suggest that this 
emergency assistance is likely to be offset 
by a decrease in development assistance in 
subsequent years.9 Still others contend that, 
although foreign assistance increases after 
a natural disaster, the surges are typically 
small in relation to the size of the affected 
economies or the economic damage.10 It has 
also been suggested that the effect depends on 
the type of disaster: foreign aid tends to increase 
after a climatic disaster and decrease after a 
geological one.11 A surge in aid also raises 
the spectre of ‘Dutch disease’ – an increase 
in the real exchange rate that erodes export 
competitiveness and slows economic growth. 
Even if it has this effect, however, foreign aid can, 
by restoring infrastructure, add to productive 
capacity which also fosters growth – so the net 
effect is ambiguous.
  Formal labour market – Large-scale damage 
and   destruction  are likely to disrupt   manu-
facturing   as  well as agriculture and thus reduce 
both employment and wages. One study on 
Bangladesh estimated that, five years after 
the 1998 flood of the century, for each 
one-foot deviation from the normal flood level, 
agricultural and non‐agricultural wages 
decreased by 4 to 7 per cent.12 However, in 
some circumstances wages could rise. A disaster 
that leads to high mortality, for example, could 
seriously reduce the labour force; even a limited 
loss of life can cause certain labour markets to 
tighten significantly. This can also happen, for 
example, if workers withdraw from the labour 
force to secure family and property or if they 
move to the booming reconstruction sector. 
Wages can then rise even for semi-skilled or 
unskilled workers – eroding the competitiveness 
of the tradable sectors and acting as a drag on 
economic recovery. 
There is some evidence that this is indeed 
what happened in the aftermath of the 
Indonesian earthquakes between 2000 and 
2007. Reconstruction in the affected 
communities caused wages to rise and 
encouraged workers to move from 
agriculture   and manufacturing to the 
services and non-tradable sectors. This 
reduced the growth in agriculture and 
eroded the competitiveness of the tradable 
sectors.13 The 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, 
China also saw a reallocation of workers – in 
this case between private manufacturing and 
the public reconstruction and rehabilitation 
activities. However, the outcome here was 
different. Reconstruction enhanced productivity 
in manufacturing and led to readjustments in 
the labour market. 
  Public finances – There is also an impact 
on fiscal balances and public debt. As a result 
of natural disasters, governments will spend 
more on emergency relief, reconstruction and 
social welfare for the poor. They may also offer 
financial support to affected businesses and to 
financial institutions. If they have to borrow for 
this purpose, there will be an increase in public 
debt. At the same time disasters will also 
affect public revenues. A fall in output is likely to 
reduce revenue from taxes and duties. And even 
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a rise in imports of emergency-related goods is 
unlikely to generate much revenue as most of 
these tend to be exempt from duty. 
The net effect on the budget will depend on 
the particular circumstances, but generally the 
budget effect is likely to be lower in developed 
economies – which have stronger financial 
sectors and extensive disaster insurance. In 
this case a larger chunk of the output loss will 
be absorbed by the private sector, so the fiscal 
impact is lower. In most developing countries, 
on the other hand, the brunt of the 
responsibility for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction falls on the government which 
can see its budget deficit increase. One survey 
of middle- and upper-income countries found 
that natural disasters led to an increase in 
government expenditure by 15 per cent and a 
decrease in government revenue by 10 per cent, 
increasing the budget deficit by 25 per cent. As 
the budget deficit increases, there may be an 
increase in public debt.14 
When a natural disaster leads to a sharp 
increase in the fiscal and current account 
deficits, there is likely to be an increase in prices 
and interest rates. The impacts on the exchange 
rate, however, are less clear. But none of these 
outcomes are automatic; much will depend 
on government policies, and private-sector 
expectations and responses. 
DiffereNt impacts of ecoNomic 
crises aND NatUral Disasters
Natural disasters and economic crises both 
affect the economy, but in different ways. 
Natural disasters destroy property and 
productive capacity and deliver adverse shocks 
to the aggregate supply curve. Economic crises, 
on the other hand, do not destroy anything 
directly but do deliver adverse shocks to the 
aggregate demand curve. 
As a result they have different impacts on 
inflation. A supply shock from a natural 
disaster will increase inflationary pressure, 
while a demand shock from an economic crisis 
is likely to be deflationary. Natural disasters and 
economic crises that are simultaneous may thus 
mitigate each other’s impact on the price level. 
So getting policies right will mean considering 
both impacts. 
Adverse aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply shocks both reduce GDP, which in 
turn exacerbates fiscal imbalances. If a natural 
disaster follows in the wake of an economic 
crisis, it will compound the fiscal imbalance.
While both types of shocks can wreak havoc 
on any developing country, some countries will 
take longer to recover. One study covering the 
period from 1970 to 2001, found that the costs 
were greater, and the recovery period longer, in 
the world’s poorer developing countries.15 On 
average, both emerging market economies and 
the poorer developing countries experienced a 
drop in output every 16 years. But while the 
emerging economies suffered a cumulative loss 
of 40 per cent of GDP, and took six years to 
return to the pre-crisis per capita output, the 
low-income countries had twice the losses and 
took twice as long to recover. It was also found 
that some countries were more susceptible to 
particular types of shock. While the emerging 
economies were more vulnerable to shocks 
relating to financial flows, the low-income 
countries were more susceptible to adverse 
terms-of-trade movements. 
However, such studies are more suggestive 
than definitive and indicate the need for more 
empirical research. Indeed they do not 
necessarily accord with the experiences of many 
Asian economies. In Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines where natural disasters are 
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frequent and severe, a large measure of output 
variability does stem from natural disasters. 
So far this section has considered cases when 
macroeconomic crisis and natural disasters 
happen separately. Recent years, however, 
have seen multiple, simultaneous crises which 
compound each other’s adverse impacts. 
Economic analysis is still at its infancy when it 
comes to dealing with such interlinked crises, 
perhaps because they arise from fundamentally 
unpredictable processes.16 
Nevertheless, there has been some qualitative 
work. One sociological study covers the 
period from 2008 to 2011 in 17 countries
– including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand 
and Viet Nam – looking at the effects of 
simultaneous crises in finance, fuel and food, 
exacerbated by natural disasters.17 This found 
that whatever the shock those hit hardest 
were the poorest and most vulnerable, with 
devastating impacts on their long-term well-
being – a subject addressed in Chapter 3.
 
aDDressiNG NatUral Disasters 
For natural disasters, there is a fairly large body 
of literature on the macroeconomic impact, but 
much less on the appropriate policy response. 
Governments need an effective macroeconomic 
response: 
–  To ensure that those affected can preserve  
   core consumption;
–  To restore damaged or lost property, capital  
   and infrastructure;
–  To avoid a rise in inequality; and
–  To ensure sustainable long-term growth.
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The appropriate response will depend on 
the nature of the damage. A disaster that has 
demolished key roads and power plants will 
have a different economic impact from one 
that has destroyed subsistence agriculture 
or an island’s fishing boats. But in all cases, 
countries will need an appropriate macro- 
economic framework, including both annual 
budgets and longer-term investment plans. 
Country experiences suggest that such a frame-
work would include the following elements. 
 An explicit disaster strategy – This should 
be well integrated into national development 
strategies, such as on poverty reduction, and also 
connect with cross-cutting concerns such as 
environmental protection. The disaster strategy 
thus needs to be incorporated into national 
development planning – in all relevant sectoral 
strategies and at all levels of government. 
The ways of doing this were detailed in the 
Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015. This 
considered disaster risk reduction within the 
management of environmental and natural 
resources, social and economic development 
practices, and land use planning, building codes 
and other technical measures. In this regard, 
however, Asia and the Pacific, and especially 
the least developed countries are falling behind 
global performance.18 
Nevertheless, the region does offer examples of 
good practice. The Philippines’ Development 
Plan 2011-2016, for example, treats disaster 
risk reduction as a component of the 
development process. The plan is then integrated 
into public-sector management functions of 
planning, investment programming, budgeting, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
 Participation of stakeholders – This should 
involve community leaders, civil society, and 
the private sectors. This has been achieved in 
Indonesia for example. The Government based 
the National Disaster Management Plan of 
2010-2014 and the National Action Plan 
for disasters on the experiences of the 2004 
tsunami that hit Aceh and Nias and the 2006 
earthquake that hit Yogyakarta. These plans 
engage all key stakeholders and operate 
horizontally across line ministries, as well as 
vertically down to provincial and district 
levels. They also have a strong legal foundation 
– the Disaster Management Law 2007.19 
 Measures for disaster risk reduction  –
Successful disaster strategies require investment 
in disaster risk reduction as well as financial 
protection against disasters. Such investments 
would include making school buildings and other 
structures disaster resilient. Such measures not 
only reduce risk, they are good for development. 
Across the region, many countries, particular-
ly those in disaster-prone areas, now realize the 
importance of including disaster risk manage-
ment in their macroeconomic frameworks. Over 
the past 25 years, Bangladesh, for example, has 
invested more than $10 billion in disaster risk 
management – which has contributed to the 
current decline in disaster losses. Indonesia, 
between 2006 and 2012, increased the 
proportion of the budget going to disaster 
risk management from 0.6 to 1 per cent. 
China in 2011 created a Comprehensive 
Disaster Prevention and Reduction Plan (2011-
2015) which envisages wide-ranging investments 
in early warning, risk assessment, communi-
ty-based disaster risk management, and education 
and awareness.The aim is to reduce annual disaster 
losses from 8 to 1.5 per cent of GDP. 20
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Disaster risk reDUctioN 
is cost effectiVe
Macroeconomic management of crises has two 
dimensions. The first concerns policy choices 
related to pre-disaster risk management. 
The second concerns post-disaster relief and 
reconstruction – to restore the economy to its 
pre-disaster long-run growth path with the 
least disruption to the economy. 
Pre-disaster risk management should have 
four distinct components (Figure II-1):
1. Risk identification – This involves identifying 
risks and social vulnerabilities. It is important 
to note that risk has both structural and social 
dimensions. It is essential to identify both. 
Empirical studies suggest that societies with 
adequate social safety nets are better prepared 
to face a natural disaster than those without. 
2. Risk mitigation – This can include reforming 
land planning, strengthening building codes, 
retrofitting existing buildings, and constructing 
dams in drought-prone areas. 
3. Risk preparedness – This includes early 
warning systems, contingency planning and 
public training on risk prevention. 
4. Financial preparation – Part of this will take 
the form of self-insurance which will mean 
accumulating savings and foreign reserves in 
normal times to draw down in the event of 
a natural disaster. This can reduce economic 
growth since using scarce resources to build 
reserves will reduce those available for physical 
and social infrastructure. The other form of 
preparation is risk transfer – buying commercial 
insurance that transfers risks externally to capital 
markets and investors. Catastrophe insurance is 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
FIgure II-1
A disaster risk management framework
Source: World Bank, 2011a.
A Disaster Risk Management Framework
Ex-post, post-disaster planning Ex-ante, pre-disaster planning
Risk identification: risk mapping and 
hazard assessment
Post-disaster relief and construction
Risk mitigation: physical and 
structural work, infrastructure and 
land use planning etc.
Risk-preparedness: early warning 
system and contingency planning
Financial protection: self-insurance 
and risk-transfer, budget appropriation 
and execution
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While it is well understood that prevention 
is better than cure, in practice there are many 
obstacles to this approach. As suggested in 
Chapter 1, human societies seem to have 
innate problems in assessing risk. But countries 
may not consider risk prevention an efficient 
investment. This is indeed the case when the 
effects of disasters are relatively small and can 
easily be coped with. But there can also be 
situations of ‘moral hazard’: low-income 
countries may be tempted to underinvest in 
prevention if they believe they will always 
receive external post-disaster assistance. 
Probably the biggest hurdle, however, is the 
difficulty in comparing the immediate and real 
costs of prevention with the potential costs of 
rehabilitation. If the disaster does not happen 
then the country will appear to have lost funds 
that could instead have been used for other 
important investments. Risk avoidance today 
also appears to have no tangible financial or 
political return. Today’s policymakers may 
therefore be tempted to defer expenditure 
until a disaster happens, preferably on 
someone else’s watch.
Policymakers who do attempt to assess the 
comparative costs of prevention and rehabilitation 
will face a number of problems. Apart from 
the difficulty in estimating future costs, there 
can also be the issue of attaching a monetary 
value to a human life. This is standard practice 
for insurance companies, but for governments 
there are significant moral and ethical 
implications. Risk reduction investments are 
also likely to have distributional consequences as 
well as opportunity costs. Investing in the more 
vulnerable areas will divert resources from 
elsewhere. This may also transfer risks – for 
example, a dam that protects one group can 
increase the flood risks to another. 
Many developing countries may also lack the 
institutional capacity (Box II-3). Often the 
budgetary and planning processes are rigid and 
clogged with red tape, and afford little flexibility 
in transferring and reallocating funds across 
expenditure categories. Even if the framework 
includes various disaster-related expenditures, 
it may be non-transparent, uncoordinated and 
scattered across ministries.
Source: World Bank, 2012a.
Box II-3
Pacific island countries - limitations in disaster risk management 
Inefficient risk management in the Pacific island countries is eroding development gains and incurring 
large costs for national and local governments. The existing macroeconomic framework tends to 
underemphasize risk reduction and overemphasize support for relief operations – which have higher 
political payoffs for politicians. 
This subregion is highly dependent on foreign aid which funds much disaster relief. Progress in 
reducing vulnerability has been slow, in part because of problems with coordination and cooperation 
among relevant actors, including donors. There is also a disjunction between policy frameworks and 
the stakeholders’ responsibility in carrying out disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. 
In short, significant improvements are needed in coordination between the diverse stakeholders.
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Arriving at the best balance between 
investment in risk reduction or in rehabilitation 
is not easy. These are ultimately issues of 
public choice. Determining public priorities 
in disaster risk reduction will therefore benefit 
from extensive stakeholder participation in 
national planning and budgetary processes. 
Nevertheless, countries at high risk appear to 
be giving greater priority to risk reduction.
 Japan – Here disasters are an inevitable 
part of life. Budgetary allocations are made 
for four broad categories of risk reduction 
and recovery: scientific technology research; 
disaster prevention and preparedness; national 
land conservation; and post-disaster recovery 
and rehabilitation.21 On average, from 1995 to 
2004, the Government allocated $50 billion 
each year – representing 5 per cent of general 
funds in the national budget, of which 75 per 
cent was spent on mitigation and preparedness. 
Around half the budget is allocated to national 
land conservation projects, such as soil erosion 
control, river containment and soil and 
coastal conservation. Another quarter goes to 
prevention and preparedness, such as enhancing 
communication systems, preparing evacuation 
plans, and conducting drills and exercises. 
Science and technology research receives a little 
over 1 per cent. 
 The Philippines – Located on the Pacific ‘ring 
of fire’, the Philippines also gives high priority 
to disaster risk reduction. On average from 2009 
to 2011, 70 per cent of the annual DRR budget 
was set aside for projects and programmes that 
reduced the exposure of population and assets. 
These included projects on flood control, forest 
management, soil conservation and watershed 
management. In comparison, only 27 per cent 
of the budget was allocated to disaster response 
and recovery.22 
 India – Budgetary allocation for disaster 
risk reduction is not well coded across the 
sectoral ministries so it can be difficult 
to estimate the real amount invested. But it 
is possible to identify two categories of 
expenditure on disaster management.23 Simplest 
to track are the ‘dedicated’ schemes: those 
governmental programmes where 100 per 
cent of the allocations are for disaster response 
and relief. The second category comprises 
‘embedded’ schemes: programmes not 
formulated specifically for disaster risk reduction 
but which nevertheless, contribute substantially 
to this objective. For example, the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (NREGA) contributes to risk reduction 
by employing people to carry out works on soil 
and water conservation, building embankments, 
and developing watersheds. NREGA 
programmes thus have ‘embedded’ DRR 
strategies. Increasingly India’s expenditure 
balance is shifting from dedicated to embedded 
schemes (Figure II-2). 
Embedded schemes are more difficult to 
monitor. Nevertheless, for fiscal year 2011-
12, 85 embedded schemes were identified, 
sponsored by 75 ministries or departments, for 
a total of $79 billion, amounting to 32 per cent 
of total budgetary allocations, and equivalent 
to 3.38 per cent of GDP. Around 80 per cent 
of these expenditures contributed to disaster 
risk reduction. 
• Indonesia – Between 2006 and 2012 the 
proportion of the central government budget 
allocated for disaster risk reduction increased 
from 0.58 to 1.02 per cent, reaching 0.12 per 
cent of GDP (Figure II-3). Most national-level 
investment is dedicated to disaster mitigation 
and prevention, accounting for almost 80 per 
cent of the total $1.02 billion.24
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FIgure II-2
India, evolution of dedicated and embedded schemes for  
disaster management, 2005-2012.
Source: Based on the data from Chakrabarti, 2013
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
In
d
ex
 (
20
05
=
10
0)
 
Total Dedicated Total Embedded
FIgure II-3
Indonesia, investment in disaster risk reduction, 2006-2012
Source: ESCAP based on the data from Disaster Risk Reduction Investment Tracking: Case Study Indonesia – draft submitted to 
UNISDR and ADB, 2013.
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
1.2 
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
%
 C
en
tra
l G
ov
er
nm
en
t B
ud
ge
t 
M
ill
io
ns
 o
f 2
00
5 
U
S
 d
ol
la
rs
 
Budget for Disaster Management 
Budget for DRM (% of Central Government Budget) 
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
  
2
47
The risk of disaster varies considerably across 
this vast archipelago. So risk-sensitive, smart 
investment in Indonesia is increasingly 
decentralized. Each province can choose to 
allocate resources according to the exposure to 
risks across its constituent districts. The province 
of Central Java, for example, which is exposed 
to inundation, floods and tsunamis, uses most 
of the disposable resources for flood control 
and coastguards. The different responsibilities 
of central and provincial governments are 
indicated in Box II-4.
 Bangladesh – Over time, Bangladesh has 
shifted its disaster management focus from 
disaster relief to risk reduction and resilience 
– which has resulted in a dramatic reduction 
in the number of disaster-induced deaths and 
damages. This approach is built into national 
development efforts and strategies on poverty 
reduction. At the national level 12 key ministries 
and departments coordinate their efforts under 
the Comprehensive Disaster Management 
Programme. In disaster-prone areas the 
Government promotes safety net programmes 
Source: Indonesia, 2007. 
Box II-4
Indonesia – national and provincial disaster management responsibilities
Indonesia is a vast archipelago. Although many provinces are at risk of disaster, the nature of the 
hazard varies from one part of the country to another. These risks can be more efficiently managed by 
provinces and districts. The distribution of functions is as follows:
Central government 
Disaster risk reduction
•	 Integrate	disaster	risk	management	within	the	national	development	programme
•	 Transfer	sufficient	funds	to	state	budgets	to	execute	risk	mitigation	activities
•	 Ensure	adequate	‘on	call’	funds	are	available	to	all	line	ministries	for	emergency	response	efforts
•	 Develop	and	enforce	land	use	planning	through	line	ministries	
•	 Develop	and	enforce	building	codes	through	line	ministries	
Disaster response
•	 Provide	support	to	communities	and	refugees	
•	 Transfer	sufficient	funds,	based	on	requests	from	local	governments,	to	the	provincial	 
 governments who then transfer to local governments for recovery/reconstruction. 
 
Local Government 
Disaster risk reduction
•	 Integrate	disaster	risk	management	within	local	development	planning
•	 Allocate	funds	for	disaster	risk	management	in	local	budgets
•	 Protect	communities	and	reduce	disaster	risks	by	utilizing	the	funds	allocated	in	the	Regional	 
 Revenue and Expenditure Budget 
Disaster response
•	 Provide	assistance	to	communities
•	 Reallocate budget resources for emergency and r-ecovery efforts – prior to the receipt of  
 Central Government funds. 
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and food security measures to protect the most 
vulnerable, especially women, children and 
the elderly. For the 2012-13 financial year, for 
example, the social protection programme 
accounted for 15 per cent of the total budget – 
almost 2.5 per cent of GDP. 
The Government also supports community 
action. This includes community activities for 
risk assessment and reduction, hazard assessment, 
and contingency planning. The Government 
assists with training of community-based 
volunteers, as in the successful Cyclone 
Preparedness Programme through which 
cyclone forecasts are followed up by thousands 
of volunteers who disseminate the messages 
to all affected villages. Disaster risk reduction 
is also incorporated in the climate change 
adaptation strategy – which includes developing 
drought- and saline-resistant crops, raising 
the levels of houses, building multi-purpose 
cyclone shelters, dredging major river systems, 
and reforesting coastlines, along with 
interventions for community-based health and 
preventing disease. 
Bangladesh has invested more than $10 billion 
during the past 35 years: setting up networks 
of early warning systems; raising agricultural 
productivity in low-lying areas: improving 
flood protection and drainage in urban areas, 
installing irrigation schemes to enable dry- 
season crops; and implementing a coastal green 
belt project. These investments resulted in a 
significant decline in disaster losses.25
A number of Asia-Pacific countries are thus 
shifting the emphasis from disaster response to 
disaster risk reduction. And while the priority 
areas depend very much on country 
circumstances, there are some common elements 
– soil and water conservation, flood control, 
watershed development, coastal management, 
early warning systems, and reducing risks 
for vulnerable populations. These issues are 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
post-Disaster respoNse:  
fiNaNciNG VersUs aDjUstmeNt 
The typical macroeconomic policy response 
to a natural disaster is a combination of 
drawing down reserves, seeking new finance, 
and macroeconomic adjustment. Indeed, a 
well-accepted tenet in macro management of 
disasters is: “Finance if you can, adjust if you 
must”.26
Where can the finance come from? One option 
is to set aside contingency funds for various 
emergencies, and calamity funds especially for 
disasters. To avoid moral hazard, such funds 
should only cover risks that cannot be absorbed 
by private insurance – such as disaster-related 
damage affecting small farmers and the urban 
poor who are unable to afford private insurance, 
along with social assistance for disaster victims.
The poorer developing countries should also 
be able to rely on concessional aid or grants 
from international donors. In addition they 
might see an increase in workers’ remittances 
to families in distress; remittances tend to be 
counter cyclical and counter disaster.27 
In principle the government could also increase 
commercial borrowing. But this may be 
difficult. Many low-income countries do not 
have access to the international capital markets 
and will struggle to borrow commercially. Even 
emerging economies that have access to these 
markets will find foreign borrowing expensive, 
especially after a disaster. They may also find 
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it difficult to raise funds domestically. This is 
partly because the local debt market is likely to 
be underdeveloped, but also because a natural 
disaster can trigger a massive withdrawal of 
private savings – as happened in Bangladesh 
after the 1998 floods. This makes it much more 
difficult to borrow from the banking system. 
The choice between domestic and external 
financing depends on many factors including:
 The nature of the disaster-whether it is 
     temporary or permanent; 
 The country’s fiscal position; 
 The external balance and the exchange rate; and 
 The availability of domestic and external 
     financing. 
If the disaster is a one-off shock, it makes sense 
to finance the impact through foreign aid or 
borrowing. If the disaster or its impact is likely 
to be permanent, however – as will increasingly 
be the case for Asia and the Pacific – the country 
will need to adjust to the ‘new normal’.
Governments that do not have access to debt 
financing will need to adjust through fiscal 
policy. There are three options: 
1) redirecting funding from planned projects; 
2) cutting existing discretionary expenditure; or 
3) raising taxes on high-income earners. 
The choices will depend on the current state 
of the economy. If it is overheated and policy 
makers fear inflation they might impose a 
temporary tax on high-income citizens in the 
form of a ‘reconstruction levy’. This will not 
only reduce private demand, but also help 
finance much needed reconstruction. Australia 
used this kind of levy following the 2010-11 
floods in Queensland.
The role of monetary policy after natural disasters 
is, however, the subject of some controversy. 
Natural disasters are likely to increase prices 
while lowering economic output. This presents 
a classical monetary policy dilemma: how to 
use one instrument to reconcile two competing 
objectives – maintaining price stability while 
restoring pre-disaster levels of output and 
employment. 28
Some argue that the priority should be price 
stability. This would mean tightening the money 
supply. But this may not be the best policy in 
developing countries where economic output 
is some way below its potential and many 
people are engaged in vulnerable and informal 
employment. In this case monetary tightening 
will further worsen unemployment and poverty. 
In such circumstances there is less risk that 
an expansionary monetary policy will stoke 
inflation. In sum, for many low-income countries 
this dilemma may not exist. Nevertheless, if the 
disaster causes price hikes, workers may demand 
higher wages – which would have a second-round 
inflationary impact. In such circumstances, the 
authorities may need to tighten monetary policy 
to prevent a wage-price spiral.
There is also the risk of inflation if there is 
a sudden inflow of foreign aid. This could 
increase aggregate demand while supply is 
constrained. An upsurge of foreign aid may 
also cause the exchange rate to appreciate. 
But the effect of aid on the real exchange rate 
is ambiguous. Much depends on the way in 
which foreign aid flows are absorbed into the 
economy. If fiscal spending is sluggish or the 
central bank saves much of the available foreign 
exchange as reserves, and sterilizes its monetary 
implications, then large inflows of aid should 
not exert inflationary pressure or cause real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
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It should be noted that much will also 
depend on the country’s institutional capacity to 
formulate efficient macroeconomic policy and 
carry out efficient disaster management. This 
requires robust institutions and analytical 
capabilities that low-income countries may 
lack. If so, the recovery process could be delayed. 
One of the most difficult tasks is coping with 
the sudden arrival of large amounts of aid. In 
the past some fiscal authorities have found such 
flows difficult to absorb. To address this issue, 
Indonesia, for example, in 2007 introduced a 
Law on Natural Disaster Management which 
enables the fiscal system to be more flexible 
and accommodative while responding to the 
needs for post-disaster response and recovery 
(Box II-5).  
Another problem with aid is the need to 
deal with multiple donors. Some assistance 
Box II-5
Indonesia – Law on Natural Disaster Management
Indonesia previously had an ad hoc inter-ministerial council for dealing with disasters. The Law on 
Natural Disaster Management passed in 2007, however, established a dedicated body – the national 
disaster management agency, BNPB. It has a strong mandate to coordinate line ministries in imple-
menting preventive measures and leading recovery. In line with the law, all 33 provinces and 306 of 
450+ districts have established disaster management agencies. Subsequently, Indonesia formulated 
a national action plan for disaster risk reduction along with a national disaster risk financing strategy 
that includes budget reserve funds and disaster risk transfer instruments. 
The financial responsibility of central and local governments is defined by law. Major disasters are 
financed with support from the central budget through exceptional transfers to the provincial budgets. 
Post-disaster financing of minor disasters is generally from local and provincial governments. The 
source of emergency response funds, covering the first weeks after a disaster, depends on whether 
the event is declared a national disaster or a disaster of national significance. If so, the Central 
Government takes responsibility through the BNPB with line ministries and the BNPB disbursing 
resources through their ‘on call’ funds for emergency response. On call funds are a separate line of the 
budget that can be engaged to support post-disaster early recovery activities while emergency status 
is still in effect. If not declared a National Disaster, local governments provide financing through their 
contingency budgets. The Law also addresses the issues related to managing donor assistance.
will come from the traditional development 
partners, but a large proportion of disaster 
relief also comes through individual, private, 
and non-government organizations. This raises 
many issues of coordination and information 
sharing – a major concern, for example, in the 
aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
 
To address this issue and help governments 
prepare their regulatory systems for international 
disaster response, the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent at its 2007 International 
Conference adopted a set of recommendations 
– ‘Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and 
regulation of international disaster relief and 
initial recovery assistance’.29 These guidelines, 
which have since been widely endorsed, 
suggest how governments can prepare their 
disaster laws and plans for common regulatory 
problems. They also indicate minimum quality 
standards for humanitarian assistance. 
Source: Indonesia, 2007 
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In summary, the range of post-disaster 
macroeconomic policy options will depend on 
previous macroeconomic policy choices and 
efforts at disaster risk reduction. Risk reduction 
can lessen the disruption caused by natural 
disasters, save lives, and protect property. 
bUilDiNG a more resilieNt  
macroecoNomic frameWork
Faced with multiple overlapping crises, how can 
governments strengthen their macroeconomic 
frameworks so that their people are protected 
and their economies can withstand, adapt to, 
and recover from multiple shocks quickly and 
efficiently? What follows is a set of guidelines 
for a more resilient macroeconomic framework 
for Asia and the Pacific. 
Macroeconomic stabilization as 
a means to an end
Macroeconomic stability exists when key 
economic relationships are in balance – for 
example, between domestic demand and output, 
fiscal revenues and expenditure, and savings 
and investment. The government will also be 
concerned about the balance of payments.30 
Most definitions of macroeconomic stability
also include manageable levels of external and 
internal debt, moderate inflation, realistic 
exchange rates and smoother business cycles. 
Nevertheless, all the relationships need not be 
precisely in balance. Fiscal and current account 
deficits or surpluses, for example, are quite 
compatible with economic stability, provided 
they can be financed sustainably. 
Moreover, macroeconomic stability is not an 
end in itself-it is a means to an end. One of 
its objectives is to inspire business confidence. 
Businesses are more likely to invest if there is 
a degree of certainty in price levels, exchange 
rates, interest rates, the tax burden and the 
availability of credit. This helps create an 
environment conducive to high savings, 
efficient investment and steady growth, all of 
which affect the welfare of the poor. 
Another benefit of macroeconomic stability is 
that it helps governments create fiscal space 
and build greater resilience to economic shocks 
– and thus helps preserve policy autonomy. 
During the good times, therefore, all countries 
should aim for macroeconomic stability, creating 
a policy space that will offer the flexibility 
needed to confront sudden shocks. 
The value of a stable macroeconomic 
environment has been demonstrated by the 
recent experience in Asia and the Pacific. In 
1997, the Asian financial crisis had a severe 
impact because many of the region’s economies 
confronted it in a weakened macroeconomic 
environment. However, by 2008 in the run-up 
to the global financial crisis they were in much 
stronger positions. This enabled them to sustain 
economic activity by swiftly launching large 
stimulus packages. As a result, they avoided 
lasting damage to their real economies and 
employment – and most importantly, were able 
to protect the poor and most vulnerable. 
Much of this strength was based on fiscal 
prudence and the accumulation of large foreign 
exchange reserves. Most governments were in a 
position to efficiently finance their budgets 
without generating explosive increases in 
public debt. Nevertheless, aggregate figures 
mask substantial variations across subregions 
as well as countries. The following highlights 
some subregional difference.31
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 Fiscal balances – These were generally positive 
though there were small deficits. The deficits 
were somewhat larger in the Pacific and South 
Asia where they exceeded 5 per cent of GDP.
 Primary fiscal balances – These are the fiscal 
balances minus interest payments on public 
debt. The position varied significantly across the 
region. South-East Asia was the only subregion 
that ran a relatively large primary surplus. South 
Asia had large and persistent primary deficits.
 Government spending and revenues – In 
Asia and the Pacific these tend to be relatively 
low, at around 20-25 per cent of GDP, which is 
below the average for many parts of the world, 
particularly Europe.
 Public debt-to-GDP ratios – On average these 
were below 40 to 50 per cent of GDP. But they 
varied considerably across the region: In South-
East Asia 50 to 60 per cent of GDP; in South Asia 
more than 60 per cent, and in the Pacific around 
40 per cent (Figure II-4). There are also significant 
cross-country variations. At the beginning of the 
global economic crisis, public debt in the Marshall 
Islands, Fiji, Tuvalu and Tonga, already exceeded 
the 40 per cent threshold. 
Because public debt was relatively low and 
fiscal accounts were healthy, countries across 
the region were able to respond to the recession 
with large stimulus packages. The average 
stimulus was equal to 7.5 per cent of GDP, 
compared with 2.8 per cent for packages in 
the G7 countries (Figure II-5). The stimulus 
package of China amounted to a sizeable 13 per 
cent of GDP. Even low-income countries such 
as Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic  implemented programmes through 
domestic sources. Among the Pacific island 
countries, Papua New Guinea, which benefited 
from commodity price increase and had some 
fiscal space, increased spending by about 5 per 
cent of non-oil GDP. The structure of the stimuli 
differed across countries-but common to all 
were the efforts to minimize the social 
consequences of the crisis by bolstering social 
FIgure II-4
Debt-to-GDP ratios in Asia and the Pacific, 1990-2008
Source: Adams and others, 2010. 
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FIgure II-5
Stimulus expenditures in selected economies
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safety nets and other social sector spending; and 
undertaking strategic long-term investments in 
physical and human capital. 
to maintain adequate liquidity for the 
economy, most Asian countries adopted 
expansionary monetary policies. These 
efforts went beyond cutting policy rates; they 
also included direct injections of liquidity, 
especially for affected sectors and SMes.   As 
in most economies there was an increase of 
money and credit. governments cut policy 
interest rates sequentially from the last 
quarter of 2008 and, in most economies, 
have kept them low since. These monetary 
operations, along with fiscal expansion, 
mitigated the adverse impact of the global 
slowdown and steered the region’s recovery. 
The Pacific island countries, however, generally 
recovered from the recent global financial 
crisis more slowly than the Asian low-income 
economies. recovery was slower in Fiji and 
also in Samoa where the already weakened 
economic system was hit by natural disasters 
(Box II-6). 
Though the economic stimulus played a major 
role in the region’s V-shaped recovery, this 
was followed by a number of macroeconomic 
developments:
 Fiscal deficits and public debt – There was a 
sharp increase in fiscal deficits and the ratios of 
public debt to GDP. This reflected the cost of 
the stimuli as well as the adverse effects of the 
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Box II-6
Pacific island countries – facing multiple shocks
Compared to the rest of the region, the Pacific island countries were in general on a slower path 
to recovery from the recent global financial crisis. However, there were significant variations in the 
recovery process. These partly reflected their different economic structures and macroeconomic 
imbalances but also the natural disasters they faced. The recovery was slower in Fiji due to floods 
in 2012 and in Samoa due to an earthquake and tsunami in 2009. Except for commodity exporting 
economies (Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands), economic growth remained low in all Pacific 
island countries. 
Fiscal space remains limited in Pacific island countries, particularly in microstates such as the Marshall 
Islands, Tuvalu and Tonga. Since the beginning of the global economic crisis, fiscal balances have 
deteriorated in Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga. Public debt and external debt ratios remain relatively 
high for a number of countries. For Samoa, public debt and external debt exceed the prudential limits 
prescribed by the IMF. Several island economies such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu 
have accumulated comfortable levels of reserves that could provide temporary buffers against external 
shocks. Pacific island countries remain highly dependent on foreign aid which is equivalent to 20 per cent 
of GDP.
crisis on GDP and tax revenues. In some cases, 
additional support and guarantees to financial 
and industrial sectors also played a part. 
 Inflation – A number of economies saw an 
increase in inflationary pressures. These were 
partly the result of rises in food and fuel prices. 
But they also reflected expansionary monetary 
policies, as in China, India, and most ASEAN 
countries. Central banks in these economies 
kept interest rates low and soaked their 
economies with liquidity so as to sustain the 
recovery.
All in all, even in the midst of a global recession 
the region has so far avoided accelerated fiscal 
consolidation and monetary tightening. This 
again contrasts with the response to the 1997 
Asian financial crisis when most of the affected 
countries tightened fiscal and monetary policy, 
without giving much consideration, especially 
at the beginning, to the impact on the real 
economy or employment.32 Macroeconomic 
stabilization is thus important, but experience 
shows that it should not be considered an end 
in itself. 
A continuum of thresholds
International financial institutions and academia 
have recently been giving greater attention to 
macroeconomic resilience, but there have been 
few empirical studies of the determinants of 
resilience, particularly for developing economies. 
One such study was the World Economic Outlook 
2012.33 However, this largely addressed eco-
nomic shocks and did not include natural 
disasters. Moreover, its policy prescriptions, 
which did not have a rigorous empirical 
foundation, were largely mechanical one-size-fits 
all measures. These were: 
– Monetary policy – Whether the central bank 
has adopted inflation targeting and achieved an 
inflation rate below 10 per cent.
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– Fiscal policy – Whether the government is 
running a fiscal surplus or deficit; whether it 
has had a high public debt, the threshold of 
high public debt being defined at 50 per cent. 
Whether the government has fiscal space to 
run counter-cyclical policies if required.
– External sector policy – Whether the economy 
has a current account surplus or deficit; a high 
or low ratio of external debt to GDP (above 
or below 40 per cent), or a high or low ratio of 
international reserves to GDP.
The IMF study also highlighted a set of 
structural policies. These include increased trade 
openness and diversification; increased financial 
openness and a change in the composition of 
capital flows, along with income inequality. 
Such prudential macroeconomic parameters 
provide general guidelines. But they should 
not be interpreted as iron-clad rules – rather, 
to be interpreted flexibly based on national 
circumstances. 
This is because the midst of a crisis or a 
disaster is not the best time to mechanically 
pursue prudential norms of macroeconomic 
stabilization. The overarching aim should be 
to arrest the spread of the shock to the real 
economy, labour markets and above all to the 
poorest and most vulnerable. Employment, real 
wages, and poverty reduction take much longer 
to recover than GDP.34 A review of financial 
crises in 80 countries found that real wages take 
an average of three years to pick up again, while 
employment growth does not regain pre-crisis 
levels until several years after that.35
Moreover, even in ‘good times’, evidence shows 
that there is no unique threshold of stability 
for each macroeconomic variable – growth, 
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inflation, the fiscal deficit, the current account 
deficit, international reserves. Rather, there 
is a continuum of thresholds for various 
combinations of these key variables which 
could indicate a degree of macroeconomic 
instability. It may be relatively easy to identify 
a country in a state of macroeconomic 
instability – for example, one with large 
current account deficits financed by short-term 
borrowing, high and rising levels of public 
debt, double-digit inflation and stagnant or 
declining GDP. And it is relatively easy to 
identify at the other end of the spectrum the 
contributors to macroeconomic stability – 
current account and fiscal balances consistent 
with low and declining debt levels, inflation 
in low single digits and rising per capita GDP. 
But there is also a substantial grey area: indeed 
this is where most developing countries operate 
in reality. 
This has been the case, for example, in the 
high-performing Asian ‘miracle’ economies. In 
general they have had a history of fiscal prudence 
and discipline, but not all have achieved the 
same degree of macroeconomic stability. Take 
inflation. Between 1961 and 1991, Malaysia 
and Singapore consistently maintained low, 
single-digit inflation – around 3.5 per cent. 
But the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, on 
the other hand, regularly posted double-digit 
inflation rates – around 12 per cent.36 There 
is a similar diversity in budget deficits. In the 
1980s, Singapore always maintained a budget 
surplus and the Republic of Korea’s deficit at 
1.9 per cent was below the OECD average. On 
the other hand the average deficit in Thailand 
was 6 per cent of GDP and in Malaysia 11 
per cent. These economies also took different 
approaches to foreign borrowing. Singapore 
along with Hong Kong, China and Taiwan 
Province of China avoided borrowing abroad, 
while the Republic of Korea and Indonesia 
relied on substantial foreign borrowing during 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
It should also be emphasized that prudential 
parameters simply represent policy outcomes. 
They do not indicate policy content or quality. 
The same outcomes can be achieved in many 
different ways using different institutional 
designs and policies that are sensitive to 
local constraints.37 In the absence of other 
complementary conditions, particularly those 
related to governance, mere adherence to 
macroeconomics norms will not always yield 
the best outcomes.38 
Nor are these norms likely to take the form 
of specific ‘safe levels’. How high is too high 
for inflation? Or, how high is too high for the 
budget deficit? Much will depend on local 
circumstances. For example, if an economy 
is growing briskly, the government can sustain 
a fairly large budget deficit. What matters 
more in this case, is how the expenditure is being 
financed and what it is being used for. If the 
deficit is large and financed by monetization, it 
may lead to inflation; if it relies on heavy domestic 
borrowing, it may lead to an increase in the interest 
rate and crowd out private investment; and if it 
relies on large external borrowing, it may build up 
an unsustainable debt burden. 
Also important is the purpose of the expenditure. 
If it is for physical infrastructure that relieves 
a critical constraint on economic growth, the 
budget deficit may have little adverse impact 
on the debt burden in the medium term. Many 
possible combinations can work. It should also 
be borne in mind that while investors or rating 
agencies and international financial institutions 
do care about public debt and inflation, they 
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also worry about a country’s long-term growth 
prospects. Therefore, policymakers must avoid 
an excessive focus on stabilization which may 
make macroeconomic policies pro-cyclical.
Macroeconomic policies for stabilization 
and development 
Developing countries should thus not have 
an overly mechanical interpretation of 
macroeconomic prudence. Instead, while 
maintaining short-run stability they should 
be guided by the goals of long-run economic 
development and poverty reduction. This may 
require striking a balance between development 
and stability. Promoting economic development 
will mean mobilizing public investment and 
allocating it efficiently. Stabilization will mean 
creating macroeconomic buffers that will act as 
self-insurance against future external shocks, 
economic or natural. The exact balance will 
depend on national circumstances, but is likely 
to include some of the following elements. 
 Fiscal policy – This should support public 
investment in social and physical infrastructure, 
including disaster risk identification, mitigation, 
and preparedness. For this purpose low-income 
countries will probably need to increase fiscal 
space – for example, by improving domestic 
resource mobilization, expanding public-private 
partnerships, enhancing the efficiency of public 
expenditure, and creating an environment that 
attracts investment. 
 Monetary policy – This should aim to 
provide affordable credit to agriculture 
and manufacturing, especially to SMEs. 
Governments can also improve prudential 
regulation of the financial sector and ensure 
that it deals effectively with non-performing 
loans. 
 Exchange rate policy – This should support 
export competitiveness, while regulating 
the capital account until the financial sector 
becomes more robust.
 Macroeconomic policy buffers – Governments 
also need to strengthen existing shock absorbers, 
including social safety nets. 
 Poverty-sensitive response – This will mean 
protecting spending that benefits poor people, if 
necessary by introducing guidelines to protect 
such programmes as part of the public finance law. 
Governments that are aiming to accelerate 
growth and human development are not, 
however, going to achieve this simply through 
macroeconomic and financial reforms. They 
will also need structural reforms to boost 
production, diversify exports, and increase 
spending for health and education. 
Moreover, some countries are unlikely to make 
sufficient progress in macroeconomic resilience 
solely through their own efforts. Many of the 
least developed countries, and some Pacific 
island countries, will require continued external 
assistance from the international community. 
Currently, international financial institutions 
and other donors assist countries affected by 
external shocks. There are a number of ways 
this assistance can be improved (Box II-7). 
Upgrading macro tool kits to manage  
complex risks
Investing in disaster risk reduction pays off. 
Nevertheless, many developing countries still 
spend more on response and reconstruction. 
For financial crises too, countries tend to 
employ vigorous ad hoc and arbitrary measures, 
such as bailing out struggling banks and 
industries. 
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This short-sighted behaviour is partly the result 
of human cognitive failures in understanding 
and internalizing risks. But politicians are also 
reluctant to invest either financial or political 
capital in preparing for events that might not 
occur. In addition it is the difficulty in applying 
systems thinking to complex and inter- 
connected challenges posed by multiple shocks. 
To overcome such constraints, governments 
need to develop risk management frameworks. 
These should develop greater understanding 
of nature of the risks, wider dissemination of 
the necessary information and knowledge, 
and making resources available to poorer 
households for risk reduction and management. 
Box II-7
Development assistance for addressing shocks in low-income countries
Development assistance can help developing countries which have been affected by shocks. 
– In many cases assistance should be concessional. However, some heavily indebted countries would 
have trouble servicing even highly concessional loans, so the only option would be grants. 
– Aid is at its most effective immediately after a shock so the international community should avoid 
delays in response. One way of achieving this might be to bring forward existing commitments, and 
temporarily reallocating these to help counter the effects of a shock. 
– Large and highly visible natural disasters tend to attract more foreign assistance, while smaller 
disasters or silent crises from terms-of-trade shocks are largely ignored. Donors need to make sure 
they allocate external assistance in accordance with real needs. 
– If a country knows that external assistance will be readily available if it is hit by a shock, it may lose 
the incentive to take preventive measures. To overcome such ‘moral hazard’ the international donor 
community can direct some of its assistance to risk reduction; this would benefit both donors and 
recipients by introducing predictability in their respective financial plans. Furthermore, donors may 
link their external assistance to efforts by recipient countries to reduce their economic vulnerability to 
shocks. International financial institutions can also provide technical assistance to develop domestic 
insurance markets.
– Recent years have seen the emergence of innovative capital market-based risk financing 
mechanisms. These include catastrophe bonds, contingent credit and regional catastrophe insurance 
pools. International financial institutions can help countries gain access to such mechanisms. They 
can also assist with the development of an Asia-Pacific catastrophe risk pool.
In some cases even the most conscientious 
policymakers will struggle to act. The necessary 
information may not exist, or there could be 
deep uncertainties about a model’s underlying 
assumptions – key variables, for example, and 
probability distributions. In such circumstances 
traditional cost-benefit analysis may offer 
little guidance. Instead they may need to turn 
to some of the emerging, highly sophisticated 
decision making tools and methodologies 
based on scenario analysis and vulnerability 
identification.39 These can accommodate 
different assumptions and stakeholder value 
systems, and provide a more balanced analysis 
on unpredictable events for which there is very 
little knowledge. 
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reGioNal cooperatioN caN Help 
bUilD ecoNomic resilieNce
National authorities alone cannot deal with 
economic shocks. In a globalized world such 
crises now have trans-border implications. 
Natural disasters too frequently cross national 
borders and wherever they occur can have 
international implications. Nowadays such 
issues also need to be addressed by collective 
action, especially regional cooperation. 
This principle has already been established in 
terms of economic cooperation. The Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralization, for example, 
can provide emergency liquidity to members, 
and there has also been a regional bond market 
initiative – though these initiatives are largely 
concentrated in South-East Asia, and are at 
various stages of implementation. 
Other potential areas for cooperation are 
macroeconomic management and exchange 
rate policies. So far, however, most activities 
have remained at the level of information 
exchange and dialogue. Some of these initiatives, 
particularly the coordination of exchange rate 
management, may not fully succeed unless 
they are part of global financial architecture 
reforms, but there are still opportunities at 
the regional level. Countries across the region 
would also benefit from better coordination of 
financial policies in the face of volatile capital 
flows, and better fiscal coordination for 
building resilience to economic shocks. 
Similarly, countries can work together to 
address risks related to natural disasters. One 
possibility is to establish regional risk insurance. 
There is, for example, an on-going initiative by 
the Pacific island countries to create a regional 
insurance pooling facility, the Pacific Disaster 
Financing and Insurance Programme.40 Other 
areas where countries can make efficient use 
of limited public resources include pooling of 
resources for disaster preparedness and systems 
for monitoring and early warning. Chapter 7 
addresses regional cooperation in depth. 
In the face of multiple shocks, countries across 
Asia and the Pacific that wish to preserve and 
extend development gains will need to build 
greater economic resilience against shocks. 
But this will not happen automatically. 
Governments will need to fundamentally 
rethink macroeconomic policy making, take 
measures to prepare for shocks and mitigate 
risks, and apply new decision-making tools 
and models to incorporate risks into macro-
economic frameworks. They will also need to 
work together more closely. There is much cause 
for optimism. Countries across the region have 
successfully learnt from past crises. What is 
needed now is the political will to move forward.
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CHAPTER 3
bUilDiNG resilieNt commUNities
Those most exposed to economic crises and disasters are the poor. With few savings 
and living in precarious circumstances, they have few buffers against shocks. 
Nevertheless, poor communities and their most vulnerable members can learn from 
past adversity and can even bounce back stronger and better prepared for future 
shocks – especially if they can rely on social protection schemes and inclusive and 
adaptive governance.
People who are already disadvantaged are likely 
to be hit hardest by economic crises and natural 
disasters. Rural communities, for example, rely 
heavily on natural resources for their livelihoods 
and are at greater risks from droughts and 
floods. Poor urban communities in precarious 
housing, such as slum dwellers and those living 
on riverbanks, are also more exposed to hazards. 
And the poor who will generally be working in 
informal employment also have fewer and less 
effective economic buffers, so at times of crisis 
may resort to high-interest loans, postpone 
health-related expenditure or withdraw children 
from school. 
Within poor communities, some people are 
especially vulnerable. These would include 
children, older persons, ethnic minorities, and 
those with disabilities or living with HIV and 
AIDS. Such excluded groups often lack the 
social buffers to protect them from extreme 
weather events or economic downturns. In 
many societies, in times of difficulty girls are 
the first to be taken out of school. 
Nevertheless, despite tremendous hardships, 
communities and their most vulnerable 
members can learn from past adversity and can 
even bounce back stronger and better prepared 
for future shocks. This Chapter examines the 
potential for building community resilience. 
It reviews the capacities and strategies that 
allow communities to recover, showing the 
importance of equitable and sustainable 
economic development, of ensuring strong 
social capital, and of empowering communities. 
It also considers further ways of enhancing 
resilience to disasters and economic shocks. 
tHe VUlNerable poor
In both natural disasters and economic crises 
those who are most vulnerable are the poor (Box 
III-1). Without the safety net of savings, property 
and other buffers – they have less capacity to 
cope and often experience multiple and repeated 
shocks that further erode their capacity to cope.1 
Already disadvantaged by social and economic 
imbalances, the poor can thus be further 
marginalized into vicious cycles of chronic 
hardship, sometimes for generations. 
The poor tend to be more exposed to natural 
disasters because they live on hazardous land  –  on 
earthquake fault lines, floodplains, and in coastal 
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Box  III-1
Myanmar – the impact of cyclones on poverty
SHAN
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Myanmar: Natural Disasters 2002 - 2012 
LEGEND
Cyclone Nargis 2008
Cyclone Giri 2010
6.8 Earthquake 2011
6.8 Earthquake 2012
Floods Rakhine 2010
Floods Magway 2011
Floods 2012
Map provided by OCHA
Myanmar is exposed to many natural hazards. In 2012 it was ranked the Asia-Pacific country 
‘most at risk’. Between 2002  and 2012, it experienced three cyclones, affecting 2.6 million people, three 
floods, affecting 500,000 people, and two major earthquakes, affecting 20,000 people.  Particularly exposed 
are the eastern and southern coastal regions (see map). 
Although it is not possible to correlate poverty levels with disasters, it is noticable that following the most 
devastating cyclone, Nargis in 2008, poverty levels rose in four southern and western coastal states: Kayin, 
Yangon, Ayeyarwadi and Rakhine, which are those most exposed to cyclones.    
Sources: UNU, 2012; Myanmar Information Management Unit, 2013; UNDP, 2013.
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The poor are also likely to be hardest hit by 
economic crises. Most will be low-skilled, 
casual, seasonal or contract labourers with 
precarious or irregular work and low earnings. 
In Nepal, India and Pakistan, around 80 per 
cent of non-agricultural workers are engaged 
in informal employment. In Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Viet Nam, the proportion is 
around 70 per cent. Those in the informal sector 
are often hit hardest by external shocks; lacking 
effective social protection coverage, they rely on 
the flexibility of shifting between different, if 
low-paid, tasks.
In addition to those living below the poverty 
line there are millions more who can easily fall 
areas that are highly exposed to cyclones and 
typhoons. In the Asia-Pacific region, more 
people are living in coastal areas and cities, 
especially in the megacities that have more than 
10 million inhabitants. In 2011, ten of the world’s 
twenty largest megacities were located in Asia.2 
Within these cities many people are packed into 
informal housing areas with poor infrastructure 
where they are particularly vulnerable to natural 
disasters. Thus when severe tropical storm 
Washi (Sendong) hit Mindanao in the 
Philippines in 2011, it was informal communities 
living in poorly constructed houses that suffered 
most of the damage; within the formal housing 
zones, however, only 5 per cent of homes were 
damaged.3 
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into poverty.4 In Indonesia, for example, 12 per 
cent of the national population live below the 
official poverty line, but nearly 40 per cent live 
below just 1.5 times this value.5 In Kazakhstan, 
whilst 65 per cent of the population are 
considered non-poor, 13 per cent are estimated 
to be vulnerable to poverty.6 Even small shocks 
can propel them into poverty. Governments 
designing policies aimed at generating 
resilience thus also need to consider the 
vulnerable non-poor.7 
eXclUDeD GroUps
Also particularly vulnerable to disasters are 
‘excluded’ individuals – who are outside 
many societal bonds and relationships. When 
adversity strikes they are more isolated, with less 
access to networks and relationships of support. 
They can also be disadvantaged when it comes 
to emergency relief. Air drops delivering 
supplies, for example, can exclude the young, 
the elderly and persons with disabilities. Poorly 
designed emergency shelters or camps can also 
exclude persons with disabilities, make women 
vulnerable to sexual violence, or inadvertently 
prevent minorities from accessing aid.8 
Women – The largest excluded group are women, 
who often suffer more in disasters. After the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 70 per cent of 
fatalities in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, and 80 per 
cent of those in Sri Lanka, were women. In 
1991, following cyclone Gorky in Bangladesh 
the majority of those who died were women. 
Women also accounted for 61 per cent of 
total deaths during Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar 
in 2008.9 Women are also disadvantaged during 
relief operations. Following the 2010 floods 
in Pakistan, for example, women were either 
overlooked in the relief distribution, or were 
unable to reach places where relief was being 
distributed because of social norms that 
restricted their mobility.10 After disasters women 
come under further pressure, particularly those 
in female-headed households, because of their 
traditional responsibilities for caring for the 
elderly and children. Although active in all 
stages of a disaster, women continue to be 
seen as passive victims and their capacities in 
building community resilience are rarely 
recognized.11 
Children – Children are also vulnerable to 
multiple shocks. The Indian Ocean tsunami caused 
high mortality among children in Sri Lanka: 
31.8 per cent of the total mortality rate for those 
aged 0-5 years, and 23.7 per cent for those aged 
5-9 years.12 Furthermore, at times of economic 
crises, children’s health and education can come 
under threat.13 In Thailand during the 1997 
financial crisis, many more schoolchildren 
became malnourished and there was a higher 
proportion of low birth-weight babies, 
particularly among the poor, as well as higher 
incidences of measles, malaria and diarrhoea.14 
Girls are especially vulnerable: in many countries 
they are the first to drop out of school after 
disasters, and can face the additional hazard of 
being forced into sex work.15 In Indonesia after 
the 1997 financial crisis, the number of street 
children increased by 43 per cent, with 30 per 
cent of those becoming sex workers.16  
Older persons – By 2050, the number of older 
persons in Asia and the Pacific will triple – to 
an estimated 1.3 billion.17 Older people are also 
more vulnerable to shocks. Following the 1997 
financial crisis, older persons in the Republic of 
Korea and Indonesia were more likely to lose 
their jobs and incomes.18 And following the 
Wenchuan earthquake in China in 2008, 70 
per cent of older persons suffered greatly after 
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losing the support of their children.19 In the 
2011 Japan earthquake, for example, while only 
representing 31 per cent of the population in 
the three most affected prefectures (Iwate, 
Fukushima and Miyagi), 65 per cent of victims 
were aged 60 or over – because they were less 
mobile their evacuation was delayed. 
Persons with disabilities – During certain 
disasters, people with disabilities are more likely 
to die.20 They can be additionally vulnerable 
because of poorly designed physical infrastructure 
or inadequate emergency information.21  Following 
the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, more 
than 2 per cent of persons with disabilities 
were killed or missing compared with 1 per 
cent of those without a disability.22
 
copiNG WitH sHocks
At times of crisis and disaster, some groups and 
individuals are more vulnerable. However, they 
are rarely passive victims. Different groups and 
individuals react differently (Box III-2). Most 
will try to cope with adversity by drawing on 
Box  III-2
The Philippines – coping mechanisms during the 1991  
Mount Pinatubo eruption 
In 1991 in the Philippines, one of the world’s largest volcanic eruptions took place at Mount Pinatubo. 
Different communities in the surrounding areas coped in different ways. Some felt they could not rely 
on the Government or anyone else and a feeling of mutual distrust emerged, so they resorted to the 
kanya-kanya syndrome – everyone for themselves. The alternative was pakikipagkapwa, that is, being in har-
mony with another person, helping or connecting with them: by talking to a companion they could give 
vent to their feelings and help ease and relieve their pain. The disaster affected various ethnic groups, 
which had different coping responses based on their own cultural norms and values. In some cases the 
disaster eroded social cohesion whereas in others it strengthened community resilience.
all their economic, social and natural resources. 
In many cases they can ‘bounce back better’. 
But under pressure they can also be forced into 
‘erosive’ strategies that lead to a vicious cycle of 
poverty (Box III-3). 
Erosive strategies
Sometimes people take actions that offer 
immediate relief but can undermine their 
livelihoods in the long run. For example, they 
might sell their working or breeding animals 
or agricultural or fishing equipment. Or they 
may take out high-interest loans. As a last 
resort they may pull children out of school.23 
They can also reduce the quantity or quality of 
food, forego medical treatment, or overexploit 
natural resources.24 All these measures can 
perpetuate poverty and reduce the incomes of 
future generations. 
Following crises, access to finance typically 
becomes even more difficult. In Cambodia, 
the Philippines and Thailand, for instance, 
during the 2007-2008 economic crisis, many 
people pawned assets such as jewellery or sold 
Source: Guss and Pangan, 2004; Jocano, 1997.
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• Selling productive livestock such as working or 
 breeding animals
• Eating very little or very unpleasant food resulting 
 in less physical health
• Selling agricultural or fishing equipment
• Mortgaging or selling land
• Borrowing money at very high interest rates
• Over-exploiting natural resources
• Selling excess animals
• Consuming less-expensive or less-preferred food, 
 or gathering wild foods.
• Drawing on kinship transfers of food or money, or 
 reciprocal labour exchange
• Migration and remittances
• Casual local work or temporary migration
• Drawing on existing savings
Non-erosiveErosive
Box  III-3
Coping with disasters – erosive and non-erosive strategies 
productive equipment such as motorbikes or 
boats. Similarly, in Kazakhstan, people sold 
houses, cattle and cars.25 In Mongolia, poor 
herders severely affected by declining world 
prices of cashmere had to sell a larger number 
of animals while the wealthier herders could 
rely on savings and other sources of income 
and could wait for the prices to recover.26 In 
Viet Nam, rural communities had to rely more 
on natural resources and extracted more forest 
production, often beyond sustainable limits.27 
In the most extreme circumstances, people 
may even work as illegal migrants under severe 
oppression, sell body organs or become victims 
of human trafficking (Box III-4). In many 
countries in Asia, unsuspecting women who 
are trying to eke out a living can be trafficked 
into commercial sex.28 For a few, the final resort 
is suicide – a recurrent tragedy in some parts 
of India when indebted farmers cannot repay 
loans to moneylenders or banks. 
Source: Heltberg and others, 2012.
Non-erosive strategies
On the other hand, the more resilient groups or 
households respond with non-erosive strategies 
that do not endanger their future livelihoods. 
They might, for example, be able to draw on 
existing savings, sell non-essential possessions, 
or consume less-expensive or less-preferred food. 
They might also seek additional work, either 
locally or by migrating to another area or a 
nearby city. 
People can also draw on family or social 
solidarity networks for food supplies or informal 
loans, or engage in reciprocal labour exchange. 
During the 2008 crisis, women in Bangladesh 
showed great skill and flexibility; though women 
are often seen as vulnerable during a disaster, 
they can also be resilient shock absorbers 
(Box III-5). 
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Some households will have diversified their 
sources of income through international 
migration – and benefit from remittances 
from family members overseas. In 2011, 
countries in South Asia, South-East 
Asia and the Pacific received almost 
half the world’s remittances and the 
volume continued to increase in 2012.29 Indeed 
remittances are now on such a scale that they 
exceed government social expenditure or official 
development assistance. In the year ending June 
2012 Bangladeshis sent home $13 billion, more 
than all the Government’s social protection 
programmes put together.30 Remittances have 
the advantage that they are often counter- 
cyclical, rising during economic downturns 
and natural disasters as migrants send more 
cash to meet their families’ emergency needs. 
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Figure  III-1
The community resilience-building process
 
sUpportiNG commUNities
Many vulnerable communities, faced with 
perennial disasters and weak government 
support have organized themselves to prepare 
better against disasters and crises by undertaking 
community-based disaster risk reduction.31 
Supporting community resilience involves 
focussing on what communities can do for 
themselves and enabling them to strengthen 
their capacities. This process is illustrated 
schematically in a model in Figure III-1. This 
has two levels: the first identifies the necessary 
adaptive capacities; the second identifies the 
required mechanisms or strategies. 
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Box  III-4
Coping with shocks 
Ms. Eni Lestari Andayani Adi came from a small town in Indonesia, and like other girls her age, had big 
dreams of pursuing college and becoming a professional. However, her dreams were shattered when 
her family lost their small business in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The family then 
became trapped in debt, unable to make a living. Torn between her dreams, and the responsibility to 
support her family, Ms. Eni decided to leave Indonesia to become a domestic migrant worker abroad.
As a female domestic migrant worker, she faced unbearable injustice and gender discrimination. She 
says, “The recruitment agency forced me into confinement in a training camp for five months. I was 
made to sleep on the floor with hundreds of other women, verbally abused, and even witnessed torture 
and rape of my friends. I had no access to family and friends and just hoped to leave this place soon.” 
Ms. Eni was relieved when she found a job in Hong Kong as a domestic helper, but her happiness was 
short-lived. She was denied wages for the first few months, cut off from the outside world, and was 
given no holidays. She found herself trapped with no support network, living in a foreign country with 
an abusive employer. Yet she stayed because she was the main breadwinner for her family back home. 
When she could not bear the sufferings any longer, she managed to escape from her employer’s house 
and take refuge in a shelter for domestic workers in Hong Kong. There she learnt about her rights as 
a migrant worker and found solace in the company of other women of different nationalities who had 
faced similar fate. She realized that she suffered mainly on account of being a female migrant worker. 
Ms. Eni says, “I have learnt that discrimination is not only in the form of employment or physical abuse 
but also in the form of structural abuse. Government policies fail to treat women as equal to men.” 
Now, as the founder of the Association of Indonesian Migrant Workers in Hong Kong, she is strongly 
committed to help other millions of female migrant workers who are vulnerable to external shocks and 
gender discrimination, through education, awareness, and promotion of protection and rights. 
Box  III-5
Bangladesh – resilient women during the 2008 crisis 
During the 2008 financial and food crisis, poor Bangladeshi women demonstrated great resilience and 
resourcefulness. In response to the spike in food prices, many rural women diversified their sources 
of income. Some participated in the Government’s new 100 Days Employment Guarantee schemes. 
Others took jobs previously considered taboo for Muslim women, such as working publicly in restaurant 
kitchens or managing market stalls. One new niche livelihood involved the gathering and sale of 
vegetables rejected by local wholesale markets. Overall in Bangladesh, women and girls whose labour 
is often priced lower than market rates, showed great resilience and initiative in finding alternative 
sources of livelihoods for themselves and their families.
Source: Heltberg and others, 2012.
Source: From the speech of Ms. Eni Lestari Andayani Adi, founder of the Association of Indonesian Migrant Workers in 
Hong Kong, at the International Women’s Day, Bangkok, 8 March 2013.
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To build resilience, communities can draw on 
three types of capital: economic, natural and 
social. Economic capital provides economic 
and material capacities, and natural capital 
provides them with ecosystem goods and services 
that are essential for survival and well-being. 
But people can also be vulnerable to disasters 
because they lack bonds of solidarity and 
cohesiveness. They also therefore need sufficient 
social capital – in the form of durable networks 
of trust and solidarity that enable collective 
action.
To enhance these three adaptive capacities 
there are five main strategies: strengthening 
social protection; fostering mechanisms for 
risk transfer; enhancing local governance; 
promoting partnerships; and using information 
and communications technology. 
Strengthening social protection
Resilient communities are built on sustainable 
and inclusive development. For this they will 
need economic resources, decent employment 
and access to social services, including health 
and education. And over their lifetime they 
need economic security. Most of this they 
should be able to provide themselves directly, 
but they should also be able to take advantage 
of more formal systems of social protection. 
This can take the form of old age and disability 
pensions, unemployment pay, maternity and child 
benefits, and universal access to essential health 
care. In many developing countries, however, 
such systems fall short. Some are poorly 
designed or offer scant benefits – and often fail 
to address the particular vulnerabilities of those 
who need protection the most. As a result, 
people tend to rely primarily on their families 
or communities.
Providing a strong social protection floor that 
guarantees certain basic rights for all citizens 
is critical. The State plays a pivotal role in the 
development of integrated approaches to social 
protection rooted in universalism and a rights-
based framework. Building a social protection 
floor must be seen as an investment in human 
capacity and capabilities. Once established by 
offering a minimum level of access to essential 
services and income security for all, social 
protection programmes can be built incrementally, 
with the capacity for extension according to the 
needs and aspirations of countries, and the level 
of economic development.
Effective social protection programmes should 
be all inclusive and maintained or enhanced 
in times of crisis. Viet Nam, for example, has 
a wide range of programmes (Box III-6). And 
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Box  III-6
Viet Nam – The National Target Programme for Poverty Reduction
Arising out of the country’s socialist legacy, Viet Nam has a wide range of social policy and protection 
programmes. One is the all-inclusive National Target Programme for Poverty Reduction. This has a 
wide range of instruments, including preferential credit to poor households and subsidies for education. 
The Programme also offers subsidies to poor communities in mountainous areas to support their 
agricultural and residential land, including housing and water supply. 
In addition, the Government has developed the Socio-Economic Development Programme for Ethnic 
Minority Areas or ‘Programme 135’. This targets communities and villages of ethnic minorities and 
those in mountainous areas, and has four primary components: 
1. Market-oriented agricultural production, providing agricultural extension and marketing services to 
improve household income. 
2. Community infrastructure development to improve access by the poor to various social services as 
well as increased economic opportunities.  
3. Capacity building for local officials and communities to better plan, manage, implement and monitor 
investments. 
4. Improve socio-cultural livelihoods by providing social services, which includes safe water and 
sanitation, and assets such as housing and land.
The first phase of the Programme from 1998 to 2005 covered 2,410 of Viet Nam’s poorest communities. 
Of these, 1,938 (1.1 million households) were in mountainous areas, while 472 (over 6 million people) 
were in the lowland areas. 
Source: ILO, 2010.
Indonesia has demonstrated the value of a 
comprehensive response to a crisis (Box III-7). 
Social protection systems cannot be set up 
overnight, so crisis interventions are more effective 
if they build on pre-existing mechanisms.32 
For example, after the financial crisis in 1998, 
Indonesia started a system of community- 
linked cash transfers. So when a tsunami hit 
Aceh province in 2004, the Government was 
able to strengthen the system to make it a 
central delivery mechanism for rebuilding 
community livelihoods and infrastructure.
Social protection systems also need reliable 
funding. During economic crises, the tax 
revenues and contributions reserved for social 
protection may decrease just when more people 
are seeking assistance. It is important therefore 
to ensure that the financing systems are flexible 
and can be scaled up for episodic shocks, with 
elements of contingent targeting.33 India and 
the Philippines have successfully managed to 
maintain calamity funds – with an annual pool 
of reserves to deal with more frequent small-
scale disasters.34
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support to vulnerable groups such as young 
professionals, persons with disabilities and 
mothers with small children. These measures 
are expected to generate over 14,000 jobs 
annually between 2013 and 2015 (Box III-8).  
Informal social protection
In the absence of formal social protection, 
many people rely on a variety of traditional or 
informal protection within households, groups 
and networks. People can use such networks, 
for example, to find jobs through friends, 
relatives, neighbours and communities – or 
through other workers in the same occupational 
group. They may exchange meals and small 
loans and receive emotional support. For many 
people, such as excluded groups or migrants 
from other countries, this support may be all 
that is available. 
If the crisis is prolonged, however, with high 
levels of stress, solidarity mechanisms can start 
to weaken. They are unlikely to be completely 
destroyed but will have less capacity, perhaps 
providing aid to only the neediest or to older 
persons.37 Reports from Cambodia showed that 
during the economic crisis of 2008-2009, 
although stretched and weakened by the shock, 
Sources: Davies and McGregor, 2009; Prichett, Sumarro and Suryahadi, 2003.
Box  III-7
Indonesia – social protection response to the 1997 financial crisis 
During the 1997 financial crisis, Indonesia’s poverty rate doubled within a year. The Government 
responded quickly with a National Safety Net Programme which between 1998 and 2000 helped 
reduce the poverty rate from 33 to 12 per cent. The programme is also thought to have contributed 
significantly to the country’s wider economic recovery. The success of this programme also 
encouraged the Government to set more ambitious social objectives, as demonstrated by the launch of an 
unconditional direct cash transfer programme in 2005, and a conditional cash transfer programme 
in 2007.  
Dealing with multiple shocks is, however, best 
achieved in a more comprehensive way through 
‘adaptive social protection’. This involves 
integrating social protection with disaster risk 
reduction and climate change adaptation.35 
Thus far these fields have largely developed in 
silos – within ministries of the economy, 
environment, interior or civil protection, 
and social affairs – leading to duplication, 
inefficiency and competition. 
In the Philippines, Samoa and Maldives, 
governments have introduced legal frameworks 
and national action plans to integrate disaster 
risk reduction and climate change. They are 
building on existing systems by ensuring the 
programmes are sufficiently flexible.36 Households 
can then cope with higher levels of everyday risk 
– regardless of the source: disasters, economic 
crisis or changes in average climate conditions. 
To achieve long-lasting results, social protection 
systems need to be accompanied by longer-term 
measures for poverty reduction. These could 
include social assistance programmes to protect 
the vulnerable as well as child-care facilities 
to enable women to join the workforce. After 
the 2008 global financial crisis, the Russian 
Federation, for example, provided livelihood 
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Box  III-8
The Russian Federation – response to the 2008 global financial crisis 
The National Government of the Russian Federation responded to the 2008 global financial crisis with 
measures for employment generation. These projects targeted young professionals, persons with 
disabilities and their parents, and mothers with young children. The Government coordinated 
and organized activities aimed at providing livelihood support by improving social security and 
offering subsidies. 
Young people, including those unemployed and at risk of dismissal, were assisted through vocational 
training and internship programmes. At the end of this training, workers obtained a certificate to prove 
their professional qualification to potential employers. There were also programmes to support small 
and medium enterprises and encourage individuals to set up their own businesses.
Source: The Russian Federation, 2013.
mutual support offered the most important safety 
nets for rural poor households, and the only 
ones for rural migrants in cities.38 Nevertheless, 
in the face of multiple, covariate shocks, even 
informal community-based safety nets may 
eventually collapse. 
In developing countries, adequate coverage is 
likely to involve a combination of formal and 
informal channels - taking advantage of informal 
connections and systems but supporting these 
by formal mechanisms where appropriate. 
Indeed there are increasing calls for traditional 
mechanisms to be incorporated in more 
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Box  III-9
Samoa – combining formal and informal social protection
As a small island country, Samoa is highly vulnerable to disasters and global economic crises. It is 
one of the five most vulnerable states on the Commonwealth Vulnerability Index. To address such 
vulnerabilities, Samoa has both formal and informal mechanisms for social protection. For those 
in formal employment the Government provides a National Provident Fund and a worker’s 
compensation scheme – with voluntary participation by those working in the informal sector. The 
Government also provides a pension for everyone older than 65.  
But Samoa also provides support through traditional and customary practices: ‘fa’a Samoa’. This is 
based on matai system of heads of families and the traditional obligations of the extended family to 
provide both social and financial security and protect the vulnerable. Communities collect cash and 
food which the matais allocate according to individual needs or for village enterprises, the church and 
ceremonial activities. Finance is primarily received from wages and remittances. 
The matai system is also embedded within national politics and government. Matais take almost all the 
parliamentary seats. This facilitates a strong combination of formal and informal social protection 
mechanisms. 
Source: Amosa and Samson, 2012.
formal programmes.39 In Samoa, informal 
systems work alongside formal systems to 
reinforce social protection and enhance 
community resilience (Box III-9).
Fostering risk transfer
While richer individuals might be able to take 
out their own insurance against disaster, poorer 
households cannot afford such coverage. One 
alternative is ‘microinsurance’ which pools the 
risks and resources of whole groups. Micro-
insurance is valuable for people who are excluded 
from social protection schemes, particularly 
informal workers and their families. It can offer 
protection against a variety of shocks, including 
illness, old age, natural calamities, death of 
the family bread-winner, and theft or damage 
to assets or means of production.40 Coverage 
may include: repair of damaged assets, funeral 
services, cash transfers, concessionary credit, 
and the provision of permanent shelter. In 
addition, there may be donations for health 
treatment, or purchase of household commodities. 
Most microinsurance mechanisms involve a 
small premium. Some schemes are linked to 
loans and allow lenders to stop their repayments 
when a disaster strikes.41 Some boxes in this 
Chapter illustrate the recent experiences of 
India (Box III-10), Tajikistan (Box III-11), 
Solomon Islands (Box III-12), and Pakistan 
(Box III-13). They describe how these schemes 
have evolved to respond to frequent disasters 
and form part of resilience-building strategies.
However, one of the biggest challenges in 
microfinance is debt management. In Cambodia, 
for example, prior to the 2008 crisis a number 
of communities had taken significant amounts 
of credit from microfinance institutions. Some 
villagers resorted to borrowing from informal 
moneylenders to service their debts, but interest 
rates were high and many ended up losing their 
houses and their sources of income.42
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Box  III-10
India – microinsurance schemes after the 2001 earthquake
The 2001 earthquake in Gujarat left over 12,000 people dead and caused damage of approximately $2.5 
million. As people turned to the Government for financial support, it became clear that funding was 
limited. In response, the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute created an all-hazard insurance 
programme, AfatVimo, for men and women in Gujarat running microenterprises. Unlike other insurance 
schemes, AfatVimo covers 19 disaster risks and includes groups based in different geographic 
locations that are not equally exposed to disaster risks. Through the scheme, risk is transferred from the 
individual to the community or inter-community levels. The policy is available for an annual premium 
of less than $5 (a four-day wage) and is supported with micro-mitigation measures, such as fire-safety 
training, seismic-safe construction practices and business development services. 
Insurance schemes have now evolved into an effective means of reducing vulnerability to climate- 
related events, as well as other disasters. Thanks to a favourable regulatory environment, 
microinsurance schemes have been spreading. For example, insurers are now required to increase their 
number of low-income clients. 
Another channel for microinsurance is through microfinance institutions. To protect their microcredit 
and savings operations, these institutions have started to offer microinsurance schemes to their 
debtors. Sometimes microfinance clients are required to have insurance alongside their loans and 
savings, as is the case in Swayamkrushi, a saving and credit cooperative in Andhra Pradesh. 
Index-based microinsurance policies have also been pilot-tested in India. As they use an objectively 
calculated index, they also reduce moral hazard and the potential for manipulating claims. 
Sources: UNISDR and UNDP, 2007; Mechler and others, 2006; ESCAP, ADB and UNEP, 2012.
Some of the most effective microinsurance 
schemes have been index based. These schemes 
assess the exposure to extreme weather events 
and compensate vulnerable groups for the 
associated loss of income without people having 
to make individual claims. In the Republic of 
Korea, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries has started a crop 
disaster insurance programme and a fisheries 
disaster insurance programme. The intention 
is to cover all natural disasters such as typhoons, 
floods and storms. In recent years, formal insurers 
have also seen the potential in low-income 
markets, encouraging them to offer products, 
mainly in health and life insurance.43  
Enhancing local governance
Local governance institutions have an important 
part to play in enhancing community resilience. 
They can support local responses, engage 
vulnerable groups in decision-making and 
help them become self-reliant, independent, 
and resilient. For this purpose they need to 
involve vulnerable communities and other 
stakeholders in every step of the development 
process – from vision setting, planning, and 
implementation to monitoring and evaluation.44 
In rural areas one of the most important 
functions would be to improve the productive 
capacities of small farmers to maintain food 
supplies at times when international prices are 
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Box  III-12
Solomon Islands – developing community resilience
Kahua region, on the eastern Solomon Island of Makira, has been facing rapid changes through 
population growth and economic development. The region, with 4,500 people, is relatively isolated; 
it has little government presence and receives little assistance from external institutions. In 2000, 
community leaders established the Kahua Association (KA). KA acts as a bridging organization both 
between communities as well as externally with development organizations.
Despite having no formal controlling authority, KA has stimulated cross-community discussion and 
more equitable decision-making, with a horizontally structured hierarchy that limits the potential for 
power imbalances. The organization has been helping communities learn more about external market 
forces and appreciate the risks they face, while helping them enter into partnerships with development 
agencies.  
Box  III-13
Pakistan – disaster risk insurance for low-income communities
Traditional insurance cover for low-income communities would require an extensive network of trained 
people to assess the value of the asset being insured as well as claims for individual losses. In addition 
to the cost, this would be time consuming and involve long pay-out times. An alternative is index or 
‘parametric’ insurance. Such contracts are written against a physical trigger such as an earthquake of a 
predetermined magnitude. Each time there is an earthquake of the magnitude above the agreed level 
the people of the area would become eligible for certain amount irrespective of their actual losses. In 
the case of weather derivatives, farmers collect an insurance payment if the index reaches a trigger 
level – for example a certain measure of rainfall. 
In Pakistan, index-based crop insurance schemes are promoted and distributed by microfinance 
institutions, with technical assistance from the World Bank. The risk is borne by commercial or 
public insurers.
Source: Pakistan, 2013.
Sources: Schuett and Fazey, 2010; Schwartz and others, 2011.
Source: UNISDR and UNDP, 2007.
Box  III-11
Tajikistan – disaster risk reduction through community endowment funds
The Disaster Preparedness Action Plan focuses on community mobilization, disaster mitigation, 
and capacity building. Launched by CARE International in 2003, the project has sought to reduce 
disaster risk through better preparedness among vulnerable people. Sixty-four community-based 
organizations have been formed. Each organization establishes an endowment fund to enable the 
community to tackle and finance problems locally using its own resources.
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high. This could take the form of technological 
support and improved access to seeds and 
fertilizers.45 Strong links between communities 
and local governments are important also for 
successful collaboration in times of emergency.
An important contribution to greater local 
resilience is effective decentralization which can 
improve the delivery of key public services. 
Regional and local authorities can have a more 
complete understanding of local conditions and 
better respond to emerging needs. But decentral-
ization is not always effective. Decentralization 
can only be effective if local governments have the 
necessary capacity, resources, accountability and 
transparency. In the absence of these conditions, 
decentralization can lead to capture by local elites.
In principle, the government should address 
the poverty and vulnerability in each region 
through fiscal transfers, especially for natural 
disasters. In reality such transfers generally give 
little weight to levels of poverty or vulnerability 
– being based more on the size of the popula-
tion or the geographical area. Fiscal transfers 
thus fail to address regional inequalities; indeed 
the rich regions may get more than the poor. 
The problem is exacerbated when the grants 
are distributed in an ad hoc and discretionary 
manner. For example in India, the state 
governments often allocate and disburse funds 
to the panchayats depending on the project and 
on a case-by-case basis. This can result in an 
inequitable distribution of grants.46  
It is also important to monitor expenditure 
carefully to account for the flow of funds to the 
local levels. There are a number of important 
tools for analyzing the efficacy of fiscal 
decentralization in providing basic services to 
the poor. These include fiscal incidence studies 
and public expenditure tracking surveys – which 
have been used successfully in many countries 
such as Uganda, Peru and Zambia. 
Across Asia and the Pacific many local 
governments have helped communities build 
greater resilience to economic shocks and 
natural disasters:
 Sri Lanka   – The Ministry of Local 
Government and Provincial Councils carries 
out an annual performance appraisal for 
municipal councils, urban councils and 
pradeshiyasabas – using 78 indicators to gauge 
how local governments work on many issues, 
including disaster risk management. In 2009, 
Matara, a city on the southern coast, was 
recognized for its excellent performance 
and for integrating disaster risk reduction 
into the structures and work of the local 
government – in particular for managing flood 
risk by integrating disaster risk reduction in 
land use planning and for increasing public 
participation. Also, the local government 
partnered and collaborated with different 
stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive 
understanding of the city’s vulnerability.47 
 The Philippines – The Community-Based 
Disaster Risk Management and Local Govern-
ance programme is implemented by the Centre 
for Disaster Preparedness in Dagupan, north 
of Manila. This seeks to integrate community- 
based disaster risk management projects into 
good city governance. It has helped city officials 
re-engage with urban communities and 
provided training on disaster risk management 
– bridging the gap between high-level officials 
and local communities.
Promoting partnerships 
An important activity for both national and 
local governments is to promote public-private 
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partnerships (PPPs). An Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation workshop on PPPs and disaster 
resilience in 2010 pointed out that the private 
sector has much to offer in terms of resources 
and expertise and essential services. In many 
economies, the private sector operates critical 
infrastructure.48  
Governments can also work closely with civil 
society organizations – which can help 
communities to organize themselves more 
effectively to prepare for disasters and crises.49 
There are many examples of successful 
collaboration:
 Bangladesh – Practical Action Bangladesh 
and its local partner NGOs have an ongoing 
project with marginal farmers, fishermen, 
daily-wage labourers, local elected bodies, local 
educational institutions and government service 
providers. These projects have strengthened 
community capacity in livelihood-centred 
disaster management and awareness.50 
 Cambodia – The Asian Disaster Preparedness 
Centre has embarked on community-based 
flood mitigation and preparedness with 23 
communities – based on partnerships with 
international organizations. Community members 
contributed money and labour as well as their 
knowledge and expertise on which projects 
would be most effective.51 The exercise resulted 
in the construction of emergency evacuation 
routes, elevated roads and more bridges. 
 India – The NGO Gram Vikas has been 
working in Samiapalli village which lies five 
kilometres from the coast of the Bay of Bengal – 
one of the world’s most cyclone-prone regions. 
The NGO has helped the community raise 
a bank loan to buy additional land for the 
construction of disaster-proof homes.52 
 Indonesia – East Nusa Tenggara has an 
annual drought season that lasts nine months, 
and the province regularly experiences food 
shortages. A local NGO Yayasan Pikul in 
2005 started working with rural farmers on a 
community-based disaster risk management 
initiative in Sikka district. The community now 
has its own monitoring system for food security 
and a food early warning system, and is now 
in a stronger position to adapt and respond to 
climatic variations.53 
Using information and communications  
technology
Community resilience and response to disasters 
demands rapid production and dissemination of 
information between communities, governments 
and supporting organizations. Fortunately this 
can now be done more effectively through a 
variety of information and communication 
technologies – print, radio, television, the 
internet, and mobile and smart phones. Social 
media platforms are also proving invaluable 
in facilitating the exchange of information in 
times of crises. 
Early warning systems are usually managed 
nationally, but the onus lies on communities 
to receive this information and respond 
accordingly. In addition, communities need to be 
prepared to react to disasters such as flash floods 
or earthquakes that can occur without warning. 
A variety of programmes within the Asia- 
Pacific region seek to inform, encourage 
consultation, and empower communities to 
respond during times of crisis. 
 Lao People’s Democratic Republic – The 
Mekong River Commission and the Asian 
Disaster Preparedness Center have implemented 
a project called Flood Emergency Management 
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Strengthening. This has focused on community 
and public awareness, and initiated various 
engagement campaigns such as the School 
Flood Safety Program. Through this, 40 schools 
in Nongbok and Xebangfai areas used role 
playing and games to engage students, parents 
and community members.
 Afghanistan – In 2006, in partnership with 
the BBC World Service, the international 
NGO Tearfund produced radio dramas aimed 
at strengthening local capacity for disaster risk 
reduction. Disaster risk reduction messages were 
integrated into the story lines of a successful 
programme called ‘New Home, New Life’ 
– exploring issues concerning earthquakes, 
droughts and floods through drama set in a 
fictional remote village.54
 Indonesia – In the city of Yogyakarta, people 
are continually threatened by Mount Merapi, 
the country’s most active volcano, which is 
believed to have an average eruption span 
of 3.5 years. The most recent eruption in 
2010 claimed 302 lives.55 In 2010, the local 
government started providing information to 
communities within a 7-kilometre radius of 
the peak of the volcano about the condition of 
Mount Merapi. The government has also been 
refurbishing early warning devices.56  
 Australia – The Queensland floods of 2010 
and 2011 proved a significant testing ground 
for the Queensland Police Service’s new social 
media platform. Using the social media, 
Facebook and Twitter, the service provided 
followers who had access to the Internet and smart 
phones with real-time, centrally-coordinated 
and authoritative information. Within 24 
hours of the flash flood in the Lockyer Valley 
on 10 January 2011, the number of followers 
had reached 165,000 – receiving a record 39 
million story views, the equivalent of 450 hits 
per second. In addition, residents stranded in 
cars by flood waters were able to watch live 
press conferences on their smart phones, share 
information, and generally be kept abreast of 
the developing crisis.57
The need for disaster statistics
If governments are to prepare effectively for 
disasters, and respond rapidly, they need timely 
and reliable data. In particular, they need 
accurate information on the situation of the 
poor and most vulnerable. The starting point 
should be a full vulnerability assessment. 
Until recently, both governments and develop-
ment partners would have been daunted by this 
task, feeling they lacked the necessary resources 
or skills. Nowadays, however, they can take 
advantage of new and innovative technology. 
A number of governments, including Indonesia 
and the Philippines, have been using satellite 
data and geographic information systems to 
produce multi-hazard maps showing where the 
poor are at greatest risk. Indonesia, for example, 
has been using such techniques as the basis 
for one of its main anti-poverty, community 
empowerment programmes: PNPM Mandiri. 
Data are fed into an information management 
system which keeps track of all poverty 
programmes, resources and beneficiaries across 
the country.  As a result, the Government has 
a clearer picture of the gaps and can design the 
necessary interventions. 
In most countries, when a disaster strikes, 
data collection is not a high priority – and is 
complicated by the involvement of many 
different relief organizations. In addition, staff 
of the national disaster management agency 
may not have the appropriate training. 
National statistical office staff have the 
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skills but may not be involved in collecting 
disaster-related data.58 Governments should 
therefore prepare in advance the systems and 
protocols for collecting data during emergencies, 
aiming to ensure consistency in reporting and 
methodology. 
Another concern is that international data 
systems for disasters do not cover low-severity, 
high-frequency events. The leading publicly 
available international database, the Emergency 
Events Database (EM-DAT), has many 
advantages but its unique methodology means 
that it only covers disasters where ten or more 
people have been reported killed or 100 or more 
have been affected. 
However, even small-scale disasters can have 
a wide economic, social and environmental 
impact particularly among the poor as each 
shock further erodes their coping capacity and 
traps them in a cycle of poverty.59 To address 
this issue, a number of countries in the region 
have been building national disaster databases 
to analyze the effects of low-severity, 
high-frequency events.  Data from Nepal and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, show 
that similar numbers of people die in a large 
number of smaller-scale disasters as in a few 
large-scale ones (Figure III-2). 
Ultimately, when faced with natural disasters or 
economic shocks communities have to fall back 
on their own resources, especially in the least 
developed countries. But many governments are 
now discovering ways of helping communities 
become more resilient (Box III-14). Policy 
makers now have many more options. Some 
of them are opening up as a result of new 
technology, but the most effective methods 
are those that engage local people themselves, 
capitalizing on their knowledge and enabling 
them to build more resilient communities. 
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Source: UNISDR from Desinventar Project Team, Disaster Information System Database. Available from http://www.desinventar.
net/DesInventar/profiletab.jsp?countrycode=or (accessed 20 May 2012). 
Figure  III-2
Total deaths due to large- and small-scale disasters
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Box  III-14
Thailand – multiple community strategies
Over the past two decades, Thailand has felt severe impacts from both disasters and economic crises. 
But it has also capitalized on these experiences to achieve greater community resilience by building 
on social capital, strengthening partnerships, empowering women and enhancing the use of ICT while 
expanding the coverage of social protection. Activities have included:
Early warning systems – An important consideration was the development of early warning systems, 
including the erection of tsunami warning towers, with strong linkages to the community level. 
However, local communities have been long been able to detect environmental abnormalities and 
changes – often as fast as high technology equipment. 
Civil society partnerships – Civil society entities, including the Save Andaman Network, helped more 
vulnerable groups, such as fishermen, rebuild their traditional capacities while focusing on long-term 
livelihood security. Community-based revolving funds helped ensuring equal access to resources and 
improve sustainable livelihoods.60 
Private partnerships – Following the 2004 tsunami, resort owners in Phang Nga province on the 
Andaman coast of southern Thailand worked with long-established European partnerships to revive 
tourism in the main resort area. Small resort owners reached independent travellers, through locally-
controlled websites and through exposure in guidebooks.
Rebuilding ecosystems – Replanting native trees and grasses helped increase biophysical resilience and 
prevent further erosion by creating a natural barrier against the impact of tsunamis or storm surges.61
Communications –Civil Defence Volunteer Units have been trained to inform communities of emergency 
operations, rules, directions, procedures, evacuation and emergency responses, and shelters. They 
have also disseminated information through hotlines and amateur radio networks. The Department of 
Mineral Resources and the National Disaster Warning Centre has provided a toolkit along with pocket 
books to schools to educate children in disaster risks and responses.62 
Social protection – The 2003 Social Welfare Promotion Act provides social insurance for workers in key 
areas, including benefits for unemployment, sickness, disability, maternity and old age.63 As a result, 
when the 2007/2008 economic crisis struck, the social protection response was considerably more 
effective, helping households to receive government support so that there was no significant reduction 
in consumption. 
Countercyclical policies – The Government managed to quickly implement countercyclical policies to 
avert the most severe social impacts, which in turn restored domestic demand and maintained short-
term productivity and thus promoted the country’s competitive edge for the future.  People could also 
borrow from relatives and friends to purchase food and basic products on credit, while assistance was 
given to the poorest from local temples.
Cash transfers – Through ‘Help the Nation’ the Government’s direct cash transfer programme for 
low-income earners, one-time payments of 2,000 Thai baht (THB) ($67) were made to workers earning 
less than THB 15,000 ($500) per month, and contributions were made to the social security fund. 
However, these only reached civil servants and formal-sector workers, while around two-thirds of 
the workforce is in the informal sector. In 2011 therefore the Government proposed to expand the 
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social protection fund to initially 20 million informal workers and later extend coverage to all 
informal workers.64 
Community networks – When the 2011 floods struck, community networks organized relief and 
food centres, and provided emergency supplies, tools and food. Members of the national network of 
low-income community organizations each agreed to contribute THB 30 ($1) to assist those who 
had been affected. These funds and others were to be managed by community networks working on 
flood relief activities.65 Committees of community leaders, many involving women in leadership roles, 
mobilized resources and drew up daily plans to cook and to feed households.
ICT – The newly independent and volunteer-run ThaiFlood.com served as a clearinghouse for information 
provided on the websites of other relevant ministries or departments as well as from independent 
postings to Facebook and Twitter.66 This was supplemented by a mobile crowdsourcing application 
providing GPS-located information. In addition, easily accessible information on the floods was provided 
by RooSuFlood (“know and combat the flood”) videos posted on YouTube. Recent tsunami warnings, such 
as that of April 2012, were met with rapid evacuations from low-lying areas of the Andaman coast.
Governance – Partnerships, which include the Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Information 
and Communication Technology, the Ministry of Justice, the Thai Red Cross Society and IBM’s 
Crisis Response Team have worked to establish the technology infrastructure, technical services and 
logistics support.67  
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CHAPTER 4
Though natural ecosystems have large capacities 
to absorb and respond to many pressures, 
once tipping points are reached, there could 
be a rapid collapse that would cascade across 
our economic and social systems, threatening 
development gains. Building resilience for Asia 
and the Pacific means considering the long-term 
implications of our actions and addressing this 
nexus of converging threats.
GroWiNG laND coNstraiNts
Land for agricultural production is becoming 
increasingly scarce. Of the world’s remaining 
arable land that could be brought into 
agricultural production, most is in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa. While 
some is available in East and South-East 
Asia, there is virtually none to spare in South 
and West Asia (Figure IV-1). Moreover, 
in South Asia around 45 per cent of land 
with crop production potential is currently 
used for human settlements and there is 
concern that urban areas will encroach on 
the remainder. 1 
THE LAND, WATER, ENERGY NEXUS  
AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
Constantly producing more goods and services is pushing the countries of Asia and 
the Pacific towards catastrophic ecosystem collapse. Much of the land is facing 
serious degradation, water resources are being used wastefully or polluted, and it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to find sufficient energy. Economic planning needs to 
incorporate the true value of ecosystem services, while reducing the use of resources 
and preparing for climate change. 
In addition, much of the land currently under 
cultivation is becoming degraded – reducing 
productivity and threatening persistent crop 
failure. Globally, almost 2 billion hectares 
of land – an area twice the size of China – 
are already seriously degraded; in some 
instances irreversibly.2 In Asia, this is the 
result of erosion, nutrient depletion, chemical 
contamination or encroaching salinity 
(among other things) – which have degraded 
vast areas of cropland, grassland, woodland 
and forest. In South and South-East Asia, 
around 74 per cent of agricultural land has 
been severely affected by wind or water 
erosion or has been polluted to the extent that it 
is no longer productive. China alone has lost 3.5 
million square kilometres of topsoil to water 
and wind erosion.3
Asia has the largest amount of land affected 
by desertification – around 1,400 million 
hectares. Millions of people rely on this land for 
survival: in India, 26 per cent of the population; 
in China, 17 per cent; and in the remainder 
of the region, 18.3 per cent.4 People living in 
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FIgure  IV-1
Potential arable land available for agriculture by region, 2009
these fragile areas struggle to cope – lacking 
the capacity and technology to adjust their 
agricultural practices.
When their land is no longer productive, 
people are often pushed into ecologically fragile 
areas such as forests and wetlands.5 Putting 
extra strain on these areas could have major 
long-term ecological consequences. These 
complex and diverse ecosystems act as buffers 
against changing environmental conditions. 
Forests and wetlands, in particular, are important 
for purifying water and attenuating floods (Box 
IV-1). The Muthurajawela wetland in Sri lanka, 
for example, is responsible for wastewater 
treatment worth an estimated $654 per hectare 
per year and generates flood attenuation benefits 
worth $1,907 per hectare per year.6 Similarly 
in Cambodia, the watershed catchment of the 
Bokor National Park provides water purification 
and attenuation services worth around 
$2 million annually for the downstream 
Kamchay Hydropower Scheme. 7 
of particular concern is the loss of forests. 
A substantial proportion of the earth’s natural 
forests have already been destroyed – seriously 
impeding the water cycle. Deforestation 
reduces cloud-forming evapotranspiration 
and thus decreases rainfall. The local climate 
then becomes drier, which in turn accelerates 
ecosystem changes: the soil is less able to 
absorb rainfall and rivers fill with sediment.8 
land degradation has also led to many countries 
investing in land in other countries to secure 
this basic resource. In what has been dubbed 
‘land grabbing’, many large food companies are 
buying land in both developed and developing 
Asia-Pacific countries, creating further possible 
competition for local farmers and  threathening 
domestic food security. 9  
92
Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises
Water scarcitY
Only 2 per cent of the planet’s water can be 
used for drinking or agriculture. But these 
freshwater systems are coming under increasing 
pressure as a result of over exploitation and 
pollution. Most of this is due to cultivation. 
Almost 80 per cent of the region’s freshwater 
is used for agriculture, though the proportion 
varies by country: 20 per cent in the Russian 
Federation, for example, but up to 90 per cent in 
many least developed countries as well as India.10
This water usage is likely to increase. 
Agricultural water consumption could grow 
by around 19 per cent per year by 2050,11  but 
without using water more efficiently, the world 
will need 40 per cent more than will actually be 
available (Figure IV-2). 
In Asia and the Pacific  only  around  9 per cent of 
water withdrawal is for domestic consumption. 
Even so, almost 380 million people in the 
region do not have access to clean water 
(Table IV-1). 
Box  IV-1
Viet Nam – restoring mangrove forests 
Since 1994, the Viet Nam Red Cross, along with other donors, has initiated a project of restoration, 
rehabilitation and management of coastal mangrove forests. Mangrove and wetland ecosystems help 
protect coastal communities from storm surges and erosion, and mitigate climate change by absorbing 
carbon dioxide. 
A recent analysis of the costs and benefits of this restoration activity found that the mangrove 
forests had a substantial impact on reducing disaster risk and had enhanced community livelihoods. 
The overall cost of the project, spanning 17 years, was approximately $8.8 million, but the benefits 
were felt by approximately 350,000 people directly, with another 2 million protected indirectly through 
the afforestation efforts. Savings from dyke maintenance was estimated to be around $80,000, but 
in addition, avoided damage to communities were approximately $15 million. Also, the mangrove 
forests were able to provide additional income for coastal communities through an increased yield in 
aquaculture products, and other economic activities such as honeybee farming.
Source: IFRC, undated. 
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FIgure  IV-2
Potential global gap between water supply and withdrawals by 2030
Source: ESCAP Annual core indicators online database. Available from: www.unescap.org/stat/data/statdb/DataExplorer.
aspx (accessed, February 2013).
tABle  IV-1
Consumption of water and population without access to improved water
  Total water 
withdrawal 
(billion m3 
per annum) 
Total 
freshwater 
withdrawal  
(% of total 
renewable 
water per 
annum) 
Withdrawal 
for 
agriculture  
(% of total 
water 
withdrawal) 
Withdrawal 
for domestic 
(% of total 
water 
withdrawal) 
Withdrawal 
for industry  
(% of total 
water 
withdrawal) 
Population 
without 
access to 
improved 
water in 2010 
(thousands) 
Asia and the Pacific 2,261.3 11.3 78.5 9.3 12.3 379,634 
East and North-East Asia 677.5 21.5 64.1 13.8 22.1 123,271 
South-East Asia 339.7 4.5 84.4 6.7 8.9 73,483 
South and South-West Asia 995.2 26.2 88.6 6.9 4.5 163,981 
North and Central Asia 222.8 4.5 68.6 8.8 22.6 14,431 
Pacific 26.2 1.6 72.4 17.5 10.1 4,405 
World 3,689.0 7 68.7 11.3 20 798,983 
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Around 12 per cent of water in the region 
is used for industrial production. The most 
water-intensive industries include electronics 
manufacturing, pulp and paper production, 
textile production, food and beverage production, 
metal mining, chemical manufacturing and 
refining. A number of enterprises are becoming 
concerned about supplies: corporations such 
as Coca-Cola and Nestle now take into 
account future water availability when choosing 
manufacturing locations. 12
Water is also needed for the production of 
energy – as well as for transport and processing 
of primary fuels. In 2010, around 15 per cent 
of the world’s total water withdrawals were for 
energy purposes.13 Water is also used in the 
production of biofuel crops. Several Asia-Pacific 
countries are expanding their production of 
biofuels – for purposes of energy security, 
climate change mitigation, foreign exchange 
savings and rural development. This also adds 
pressure to the land and water requirements; 
one litre of ethanol from sugarcane uses enough 
water to produce food for one person’s dai-
ly consumption.14 To a limited extent, energy 
can also be used to increase freshwater supplies 
through desalination – though this is extremely 
energy intensive. 
reacHiNG eNerGY tHresHolDs
Across the world, energy consumption has been 
growing rapidly whether for industrial processes, 
for transport, or for households for cooking 
and heating. This has given rise to increasing 
concerns about future availability. Some energy 
sources such as coal, are still relatively abundant. 
And fossil fuel sources, such as shale oil and 
gas, seem to be increasing as further reserves 
are discovered. However, these new reserves 
are more difficult to exploit – demanding 
significant amounts of energy for extraction. 
This can be assessed through the energy return 
on investment (EROI) – the amount of energy 
required to extract a unit of energy. At one end 
of the spectrum are oil and gas reserves that 
historically have been easily accessible. At the 
other end are fuels derived from tar sands or 
corn. As illustrated in Figure IV-3 EROI can 
fall exponentially – disappearing over what has 
been called the ‘net energy cliff ’. These new 
extraction and energy production methods 
could thus lead to more price shocks. 
Beyond the availability of fossil fuels there is 
the even greater concern for climate change 
since fossil fuel combustion is one of the 
primary sources of CO2 emissions. Figure IV-4 
projects Asia-Pacific energy demand according 
to two scenarios – one based on business as 
usual, the other assuming effective efforts at 
mitigation which are detailed in Box IV-2. 
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Source: Lambert, Jessica and others, 2012.
FIgure  IV-3
The net energy cliff – energy ratios for different technologies
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FIgure  IV-4
Asia-Pacific energy demand, with and without CO2 mitigation, 1990-2035
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scarcer miNerals
Another concern is the future availability 
of minerals. Between 1970 and 2008, the 
use of metals and minerals for industry and 
construction, grew on average by 7 per cent 
per year. Much of this was extracted from 
within  the region: in fact, in 2008, Asia-Pacific 
countries extracted over 1,100 per cent more 
minerals and metals than in 1970.15 Both 
within the region and beyond, however, some 
of these minerals are becoming uneconomical 
to extract.16
Of particular concern are the ‘rare earth’ 
elements such as cerium, lanthanum and 
dysprosium. These are critical for several 
important industries, including the manufacture 
of renewable energy technologies, electronic 
equipment, vehicle parts, batteries, components 
for power stations, semiconductors and computer 
chips.17 Such has been the pace of consumption 
that for some elements mineral reserves are 
likely to last only 4 to 20 years.18
These elements are also vital for the production 
of clean energy technologies such as wind 
turbines, hybrid vehicles and energy-efficient 
light bulbs. One estimate suggests that by 2035 
the demand for these elements will be between 
600 and 2,600 per cent of the amount known to be 
extractable – economically or non-economically 
(Figure IV-5).19 This has serious implications 
for climate change mitigation.
Box  IV-2
Energy and climate change
The International Energy Agency has developed a number of scenarios including current energy policies 
(current policies scenario),  and the energy policy requirements to limit carbon dioxide levels in the 
atmosphere to 450 parts per million, which could stabilize the average global temperature rise to 2°C 
(the 450 scenario). This modest temperature rise is already likely to happen; as the temperature rises 
further, the impacts will become more extreme. The chart below shows the potential outcomes.
Source:  IEA, 2012.
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implicatioNs of crossiNG 
tHresHolDs
Crossing one or more of the converging 
thresholds of land, water and energy would 
have dramatic and widespread impacts: 
Economic – Some of the effects are already 
being felt. Energy prices are volatile but on an 
upward trend. The prices of rare earth minerals 
rose significantly in 2011: for some of these 
around 95 per cent of extraction is in China 
which has instigated strict export quotas.20 
Social – One of the most immediate impacts 
will be on food supplies. Between 2012 and 
2050 the Asia-Pacific population is expected 
to rise from 4 to 5 billion.21 This, combined 
with changing diets, is likely to increase the 
demand for food by 50 per cent by 2030 and by 
70 per cent by 2050.22 Already, over 510 million 
people in Asia and the Pacific suffer from 
undernourishment. And, with little extra land 
becoming available, prices are likely to soar. 
Water supplies too will come under increasing 
pressure. Some 380 million people have no 
access to clean water as indicated earlier in 
Table IV-I, and it may become increasingly 
difficult to ensure universal access. 
The compounding effect of climate change
All these issues will be exacerbated by 
climate change. This is already reducing crop 
FIgure  IV-5
Rare earth element requirements as a percentage of available supply by 2035
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yields in some places and affecting glaciers 
which for several countries are important sources 
of water (Box IV-3).23 Rising temperatures and 
extreme weather events are affecting production 
of rice, maize and wheat (Box IV-4 and Box 
IV-5). By 2020 crop yields could fall by between 
2.5 and 10 per cent and by 2050 by between 5 
and 30 per cent. On this basis, by 2020 some 
49 million people could be at risk of hunger, 
rising by 2050 to 132 million. By the end of the 
twenty-first century, rice production in Asia is 
projected to decline by 3.8 per cent – due to a 
combination of the fertilization effect, thermal 
stress and water scarcity.24 
Climate change will also add to water stress. The 
projected increase in air temperature in north-
western China, for example, will likely result in a 
27 per cent decline in glacier area, a 10 to 15 per 
cent decline in frozen soil area, and an increase 
in flood and debris flow. In parts of China, 
temperature rise and declines in precipitation 
have already resulted in dried-up lakes and 
rivers. By 2025 the population exposed to 
increased water stress could increase to 120 
million-1.2 billion people.25
Rising temperatures will lead to rapid thawing 
of permafrost, triggering landslides, and will 
also degrade forest ecosystems. In addition, a 
2ºC to 4ºC increase in sea surface temperature 
is projected to increase tropical cyclone 
intensities by 10 to 20 per cent in East Asia, 
South-East Asia and South Asia.26 
Australia and New Zealand are already coming 
under greater water and agricultural stress,  
with changed natural ecosystems and reduced 
seasonal snow cover. Some areas are experiencing 
extreme events, such as wildfires, heat waves, 
cyclones, droughts and flooding.27 But the most 
vulnerable countries in the Pacific are the small 
island States (Box IV-6). Here sea level rise 
will affect coral reef and fisheries and reduce 
water supplies. Moreover, most infrastructure 
and settlements are along the coasts and thus 
vulnerable to storm surges and extreme weather 
events. Climate change is also likely to alter the 
distribution of vector-borne diseases.28
 
However, the impact will vary according to 
location, with some areas suffering more 
droughts and others experiencing more floods. 
Box  IV-3
Nepal – climate change impacts 
A recent social survey of climate change impacts in Nepal indicate that many people have seen a reduction 
in rainfall, an increase in temperature, more frequent extreme weather events, and a lower agricultural 
productivity over the past 10 years. Though many have enough information to know about the impacts of 
climate change, those currently most affected do not think they have the right information to be able to 
respond to the impacts. They recognize the need to make changes to their livelihoods, yet are unable to 
do so due to lack of resources, access to information, and limited government support. 
Source: BBC,  2013.
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Box  IV-4
Afghanistan – the 2007/08 drought 
Rainfall and winter snowfall across the majority of Afghanistan during late 2007 and early 2008 were 
well below normal and led to the worst drought for a decade. Severe drought in 2008/09 caused a 
precipitous decline in grain production resulting in an acute food supply crisis. In 2008/09 wheat 
production in Afghanistan was 1.5 million tons, down 60 per cent from the year before. Losses to winter 
grain production were substantial enough to have serious ramifications in the domestic food and feed 
grain market during the 2008/09 marketing year. 
In recognition of the severity of the grain production shortfall, the Government of Afghanistan and the 
United Nations in 2008 issued an emergency appeal for donations of up to $400 million to cover the 
sizable wheat import and food aid needs for the 4.5 million Afghans affected, as well as to prepare for 
the next winter cropping season. Irrigated wheat production in Afghanistan accounts for roughly 70 per 
cent of output, and is nearly totally reliant on the surface water flow through mountain streams and 
rivers from snowmelt. Low snowfall in 2008/09 caused the majority of the grain losses, and there the 
frequency of low rain- and snowfall seems to be increasing.
Central Afghanistan: Winter Snow Pack Comparison
Mar 23, 2007
Snow Pack
Mar 23, 2008
Source: United States Department of Agriculture,  2008.
The frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones 
in the Pacific have increased over the last few 
decades, whereas the cyclones in the Bay of 
Bengal and Persian Gulf have decreased in 
number but are becoming more intense. In both 
cases, the damage caused by cyclones has risen 
significantly, notably in India, China, the 
Philippines, Japan, Viet Nam, Cambodia and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.29
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Box  IV-5
Viet Nam – protecting the rice supply chain 
In Viet Nam, rice production not only ensures national food security but also accounts for around 20 
per cent of global rice exports. Now the paddy fields are being affected by climate change and sea level 
rise. In response, in June 2012 the Ministry of Industry and Commerce embarked on a new project: 
“Protecting the rice supply chain of Viet Nam in response to climate change and sea level rise.”
This initiative integrates the protection of rice supply chains into national development strategies and 
planning. It addresses the impact of climate change on the current rice supply infrastructure, establishes 
standards for businesses and enterprises that make up part of the rice supply and export chains, and 
provides incentives for construction works and projects that deal with climate change response and 
supply chain protection. 
Source: Viet Nam, 2013. 
Box  IV-6
Maldives – climate change impacts 
The average height above sea level in the Maldives is 1.5 metres, with over 80 per cent of land area 
less than 1 metre above sea level. Even a slight sea level rise would have devastating consequences, 
including land loss and beach erosion, and damage to infrastructure and coral reefs. The 2007 IPCC 
report suggested that by the end of this century sea levels could rise by between 190 and 590 mm. 
The two figures below graphically represent the inundation of Male, the capital, in 2100 based on IPCC 
best- and worst-case scenarios.
A number of adaptation measures have already been implemented, including protecting the Male’ 
International Airport, building breakwater walls around islands, constructing safe shelters, and 
facilitating migratory movements of the population.
Source: Maldives, 2012
Best case scenario: 50 per cent inundated Worst case scenario: completely inundated
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respoNDiNG to tHe coNVerGiNG NeXUs
Governments and societies need to recognize 
the limits to the natural resource base and 
the potential tipping points that could lead to 
ecosystem collapse. They can no longer view 
economic and social systems separately. They 
can take some incremental steps to use resources 
more efficiently, but ultimately will need to 
adapt and diversify their systems of production. 
Other chapters in this report consider how the 
countries of Asia and the Pacific can respond 
to immediate shocks. This chapter considers 
strategies for responding to longer-term 
disasters such as droughts and shortages of 
food and water. 
1.  Ensure widespread participation
The best results will come from involving 
stakeholders and communities. The first step is 
to raise public awareness – either through broad 
public media campaigns or specific measures 
such as labelling appliances according to their 
use of water or energy. Popular involvement 
is particularly important in rural areas where 
local people have extensive knowledge that 
can feed into actions by government and 
civil society organizations. In a semi-arid region 
of Maharashtra State in India, for example, 
local communities are working with an NGO, 
the Watershed Organization Trust, to carry 
out a series of restoration measures including 
soil, land and water management while also 
diversifying livelihoods so that households are 
less exposed to shocks.30 
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2.  Place value on natural resources
One reason why natural resources can rapidly 
be exhausted is that they are not properly 
priced and are consequently used inefficiently. 
Changing this would require significant 
investment: globally, the cost of introducing the 
technology to use energy more efficiently has 
been estimated at $11.8 trillion, but this would 
be more than offset by the reduction in fuel 
expenditures of $17.5 trillion and of supply-side 
investment of $5.9 trillion. It has been estimated 
that more efficient energy use could increase 
economic output through to 2035 by $18 trillion. 
Some of the greatest gains in GDP would be in 
China, 2.1 per cent, and in India, 3 per cent. 31 
In Mongolia, for example, it has been 
estimated that retrofitting buildings could 
reduce energy costs by 60 per cent – which 
could save half a million tonnes of coal per year, 
worth almost $6.5 million.32 
A good starting point for more efficient energy 
use is to remove fuel subsidies. Indonesia, for 
example, was by 2008 providing subsidies 
that cost 20 per cent of the government 
budget – more than its spending on housing, 
education, law and order and health combined.33 
Moreover, the subsidy was badly targeted – 
only 15 per cent reaching the lowest-quartile 
income households.34 The Government has 
reduced some of the subsidies, triggering 
widespread protests; even so, Indonesian 
energy prices are still heavily subsidized.35 
Energy efficiency measures can be paid for by 
levies on energy use. Thailand, for example, has 
since 1992 applied a small levy on petroleum 
sales for its Energy Conservation Fund which 
generates between $67 million and $168 million 
per year – for activities such as revolving loans, 
subsidies for renewable energy, research and 
development on clean energy technology, and 
pilot studies and demonstration projects.36 
China too has been encouraging enterprises 
to become more energy efficient: since 2010, 
the Government has offered tax exemptions 
and other financial benefits for enterprises that 
sign contracts with energy service companies to 
improve their efficiency.37 
Water and other natural resources can also be 
undervalued and wasted. Some countries have 
therefore been making efforts to use water more 
efficiently. Since the 1980s, Singapore has had 
a comprehensive water management system 
which includes carefully designed water pricing 
structures. As a result, between 1994 and 2008, 
Singapore reduced the proportion of water that 
was imported from 50 to 33 per cent, and by 
2061 aims for self-sufficiency. Strategic long-
term investment in national water projects has 
also spawned a thriving water industry; more 
than 50 international and local companies are 
active in the Singapore water market.38
3.  Make better use of urban space 
Roads and bridges usually last for decades. 
Indeed, the way cities are built generally locks 
societies into fixed consumption patterns for 
generations. Cities also suffer from a legacy 
of underinvestment in public transport. Faced 
with inefficient transport systems, people will 
prefer to use their own vehicles – heightening 
traffic congestion, polluting the air and adding 
to greenhouse gas emissions. Many cities also 
lack effective controls that improve energy 
efficiency: buildings contribute around 35 per 
cent of greenhouse gas emissions.39 
Instead, city planners can take account of both 
current and future demands. Good urban 
planning allows for city growth – considering the 
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needs of its inhabitants yet also allowing more 
efficient use of resources (Box IV-7). Yokohama 
in Japan has demonstrated how this can be 
achieved. As the population grew, new satellite 
towns arose. The city authorities quickly 
installed efficient public transport systems such 
as railways. They also rehabilitated a water and 
parkland network along the coast to enhance 
ecological sustainability and serve as recreational 
area. Energy-saving houses were promoted, 
requiring mandatory building certification with 
subsidies for the assessment costs. Low-interest 
loans were made available for house owners 
wishing to construct green houses.40 The city 
has also been retrofitting buildings in industrial 
areas to minimize environmental harm. 
Box  IV-7
The Philippines – building resilience to disasters in Metro Manila 
Reducing the exposure of people and assets to disasters requires good land use planning. In 2011, 
the project ‘Building Resilience and Awareness of Metro Manila Communities to Natural Disaster and 
Climate Change Impacts’ (BRACE) was established. Starting as a pilot in Taguig city, this project aimed to 
reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience to risks posed by disasters and climate change. It developed 
a social housing model that builds safer disaster resilient settlements by addressing the needs of urban 
poor communities. 
The BRACE project builds the Government’s capacity to understand and map the risks from disasters 
and to strengthen community-based disaster risk management. It integrates disaster risk reduction 
and climate change adaptation into urban land use planning, and provides safer settlement and 
livelihood support for up to 1,800 vulnerable families living in hazard-prone areas.
Source: Australia, 2012. 
4.  Exploit new technology
Many new technologies, some initially with 
government support, now offer opportunities 
to diversify sources of natural resources, 
and use them more efficiently. In Cambodia, 
for example, some pilot villages without 
access to electricity have been trained in the 
manufacture of solar cooking stoves and have 
received entrepreneurial training so they can set 
up businesses to produce other clean technologies 
that meet basic household needs.41
New technologies are also available for 
monitoring climate impacts and for disaster 
early warning systems. These include information 
and communication systems, space technologies, 
and automatic weather stations (Box IV-8 and 
Box IV-9). 
The shortage of ‘rare earth’ minerals could be 
offset by technological advances that allow the 
use of alternative and more abundant resources, 
though in the short term, as prices rise, more 
extreme extraction techniques may become 
economically viable.42
104
Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises
Box  IV-9
Maldives – climate resilient development 
Photo: Satellite imagery of a Maldives atoll 
Source: : ISLES provincial information management system, 
Government of Maldives, http://isles.egov.mv
Maldives is working with the UN country team and RIMES  to apply 
global climate change models at the national level. As part of a “Low 
Emission Climate Resilient Development” (LECReD) programme this 
aims to ‘statistically downscale’ the models using historical data and 
satellite imagery. 
For one pilot atoll the LECReD Programme takes a climate-resilient, 
low-carbon development approach in order to visibly reduce its 
vulnerability. The programme integrates approaches related to energy 
security, rising sea levels, water, sanitation, livelihoods, food security, 
human health, governance, disaster risk reduction and natural resources. 
By demonstrating integrated climate resilient development in one atoll, 
the aim is to generate a robust climate resilient development model that 
can be replicated in all atolls. 
Box  IV-8
Bangladesh – regional early warning system 
The international community has been helping Bangladesh – one of the world’s most disaster-prone 
nations – to strengthen its early warning systems. The ESCAP Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster 
and Climate Preparedness, in collaboration with the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre has 
supported the establishment of  the Regional Integrated Early Warning System for 
Africa and Asia (RIMES). RIMES helped Bangladesh develop long-lead flood forecasting 
and concurrent monitoring of depressions and cyclones in the Bay of Bengal. 
It has developed and transferred technology to the Bangladesh Meteorological Department 
and Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre and is providing back-up support to both 
institutions until new technology is fully integrated into their operations.
RIMES has also been working with Bangladesh user agencies such as the Disaster Management 
Bureau and the Department of Agricultural Extension so that they can better interpret forecasts and 
translate these into impact outlooks and response options for resource and disaster risk management. 
The Government of Bangladesh has mobilized $28 million from the Climate Resilient Fund for a 
comprehensive early warning system improvement project, of which $4 million is budgeted for technical 
inputs for RIMES.
Source: ESCAP, 2012b.
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5.  Integrate policies and regulation
Many countries have policies, regulations and 
statutory tools aimed at conserving resources 
and decoupling resource consumption from 
economic development. In some instances 
these are sectoral – as with the Malaysian 
National Renewable Energy Policy and Action 
Plan (2010). Others take a more integrated 
approach such as the Singapore Sustainable 
Development Blueprint (2009), Japan’s Law 
on Promotion of Circular Society (2001) and 
the Republic of Korea’s National Framework 
Act and Presidential Decree on Low Carbon 
Green Growth. 
National level policies will benefit from an 
integrated approach, even if the regulations are 
implemented in a more sectoral manner. China, 
for example, has a Circular Economy Law 2008 
which specifies responsibilities across a 
number of sectors including government, 
business, industry and consumers. This includes 
tax incentives to promote water, energy and 
material conservation, and pricing policies to 
support resource efficiency, reuse and recycling, 
along with restrictions on the production or 
import of wasteful products. India similarly has 
a National Environmental Policy (2006) which 
encourages the efficient use of environmental 
resources per unit of economic output and 
encourages actions for recycling and reuse 
of waste. 
Unfortunately, governments often develop 
policies but do not implement them. This 
may be because of a lack of resources, poor 
planning, conflicts between sectoral priorities 
and institutions, bureaucratic inefficiencies or 
corruption. Regulations can only be effective if 
supported by strong and effective administration, 
monitoring and enforcement (Box IV-10). 
Box  IV-10
The Philippines – Legal enforcement of environmental rights 
Serious concerns over environmental degradation, exploitation of the environment and unsustainable 
consumption patterns have resulted in a programme between UNDP and the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines to ensure accountability for resource management, enforcement of environmental laws, 
and the promotion of public awareness to prevent environmental damage. 
After much multi-sectoral consultation, new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases were 
established in 2010, laying down the procedures governing the civil, criminal and special civil actions 
in all trials regarding environmental cases. The ultimate purpose is to recognize the constitutional 
rights of people to health and to a balanced, healthy ecosystem, by providing a simplified, speedy and 
inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of environmental rights under Philippines law. To ensure 
that the law works in practice, a number of initiatives and capacity building programmes were developed, 
particularly for judges and other stakeholders.
Source: UNDP, 2012. 
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aDaptiVe GoVerNaNce
Adaptive governance involves integrated 
and forward-looking analysis, along with 
regular policy review. It also demands
active consultation with all stakeholders but 
particularly with disadvantaged groups 
who are vulnerable to economic shocks and 
natural disasters. 
Institutions need to be well informed and 
sufficiently flexible in the face of complexity 
and change to recover from shocks. And 
given the cross-cutting nature of threats 
some of these institutions will need to 
operate at the highest levels. For climate 
change, for example, such institutions 
include the National Development and 
Reform Commission in China, the Prime 
Minister’s Council on Climate 
Change in India, and the Office 
of the President in Indonesia.43 
These institutions are in a strong position 
to assess the threats and develop integrated 
responses. In Indonesia, for example, the 
President has announced that the savings from 
cuts in fuel subsidies would be redirected to 
other programmes for food security, social 
protection and education.44 
Adaptive governance should consider all 
stakeholders, including local communities that 
have shown great flexibility in the face of a 
crisis. The most effective programmes at the 
community level have involved governments 
at various levels working to establish strategies 
with communities and other key stakeholders 
(Box IV-11).
Building resilience means recognizing the 
significance of natural resources and ecosystem 
services in economic and social development 
and recognizing the full cost of consumption. 
Governments need to integrate the true value 
of ecosystem services in their national economic 
strategies while preparing for resource 
constraints and climate change.  Adaptive 
strategies that are inclusive and flexible will 
lead to better systems of governance and more 
resilient societies.
Box  IV-11
The Philippines – resolving water supply disputes 
Disputes over access to water resources already occur in some regions of the Philippines. In one example, 
an important water source in the south of the Philippines was located within the ancestral lands of an 
indigenous community. With some mediation, an agreement was reached between the municipal 
government and the local community for the construction of a reservoir, with piping for the indigenous 
community for free, while both parties agreed to maintain the water source to ensure good quality 
water for all users. 
In another case, a local authority established a pipeline to a privately owned water source. The land 
owner then cut the distribution line. Through mediation, an agreement was reached: the land owner 
received a regular honorarium to maintain and secure the water source, as well as a free supply of 
drinking water in exchange for building a reservoir and a water distribution system.
Source: UNDP, 2012. 
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CHAPTER 5
1. fiNaNcial sector 
The financial sector is an essential channel of 
economic development. It transmits money 
from where it is available to where it is needed 
– enabling lenders of capital to be remunerated 
for taking risks while enabling the borrowing 
institutions and individuals to make important 
investments. This intermediation function is 
critical for developing the private sector and for 
reducing poverty.
A national financial system can be unstable. 
This is partly because it is sensitive to shocks, 
either generated within the domestic economy 
or transmitted through international markets. 
Moreover, it is different from other sectors 
in that it is sustained largely by trust and 
confidence. Normally this functions fairly well: 
rational behaviour by individuals, despite their 
gains and losses, allows the whole system to 
PROTECTING CRITICAL SECTORS
All sectors of the economy need to become more resilient to external shocks, but it 
is especially important to strengthen certain critical sectors in which any failure is 
likely to cascade across the whole society. Principal among these are the financial 
sector, and parts of the physical and social infrastructure. 
remain stable in aggregate. But financial 
systems are also susceptible to herd behaviour. 
Individuals may, for example, collectively move 
into the same or similar investments largely 
because many others are investing in those 
stocks or property – famously characterized by 
former United States Treasury Secretary Alan 
Greenspan as ‘irrational exuberance’. Then, 
also on the basis of little evidence, they may all 
become more risk averse and start to sell 
simultaneously. Such mass sell-offs may lead 
to a sudden crisis of confidence. Banks become 
more risk averse and both raise interest rates 
and limit lending – triggering credit crunches, 
declines in production, higher unemployment, 
declining asset prices and spiralling debt. The 
circles of contagion can steadily widen and 
eventually envelop whole economies – with 
devastating consequences.
In recent years, the financial sector has been 
subject to moral hazard and reckless behaviour 
with  serious  ramifications for  the  entire  economy. 
Similarly, physical infrastructure has been 
exposed to natural disasters which affect major 
supply roads, bridges, and power and water 
systems and communications lines. Social 
infrastructure too is vulnerable, including 
schools, hospitals and community buildings. 
This Chapter identifies the critical sectors 
that need safeguarding, and outlines what is 
required to minimize their exposure.
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Types of financial shock
There are roughly four main types of financial 
shock: banking crises; the bursting of speculative 
bubbles; currency or exchange rate crises; and 
sovereign debt default crises. In reality, crises 
often evolve from one type to another or show 
multiple symptoms.
 Banking crises – These typically result from 
a loss in confidence that affects one or several 
banks. This could be due to an internal failure 
in one bank, such as through rogue trading, 
or because of an external event if one or more 
banks are over-exposed to one category of 
distressed asset such as real estate, and the 
affected borrowers cannot service their debts. 
An ensuing drop in confidence can lead to 
massive withdrawals such that the bank is 
unable to refund deposits or honour debts. 
These problems are further compounded by 
maturity mismatches: the banks’ assets are 
generally long-term loans, while their liabilities 
are largely short-term deposits. In some cases, 
a crisis in one or two banks can be contained, 
but, if not, the shock soon reverberates through 
the entire banking system and cascades to real 
economy in the form of a widespread credit 
crunch.
 Speculative bubbles – These are often 
consequences of herd behaviour. If credit is 
relatively cheap and easy to obtain, investors 
may seize on specific assets that soon become 
overpriced – the main driver subsequently 
being not the asset’s real rate of return but 
rather the common expectation that its price 
will keep heading upwards. When market 
expectations suddenly change, asset holders 
sell as quickly as possible, resulting in a rapid 
and amplified downward price correction. 
Bubbles are particularly damaging if they affect 
commodities such as food or fuel whose prices 
are of major significance to vulnerable people.
 Balance-of-payments crises – These may be 
due to long-term declines in competitiveness, or 
more immediate shocks such as natural disasters 
or political or civil conflict that suddenly 
reduces an economy’s capacity to export. A 
crisis can also arise if there is a massive outflow 
of portfolio capital. A balance of payments crisis 
can also trigger a collapse in the exchange 
rate or make it very difficult for countries to 
maintain pegged exchange rates. And as the 
costs of imports rise, there is also likely to be a 
rise in inflation.
 Debt crises – These occur after prolonged 
accumulation of unsustainable levels of 
sovereign debt and eventually lead to a sovereign 
default or forced structural adjustment. A 
default has severe economic and social 
repercussions. Domestically this often results 
in steep cuts in government expenditure and 
tax hikes, frequently provoking political and 
social unrest. Often, governments will introduce 
drastic austerity measures that deliver a shock 
to the real economy – which further reduces tax 
revenues. There are also long-term reputational 
costs: the country will face higher borrowing 
costs in international and national capital markets.1
Economic and social impact
The economic and social impact of financial 
collapse can be demonstrated by two Asia- 
Pacific experiences – the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and the global recession of 2008 – both of 
which affected the region, but in different ways. 
The 1997 crisis had its origins in South-East 
Asia.2 After a long period of economic growth, 
and a series of measures in the early 1990s to 
liberalize capital accounts, residents found it 
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relatively easy to borrow in foreign currencies. 
And since a number of countries pegged local 
currencies at relatively high rates against the 
dollar such borrowing was also cheap. The 
consequence was large capital inflows which 
in turn fuelled bubbles in real estate and stock 
markets. Furthermore, in the period immediately 
preceding the crisis, South-East Asian 
countries experienced large deteriorations in 
their balances of payments. Initially, this did 
not cause alarm as inflation was low and capital 
inflows were high which seemed to make these 
deficits sustainable. 
However, in early 1997 there was a sudden 
large correction in real estate prices in Thailand. 
This triggered a massive capital outflow. The 
Central Bank initially attempted to defend the 
Thai baht but on 2 July 1997 it removed the 
peg and allowed it to float. The baht went into 
free fall, and as interest rates rose, many banks 
and financial institutions faced bankruptcy. 
Having borrowed in dollars, after the exchange 
rate depreciation they could no longer honour 
much more expensive repayments. The crisis 
rapidly enveloped the real economy, and spread 
throughout the region. In 1998 growth in the 
developing economies of the region as a whole 
sank to 0.4 per cent. And a number of countries 
saw their economies contract: -13.1 per cent 
in Indonesia; -6.9 per cent in the Republic of 
Korea; -10.5 per cent in Thailand.3 The IMF 
and other external lenders intervened with 
massive assistance to contain the spread.
Worst affected were the most vulnerable groups 
– poor women and girls, young people, and 
low-skilled urban workers. In the aftermath of the 
shock, many affected households started 
to reduce   expenditures  on  health  and  some 
withdrew children, particularly girls, from 
school.4 Many women who had lost formal jobs 
also had to accept precarious employment in 
the informal sector. In Thailand, job losses were 
particularly severe in construction. Previously, 
poor farmers had migrated seasonally to earn 
extra income on construction sites but now 
they and other low-skilled workers had to return 
to rural areas.5 
The 2008 global recession was very different. 
This had its origins in the United States where 
from the late-1990s to the mid-2000s, home 
prices had risen rapidly. Much of this increase 
was driven by an expansion of risky lending to 
sub-prime borrowers. Encouraged by financial 
deregulation and low interest rates, agencies 
started lending heavily to borrowers who had 
limited capacity to repay, while the financial 
industry repackaged these low-quality loans 
as complex mortgage-based securities. Though 
many of the underlying loans were risky, the 
rating agencies rated the securities highly,6 
encouraging banks and funds to acquire large 
quantities of these assets. In 2006 however, real 
estate market started experiencing a downturn 
and more homeowners started to default. This 
forced the banks to write down large amounts 
of assets – rapidly undermining confidence in 
financial institutions, pushing up interest rates 
for inter-bank loans and causing a sudden 
crisis in liquidity.7 In the autumn of 2008 this 
led to a succession of bankruptcies, culminating 
in the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Many 
banks had to be either nationalized or bought 
by other banks. 
The sub-prime crisis in the United States 
turned into a debt crisis in the European Union. 
Investors became wary of the quality of 
sovereign bonds and doubted the capacity of 
some European Union member states, which 
had high levels of debt and ageing societies, 
to finance their fiscal deficits. A number of 
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European Union member states, in particular 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, 
found it difficult to borrow on international 
markets. With the support of other European 
Union countries, and in some cases the IMF, 
they had to undergo drastic fiscal austerity 
reforms. This further depressed economic 
activity which, at a time of shrinking demand, 
pushed these countries deep into recession.
The crisis was felt in the developing countries 
of Asia and the Pacific primarily through a fall 
in exports. A sharp fall in world demand saw 
their exports decline by around 10 per cent in 
the last quarter of 2008. And in 2009 developed 
countries suffered a 5.5 per cent decline in 
growth. Nevertheless, overall the region as a 
whole proved rather resilient. In 2009 China’s 
economy grew by 9.1 per cent and India’s by 
8.0 per cent, while the developing countries as 
a whole managed an average of 4.7 per cent. 
This was largely because many countries went 
into the crisis period with sound fiscal positions 
and could sustain their economies with large 
stimulus packages. Moreover, as a result of 
widespread financial sector reforms implemented 
after the 1997 crisis, Asia-Pacific developing 
countries maintained the confidence of 
international investors. Indeed they became 
anchors of stability and were soon seen as the 
drivers of world growth. 
preVeNtiNG fiNaNcial crises
Each financial crisis gives rise to a new 
impetus of reflection and discussion. How can 
individual countries and the world as a whole 
make  financial systems not just crisis resilient 
but also crisis resistant? 
Governments and financial regulators have 
taken measures to make financial markets more 
stable and reduce the potential for future crises. 
They have for example, increased surveillance by 
regulatory authorities, and reinstated controls 
on the riskiest of behaviours, notably taming 
large-scale speculative short-term capital flows. 
At the same time, they have been aiming to 
make markets more transparent. In doing so, 
they need to strike a fine balance. On the one 
hand they want to make the financial system 
less volatile and vulnerable. On the other hand 
they do not want to excessively restrain capital 
markets and limit their capacity to allocate 
funds and finance legitimate risk-taking that 
encourages innovation and productivity and 
boosts economic growth.
Increasing financial depth and regional capacity 
to absorb investment
The experience of the 1997 crisis encouraged 
many countries in the region to build large 
foreign-exchange reserves to protect their 
currencies from speculative attack. By 2011, 
official reserves across Asia and the Pacific had 
reached $6 trillion.8 While these reserves may 
provide some safety and offer buffers against 
large swings in exchange rates, they come at 
a cost. First because they are often ‘parked’ in 
foreign government treasury bonds which offer 
low rates of return. Second, because they 
represent large amounts of capital that are 
being put to little productive use so there is a 
significant opportunity cost. 
Just as official reserves are held outside the 
region, so are private funds. In 2008, Asian 
wealthy individuals had invested up to 94 per 
cent of their total assets outside the Asia- 
Pacific region.9 Likewise, the bulk of portfolio 
investment, 84 per cent in 2009, was invested 
outside the region.10 As a result, Asian financial 
systems are over-exposed to risks that originate 
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outside the region and over which they have 
little control. 
Asia-Pacific financial systems would be more 
resilient if more of their reserves and savings 
were invested in the region. There are a number 
of ways of achieving this. One, recommended 
by ESCAP in 2012, would be to establish a fund 
which would finance cross-border infrastructure 
projects and other regional public goods. This 
would provide intermediation between the 
region’s large savings and its vast unmet 
investment needs in infrastructure. 
Such a facility would also offer investors higher 
returns than those from foreign treasury bonds. 
It would help accelerate economic and social 
progress, making sustainable use of resources. 
It could also make development more self- 
reliant and reduce the region’s exposure to 
external financial shocks. Moreover, it would 
serve as a counter-cyclical tool that would 
promote regional growth at times of economic 
turbulence.11 
On 27 March 2013 in Durban, South Africa, 
the fifth Summit of the BRICS countries 
agreed on the creation of a New Development 
Bank that would mobilize resources for 
infrastructure and sustainable development 
projects in BRICS and other emerging economies 
and developing countries. The intention is to 
supplement the existing efforts of multilateral 
and regional financial institutions for global 
growth and development and this institution 
could actively contribute to redirecting some 
of the regional savings into regional investment 
projects.12
Greater transparency and better regulation
Currently governments and investors find 
it difficult to assess risk exposure. They are 
hampered by a lack of transparency, poor 
accounting standards and weak understanding 
of financial instruments. This led to inaccurate 
assessments of the quality of private-sector 
debt during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
and of the real levels of sovereign debt levels 
in a number of European Union countries in 
2011, and the over-optimistic assessments of 
sub-prime-based securities in 2008. 
This underlines the importance of increased 
market surveillance, especially in a globalized 
economy where institutions may be investing 
in distant markets about which they have 
relatively little information. To address this 
issue the IMF and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB)  have identified major data gaps that the 
international financial community should fill.13 
These include: financial soundness indicators that 
assess levels of risk in the financial sector; data 
on international financial interconnections; and 
assessments of the vulnerability of domestic 
economies to shocks. Their report also called 
for more countries, including developing ones, 
to develop and disseminate such data.
The Asia-Pacific region has already made 
progress in this direction. In 2011, ASEAN 
established the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic 
Research Office (AMRO) to serve as the 
regional macroeconomic surveillance unit of 
the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
(CMIM). AMRO will monitor and analyse 
economic situations in countries under its 
purview and thus help governments detect 
risks and take remedial action, and generally 
make CMIM decision-making more effective.14 
However, a truly Asia-Pacific system of 
resilience would mean expanding AMRO’s 
membership and the scope of its surveillance.
At the global level, the key institution for 
regulating the international financial sector is 
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the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
Through the BIS, governments have reached 
a series of Basel Accords, the third of which 
was agreed in 2011 with implementation 
scheduled from 2013 to 2019. This includes 
prudential measures at both the individual bank 
and banking sector levels that will push banks 
into internalizing the costs of risky behaviour. 
Several Asian countries are signatories of the 
Basel Accords. Other non-members might also 
incorporate these measures into their regulatory 
frameworks, but they should carefully weigh 
the pros and cons. Applying further constraints 
to their banks could reduce the availability of 
funds for investment. Moreover, in the short- 
term, the region has a relatively limited range 
of assets to use as safe investments.
One issue that has come under increased scrutiny 
is the emergence of ‘shadow banking’. In 
this case credit intermediation is provided by 
institutions that operate outside the regular 
banking system, without being subject to 
the same prudential rules.15 Shadow banking 
accounts for 24 per cent of the assets held by 
the global financial system.16 As shadow banking 
largely raises short-term funding, there are 
often maturity mismatches. In some Asian 
countries there are concerns that shadow 
banking might be encouraging unsustainable 
growth of investment in financial assets, 
particularly in real estate, leading to bubbles.17 
To reduce systemic risks, the FSB 
is developing regulations that would 
increase transparency and monitoring18 
but, given the complexity and diversity of 
shadow-banking, it remains to be seen how 
effective this will be.
Of particular importance to the stability of the 
world’s financial systems are what are termed 
‘global systemically important banks’ (G-SIBs). 
The FSB has identified 28 of these – which 
are essentially the world’s largest multinational 
banks19 – and is proposing measures to in-
crease their capacity to absorb financial shocks 
through Basel III. The G-SIBs are expected to 
meet higher standards of risk management, data 
collection, and internal controls. Furthermore, 
and perhaps of more immediate relevance to 
Asia and the Pacific, the FSB has finalized a 
principles-based, minimum framework for 
addressing ‘domestic systemically important 
banks’ (D-SIBs). From 2016, in line with the 
G-SIB framework, national authorities will 
have to apply these requirements to banks 
identified as D-SIBs. 
Finally, there have been major concerns 
about remuneration and incentives in banks. 
Remuneration structures based on large bonuses 
contributed to the 2008 crisis by encouraging 
excessive risk-taking.20 21 In response, the FSB 
has issued a set of principles and guidelines for 
sound compensation. 22  
Overall one of the most important principles 
should be global harmonization of banking 
and financial market regulations. Unless similar 
regulations apply everywhere the more 
footloose institutions will be tempted to 
migrate to laxer jurisdictions. 
These developments have highlighted the 
inherent tensions in tightening the regulatory 
frameworks – setting the need for greater 
stability against the need to encourage bank 
lending and investment. Whatever balance is 
achieved, it will entail higher costs and lower 
short-term profitability in the financial sector. 
As of early 2013, capital markets remained 
highly volatile. The liquidity glut in developed 
countries has led to surges in capital flows to 
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Asia-Pacific countries causing fluctuations in 
exchange rates. Some countries have responded 
by accumulating more foreign exchange while 
introducing direct capital account management 
measures. In 2010, Indonesia, the Republic 
of Korea, and Thailand, for example, imposed 
some capital account regulation measures23 
with some success, but may need to do more by 
targeting speculative flows. Overall, there is a need 
to tailor capital control instruments to the type of 
flows that are likely to affect a given economy, 
usually by restraining short term inflows while 
promoting investment in the real economy.24 Asian 
countries and a few other developing countries are 
now in a position to exchange experience and best 
practices on how to encourage productive foreign 
investment while reducing cross-border volatility 
and vulnerability. 
Limiting commodity-based speculation
Many Asia-Pacific developing countries, and 
in particular least developed countries, depend 
on exports of a small number of commodities. 
But they, and others, also rely on commodity 
imports, especially of food and fuel. All 
countries are thus concerned about the levels of 
commodity prices.
In recent years, food and fuel prices have been 
high and volatile. In the case of food this partly 
reflects rising global demand, but also inadequate 
supply as a result of under-investment in 
agriculture, and growing use of some food 
commodities as biofuels. On top of this the 
financialization of commodity markets offers 
greater opportunities for speculation.25 
Higher prices for food and fuels have serious 
macroeconomic repercussions – heightening 
inflation and causing deterioration in balances 
of payments and in fiscal balances.26 ESCAP has 
estimated that in some Asia-Pacific countries 
high energy prices alone could lead to a loss of 
GDP growth of up to 1.0 per cent. 27  Likewise, 
high food prices not only contribute to inflationary 
pressures, they also affect the urban poor, and 
the most vulnerable, aggravating their poverty 
and suffering. In this regard, ESCAP has 
estimated that due to increased food prices in 
2010 an additional 19.4 million people may 
have remained in poverty.28 
A number of measures have been proposed to 
dampen commodity price volatility.29  30   
 Greater market transparency – So that 
market fundamentals can function more 
efficiently in setting prices. This could include 
publishing information on stockpiles.
 More information on derivative markets – 
Notably on categories of market participants 
and on the positions they take.
 Stabilization measures – This might involve 
direct government or multilateral interventions 
to stabilize markets in specific commodities.
 Transaction taxes – Taxes on trading in 
commodity derivatives to reduce the number 
and speed of speculative transactions. 
 Increasing agricultural production – To 
reverse the long-term neglect of agriculture and 
rural development, so as to boost supplies and 
ease prices.
Ensuring robust social protection 
At times of economic contraction social 
protection systems provide useful counter- 
cyclical measures. In addition to protecting 
the most vulnerable people by supporting 
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consumption, they help smoothe the economic 
impact of financial crises.31  
Moreover, without such systems, there is the 
likelihood that bank rescues will absorb large 
amounts of public funds at the expense of 
social expenditures. Thus banks are allowed to 
make excessive profits when times are good 
while seeking public assistance when things go 
wrong – ‘privatizing profits while socializing 
losses.’   In future economic growth and financial 
sector resilience will increasingly rely on a more 
equitable sharing of gains and losses. In Asia 
and the Pacific, this should form part of a long-
term socio-economic security plan, based on 
a solid foundation of human rights and social 
inclusiveness, and on a commitment to 
equitable economic development.32
 
To some extent social protection can involve ad 
hoc post-crisis response measures. But social 
protection measures are most effective if 
they are already integrated into national 
development strategies; then if necessary they 
can be expanded at times of emergency. They 
should therefore be designed to be scalable. 
Nowadays, such systems can also take 
advantage of innovations in computerization 
and automation. Payment schemes can be 
based on computerized information systems 
using biometric technology with the option of 
mobile money transfers. This reduces leakages 
and the opportunities for corruption. 
A further measure that offers social protection 
more indirectly is to encourage flows of 
remittances from migrant   workers. These transfers 
accelerate at times of emergencies or economic 
shocks. Policymakers could facilitate such 
flows, for example, by temporarily suspending 
regulatory or fiscal controls at times of shocks. 
respoNDiNG to fiNaNcial crises
As long as there has been finance, there have 
been financial crises. It is unreasonable to expect 
that they could be eliminated. Indeed it might 
not be desirable to do so entirely – as abrupt 
corrections should promote prudent behaviour 
by financial actors. Financial meltdowns on the 
scale of 1997 and 2008, on the other hand, are 
systemically disruptive. 
Ultimately, regulators also need to prepare for 
the worst when governments are forced to step 
in to rescue the banking sector. During the 
1997 financial crisis, governments of the worst- 
affected countries took a series of measures to 
save banks that were considered domestically 
‘too big to fail.’ They guaranteed liabilities 
with public funds, for example, recapitalized 
institutions by opening up the sector to 
foreign equity investments and separated out 
troubled assets by creating ‘bad banks’. While 
these measures saved the financial sector from 
almost certain collapse, they also created moral 
hazard; banks that assumed they would be 
rescued might be tempted to take greater 
risks. In the event, these fears do not seem 
to have been realized. Banks in Asia and the 
Pacific have for the most part incorporated 
lessons from the 1997 financial crisis and showed 
remarkable resistance to the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
A number of global facilities provide safety 
nets at the time of liquidity or balance of 
payment crises.    The  Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI) developed financial safety nets 
instruments.   BRICS countries are also currently 
attempting to develop a new financial safety net 
through the creation of a Contingent Reserve 
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Arrangement (CRA). Such regional safety nets 
can have beneficial precautionary effects and 
further strengthen financial stability. 
Nevertheless, despite recent progress, there 
remain limitations on their use. This is further 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
The banking sector has an inherent tendency to 
fluctuate between boom and bust. Nevertheless, 
policymakers can encourage greater stability 
through appropriate regulations and 
cyclone shelters, while Turkey might prefer to 
invest in resilient hospitals that are needed to 
treat crushed limbs when buildings collapse in 
earthquakes. Taking into account the practices 
across the region Table V-1 summarizes critical 
infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific.
eXposUre of iNfrastrUctUre to  
NatUral Disasters
While many countries are exposed to similar 
natural phenomena, some have greater capacity 
to cope. This is illustrated in Figure V-1 which 
compares exposure to disaster with coping 
capacity. The coping capacity measures the 
ability to reduce the negative consequences 
during a disaster. Japan and Brunei, for 
example, are highly exposed but also have 
high coping capacities so are resilient. On the 
other hand, countries such as the Philippines, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Tonga, are also 
highly exposed but have less coping capacity so 
are very vulnerable.
As a result of rapid development across Asia 
and the Pacific, much more infrastructure is 
2. critical iNfrastrUctUre 
Even infrastructure that is well designed, 
constructed and maintained cannot always 
withstand natural disasters. Governments will 
therefore need to identify ‘critical infrastructure’ 
for which they need higher than usual margins 
of safety. 
What is considered ‘critical’ may differ from one 
country to another, but generally governments 
will try to keep the list as short as possible. 
Resilient infrastructure includes not just ‘hard’ 
infrastructure in terms of buildings or networks, 
but also the ‘soft’ infrastructure that supports 
this – the institutions, users, regulations, and 
legislation. All of these together should constitute 
a resilient system. An ASEAN Technical 
Working Group on Pandemic Preparedness 
and Response considers critical infrastructure 
to be that concerned with health, food, water 
and sanitation, energy, public security and 
order, finance, telecommunications, and transport.
Each country will have its own specific priorities, 
depending on local circumstances. Bangladesh, 
for example, will want schools to be especially 
robust so they can serve as community 
transparency measures, including for shadow 
banking. They can also use social protection 
systems not just to protect the vulnerable 
and sustain consumption but also to allow a 
more equitable sharing of gains and profits. 
Finally, facilitating intra-regional investments 
could increase the self-reliance of the Asia-
Pacific financial sector, limit its cross-border 
vulnerability and facilitate economic growth 
through the promotion of regional public goods 
and infrastructure.
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tABle  V-1
Critical infrastructure in Asia and the Pacific 
Systems and Services Sector Physical infrastructure 
Education, health services 
and shelters  
Housing and public 
buildings 
Housing, public buildings, educational buildings (schools, colleges, 
universities), health centres and hospitals, community buildings, stadium- 
designated as shelters  
Public transport services Transport Roads, railways, bridges, maritime ports, inland and river ports, airports, 
vehicle depots 
Telecommunication services Telecommunications Telecommunication networks (phone, fax, internet, cables, satellites), 
transmission towers and cables 
Water supply, sanitation 
services, irrigation and flood 
management system 
Water, waste water, 
irrigation and flood 
management  
Water intake, storage and diversion dams, water and sewer treatment plants, 
water distribution pipes, overhead water tanks, tube wells, sea water intrusion 
infrastructure, rain and storm water drains; irrigation canals, viaducts 
Supplies, electric power 
transmission and oil and gas 
transportation systems 
Energy and power Power generation plants, electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure 
(transformers, electric poles, and transmission lines), gas and oil storage 
depots and gasoline stations 
Urban infrastructure system 
and services 
Urban infrastructure Road, drains, water supply, education buildings, hospitals, community 
buildings, communication networks, electricity transmission, food storage and 
supply chains 
 
FIgure  V-1
Exposure  and coping capacities in Asia and the Pacific 
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FIgure  V-2
Samoa – hazard, exposure and losses 
Hazard
Exposure
Loss
Source: Mahul, Olivier, 2012.  
In addition to damage to infrastructure there 
are also losses. Both contribute to the overall 
economic impact. The damages refer to the 
monetary value of the completely or partially 
destroyed social, physical and economic infra-
structure. Losses arise from a change in the flow 
of goods and services and other economic flows 
resulting from the damaged infrastructure.34
This is illustrated in Figure V-3. The damages 
to physical and social infrastructure were much 
higher than the losses in most of the recent 
disasters. The losses were significant or higher 
in the case of the 2011 Typhoon in the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, and the Pakistan 
floods in 2010 and 2011. 
exposed to disasters. The greatest exposure is 
usually on marginal land such as floodplains, 
drought-prone areas, seismic locations and 
multi-hazard areas. This is illustrated for Samoa 
in Figure V-2. Although the whole country is 
exposed to hazards, the losses are concentrated 
in the more developed areas. Even countries 
with high coping capacities will suffer 
considerable losses – as demonstrated by the 
recent experiences in Japan and Thailand. 
Overall in 2011, the region’s total losses came 
to $294 billion.33
The damages can be assessed, and the losses 
can be estimated, for both social and physical 
infrastructure. As indicated in Table V-2 the 
damages are among the greatest in the housing 
and transport and communications sectors.
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Source: World Bank, GFDRR, 2012, available from www.gfdrr.org/PDNA (accessed November 2012)
tABle  V-2
Damage to critical infrastructure from some recent disasters
      Disaster Critical Infrastructure
 
 
Housing Health Education Transport & 
Communications 
Energy/ 
Electricity 
Water & 
Sanitation 
Irrigation & Flood 
Management 
      Pakistan  
      (Flood, 2011) 
889.9 4.9 116.7 188.3 5.3 5.7 55  
      Pakistan  
      (Flood, 2010) 
1,080.5 18.4 259.4 735.2 155.1 37.6 277.6  
      Philippines              
      (Typhoons, 2009) 
541.6 53.5 142.8 15.2 7.9 15.3  
      Thailand  
      (Flood, 2011) 
1,530.3 56.1 435.0 827.6 106.2 116.6 290.5  
      Indonesia  
      (Earthquake, 2009) 
1,664.8 60.5 63.2 69.7 4.9 78.8 4.15  
 
(Millions of US dollars)
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FIgure  V-3
Damage and losses to physical  and social infrastructure in recent disasters 
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makiNG social iNfrastrUctUre  
resilieNt
Housing
The greatest damage for social infrastructure 
is typically to housing and public buildings. 
Housing in informal settlements is unlikely to 
resist a severe disaster and even formal houses 
and other low-rise buildings generally with 
masonry structures are susceptible to damage 
by earthquakes, or the shear or wind loads due 
to storms, cyclones and hurricanes. Housing 
is vulnerable even in developed countries. 
High-rise ‘engineered’ buildings have to follow 
stringent building codes, but the requirements 
for housing tend to be lower. In the United 
States the majority of the houses damaged 
by superstorm Sandy in 2012, for example, 
were private houses while most commercial 
high-rises were not much affected. 
Much more attention is now needed for houses 
and other non-engineered buildings35 – using 
an interdisciplinary approach that includes 
both engineering and social sciences.  A number 
of Asia-Pacific countries have been looking 
at housing resilience. In the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, for example, the building code for 
unreinforced masonry buildings now limits 
these to two storeys and a height of 8 metres 
and includes provisions for seismic design.36 
Bangladesh, with the support of the Climate 
Investment Fund, is planning to develop 
low-cost, storm and cyclone proof housing.37 
For Myanmar, there are now illustrated practical 
guidelines for retrofitting rural houses.38  
While codes and guidelines are essential, 
national and local authorities also have to 
ensure that builders and homeowners comply 
with these. It should also be noted that good 
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building practices can be fostered even without 
a code, as shown in the rebuilding after the 
2005 earthquake in a remote and mountainous 
region of Pakistan (Box V-1).39 
Schools
Worldwide, approximately 1.2 billion students 
are enrolled in primary and secondary schools. 
Of these, 875 million live in seismic high-risk 
zones and hundreds of millions more face 
regular floods, landslides, extreme winds and 
fire hazards. Although these children spend up 
to half their waking hours in school building, 
all too often these are not disaster resilient.40 
Over the past decades, the death toll has 
increased sharply.41 
 Pakistan, 2005 earthquake – 17,000 students  
died under 10,000 collapsed schools.  
 Indonesia, 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta 
– 2,900 schools were damaged or destroyed.
 Philippines, 2006 Leyte island– More than 
200 students were buried alive in mudslides 
caused by floods.
 China, 2008 Wenchun earthquake – Almost 
5,400 children died or went missing when 
4,500 classrooms were destroyed.42
Box  V-1
Pakistan – earthquake-resilient housing
The 7.6 magnitude earthquake that struck the northern mountainous parts of Pakistan in October 2005 
killed 73,300 people, seriously injured 62,400, and displaced 3.5 million from their homes. Some 462,000 
private homes were completely destroyed and another 99,300 were severely damaged, many perched 
precariously on hillsides. Of the estimated $3.5 billion reconstruction cost, almost half was for housing. 
The Government quickly decided that people should be trusted to rebuild their own houses, though with 
financial assistance and technical advice. 
The Government created the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to provide 
grants directly to the affected families, conditional on houses being built to acceptable standards. ERRA 
also trained construction workers, engineers and Pakistani architects and technicians. Over three years, 
it imparted knowledge on quake-resistant design and construction to 300,000 workers. 
The National Society of Earthquake Technology, a Nepalese NGO of earthquake engineers, and the 
Citizen’s Foundation, a Pakistani NGO, along with the United Nation’s International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction and other partners, imparted a unique mix of community-based artisan training 
and seismically-resistant construction techniques that included vernacular architecture. Four years 
after the earthquake, ERRA reported that more than 90 per cent of the 400,000 rebuilt houses complied 
with safe construction guidelines, and more than 30 per cent used vernacular architecture. 
Most families had chosen reinforced masonry using cement blocks to build their homes. Thus many 
families, who earlier preferred traditional construction techniques not only rebuilt with greater safety 
but also became more aware about prevention methods. Earthquake-resistant construction also 
boosted the understanding of skilled craftsmen, who will be able to pass their skills on to the next 
generation of builders. Pakistan’s experience show that good building practices ensure safer structures, 
and that it is possible even with artisan materials and local construction techniques.
Source: United Nations and World Bank, 2011.
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 Japan, 2011 earthquake and tsunami – 7,735 
school buildings were damaged or destroyed.
Had the schools been built more disaster 
resilient, the losses could have been substantially 
reduced. ‘Safe schools’ have three essential 
elements.43  
Safe construction – This should be based 
on legislation, policy, building codes and 
standards, site location, hazard and risk mapping, 
verification, inspection, certification and 
retrofitting of educational infrastructure, 
whether in public or private facilities.
Emergency preparedness – Plans and 
policies are needed to reduce risks to students’ 
lives as well as measures to enable resumption 
of education during and after an emergency.
Culture of safety – Education should be a 
platform for increasing student, and thereby 
community, resilience and lead to generational 
change towards a culture of safety.
The ‘One Million Safe Schools and Hospitals 
Campaign’ is a global advocacy initiative as 
part of the World Disaster Risk Reduction 
Campaign in 2010-2011.44 And for all countries, 
guidelines and manuals are now available 
for building earthquake-resistant schools. 
Disasters have also triggered the construction 
of safe schools in individual countries (Box V-2).
Disaster shelters
Disaster shelters have contributed immensely 
towards saving lives in several countries. In 
Bangladesh in 2007, 15 per cent of the affected 
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population took refuge in cyclone shelters, 
which saved thousands of lives (Figure V-4). 
By 2009, when Bangladesh was struck by cyclone 
Aila the number of cyclone shelters had gone up 
to 3,000. Bangladesh has also been converting 
cyclone shelters to multi-purpose disaster 
shelters, with elevated space for livestock and 
 
overhead water storage, that can also double as 
primary schools or office spaces. The Ministry 
of Food and Disaster Management estimates 
that the country needs 5,000 such shelters as 
part of the country’s network of embankments 
against rising sea levels. Japan also has disaster 
shelters in the form of school buildings and 
community centres. All such shelters need to 
be integrated with early warning systems and 
form part of national disaster risk reduction 
strategies. 
makiNG pHYsical  
iNfrastrUctUre resilieNt
Energy and power
Storms, cyclones, floods and earthquakes 
frequently disrupt community power supplies. 
They can damage electricity transformers, 
Box  V-2
China – Wenchuan earthquake triggers construction of safe schools
After the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008, the Chinese education sector gained knowledge  in disaster 
prevention, risk reduction, and post-earthquake reconstruction. As a result, progress has been achieved 
due to:
•	 Prioritization	 of	 the	 education	 sector	 in	 the	 disaster	 prevention,	 reduction	 and	 post-earthquake	 
 reconstruction programme; 
•	 New	standards	and	codes	on	school	construction;	
•	 Successful	school	reconstruction	in	quake-affected	areas;	
•	 The	National	Primary	and	Secondary	School	Safe	School	Building	Programme;	
•	 Enhanced	education	on	disaster	prevention	and	relief;	and	
•	 Capacity	building	in	disaster	prevention	and	reduction.	
The Ministry of Education is implementing a monitoring and warning system to alert local education 
commissions and education bureaus about possible natural disasters and other safety risks. It is also 
providing advice about emergency preparedness and response, as well as about disaster reduction in 
middle schools, primary schools, and kindergartens. In 2009, a nationwide school safety assessment 
implemented by the Ministry of Education was supported by UNICEF. 
In Sichuan Province, annual risks assessment are conducted during the flood season under the guidance 
of local governments, and in collaboration with concerned sectors, particularly on landslides, mudslides 
and floods. As part of the Build Back Better project, a study is assessing the status of emergency 
preparedness and response in kindergartens and preschools in the earthquake-affected areas.
Source: UNISDR, 2011.
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pylons and poles, not only cutting supplies but 
also exposing people to live transmission cables. 
In addition, extreme weather can damage power 
generation facilities, including hydroelectric 
power stations, canals and tunnels. Flooding 
and rises in sea level could affect fuel storage 
tanks and substations in coastal areas as well as 
offshore oil rigs and refineries. 
One of the best ways to safeguard transmission 
lines is to move them underground through 
ducts or tunnels. This is expensive but it is now 
happening in many countries. Singapore, for 
example, recently awarded contracts worth $2 
billion to construct 35 kilometres of underground 
tunnels for transmission cables.45 In Nepal, in 
Salleri and Chitawan and Chapali, high-voltage 
underground connections are being built from 
substations to distribution systems.46 In Australia, 
the Government recommends that consideration 
should be given to undergrounding the 
electrical infrastructure, while accepting this is 
an expensive option.47 
Transport
Recent disasters have caused tremendous 
damage to transport infrastructure and 
operations. The Thailand floods in 2011 
submerged many roads while the 2011 Japan 
earthquake damaged roads, railways and 
airports. Transport can also be interrupted: in 
coastal areas of Bangladesh, the Maldives, the 
Pacific islands and Viet Nam, roads will be 
highly vulnerable to rises in sea levels.
Transport systems can be designed to be more 
resilient. Generally, this will mean enhancing 
the capacity of officials and the planning process 
by incorporating higher design standards. This 
would also increase the service ability and life 
of costly structures.48 49 50 For example, in the 
United States after Hurricane Katrina, the 
clearance height of bridges was increased51 and 
in Canada the design of the Confederation 
Bridge allows for a one-metre sea level rise.52  
FIgure  V-4
Bangladesh – cyclone shelters save lives, 1970–2010
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Coastal sections of roads and railways can be 
moved to higher ground or given protective 
walls or embankments. During the 2011 Japan 
earthquake and the subsequent tsunami, the 
embankment section of the expressway along the 
coast protected the inland side from inundation. 
It also offered an evacuation space, saving many 
lives. The reconstruction project envisages 
evacuation stairs for the embankment slopes. A 
study in Bangladesh found that it was economically 
viable to raise road embankments from 0.5 to 
1.0 metres to protect the roads from floods.53 
In mountainous areas, roadside slopes can be 
made more stable through bioengineering 
using living plants, as in Nepal. Combined with 
civil engineering measures these can provide 
cost effective and environmentally friendly 
solutions.54 Drains can also be built with extra 
capacity to cater for surges in water flow. The 
Bipartisan Policy Center offers a list of options.55
It is important to keep transport links open 
for disaster relief operations. For this purpose, 
transport planners should incorporate some 
redundancy – building extra routes in case one is 
damaged. They can also consider multi-modal 
networks so that traffic is distributed among 
different options – such as railways, roads, and 
water routes. Planning should also reflect the 
functional hierarchy of transport networks, such as 
primary trunk roads, national highways, feeder and 
district roads, and rural roads. Nepal for example, 
accords priority for upgrading and maintenance 
of strategic road networks which include 
important national highways and feeder roads.
Flood control
Flood risk management can employ both 
structural and non-structural measures.56 The 
experience of Thailand has shown the importance 
not just of increasing the capacity of canals and 
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pumps but also of ensuring good coordination 
among various agencies (Box V-3). While 
planning new infrastructure – including irrigation 
canals, reservoirs and waste water treatment – it 
is important to consider demographic trends 
and likely future demand. It is also imperative 
to enhance flood protection along rivers.
Climate change will be a major consideration. 
In Bangladesh, for example, the Climate 
Investment Fund is now planning to improve 
water supply and sanitation, construct 
embankments and undertake reforestation to 
protect 12 vulnerable coastal communities from 
cyclones and floods. 57 
Much will also depend on community efforts. 
In Nepal, for example, communities have 
constructed flood barriers with stones, bamboo 
and wood using traditional techniques. 58 In Khulna, 
Bangladesh, the aim is to make 80 per cent 
of each ward free from damaging floods by 
re-excavating drains and building new ones.59
Water supplies
At times of disaster, it is vital to maintain 
adequate water supplies. This can be especially 
difficult in small island developing States which 
generally have limited supplies of freshwater 
and inadequate drainage.60 In areas with 
frequent floods it is thus important to protect 
water and sewerage treatment plants and 
ensure that they have adequate energy 
supplies for treatment and pumping. 
Piped distribution networks also need 
protection from contamination.61 When 
available, it may be possible to include 
tube wells as a resilient supply. Other 
options include using recycled water, and 
supplementing supplies through rainwater 
harvesting. When the water distribution system 
is affected, contingency measures such as 
supply through tankers to the communities 
should be in place. 
Box  V-3
Thailand – flood action plan
In response to the disastrous floods in 2011, the Government has prepared a master plan on water 
resources management. In addition to measures for water management during emergencies there is 
a plan for flood mitigation in the Chao Phraya floodplain. The aim is to increase the efficiency of water 
control buildings and dykes, as well as that of water drainage systems such as pipes, canals, water 
gates, and pumping stations. 
In order to improve the capacity of the Bangkok drainage system, the Government has built a 5-kilometre 
underground tunnel, 5 metres in diameter, linking Rama IX and Ramkhamhaeng Roads, along with six 
smaller tunnels with a total length of 14 kilometres. There are also plans to construct three more 
tunnels at Khlong Bang Sue, Bung Nong Bon and Don Muang districts to divert storm and flood waters 
into the Chao Phraya River. In addition, there is a vision for a double-deck, 100-kilometre storm water 
management and road tunnel linking Ayutthaya and Samut Prakhan provinces. This would be similar 
to one in Kuala Lumpur.
Source: Thailand, 2012.
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Telecommunications
Almost 90 per cent of the world’s 7 
billion people are now connected in one way 
or another by information and communication 
technologies. Advances in these technologies 
are helping improve the disaster resilience of 
communities and people, and bridging the 
gaps in last-mile connectivity. Effective disaster 
response nowadays is also very dependent on 
information and communications technology. 
Applications of space technologies, such as 
satellite remote sensing, positioning and 
navigation  along with other monitoring systems, 
can give accurate warnings of impending 
disasters while communications systems guide 
relief operations (Box V-4). 
However, ICT systems themselves are vulnerable. 
High winds and storms can bring down 
telephone poles, and changes in rain density 
may affect mobile phone signals.  Services that 
depend on power  suppl ie s  c an  a l so  be 
interrupted. Both  undersea and terrestrial cables 
carrying voice and data services are vulnerable to 
natural disasters, even sabotage. The Hengchun 
earthquake, which struck near Taiwan Province 
of China in December 2006, devastated the region’s 
services; it took 11 cable repair ships 49 days 
to fix the damage. In 2009, typhoon Morakot, 
and the subsequent undersea earthquake, 
damaged 10 submarine cables and adversely 
affected voice and data traffic across South-East 
Asia as well as in China, India and Japan.
In order to make ICT systems more resilient, 
designers need to ensure robust construction 
throughout the networks and build in sufficient 
redundancy. For the internet there is a growing 
interest in complementing submarine cables 
with terrestrial cables, as well as satellites. 
Urban infrastructure
Urban areas are at high risk from disasters 
because they not only have high population 
densities but also high concentrations of 
economic assets, particularly infrastructure. 
Moreover, to take advantage of transportation 
links they have tended to develop around coastal 
areas and river basins. This also exposes them 
to climate-related disasters such as tropical 
cyclones and sea level rise. As a result of climate 
change they may also face more frequent 
flooding – with a ‘1-in-50 years’ flood now 
occurring one year in 15.62
Box  V-4
ICT infrastructure: last mile connectivity
While responding to the historic floods 2011 in Thailand, the Government and the affected communities 
demonstrated the effective use of innovative technologies. These ranged from near real-time satellite 
imagery, crowd sourcing, and social media, to the use of indigenous knowledge. 
The ESCAP Trust Fund supported the establishment of the Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System for 
the Indian Ocean, which went live in October 2011 – a conservative estimate of which is that it will help 
save about 1,000 lives every year for the next 100 years.
Source: ESCAP and ISDR, 2012.
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Box  V-5
Ten essentials for making cities disaster resilient
1. Institutional and administrative framework
2. Financing and resources
3. Multi-hazard-risk assessment : know your risk
4. Infrastructure protection, upgrading and resilience
5. Protecting vital facilities: education and health
6. Building regulations and land use planning
7. Training, education and public awareness
8. Environmental protection and strengthening ecosystems
9. Effective preparedness, early warning and responses
10. Recovery and rebuilding communities
Implementing these essentials
1. Organizing and preparing to apply the ten essentials
2. Diagnosis and assessment of the city’s risk
3. Developing a safe and resilient city action plan
4. Implementing the plan
5. Monitoring and follow-up
Source: UNISDR, 2012.
A study of nine Asian coastal cities considered 
five types of resilience: natural, physical, social, 
economic and institutional, using a climate 
disaster resilient index.63 The results showed 
various levels of vulnerability in Banda Aceh, 
Bangkok, Colombo, Danang, Hue, Iloilo, 
Mumbai, San Fernando and Yokohama. The 
study underlined the need to build community 
resilience for climate-related disasters.
Ten essentials for making cities disaster 
resilient are outlined in Box V-5. However, 
these guidelines focus more on disaster risk 
reduction rather than on developing resilient 
infrastructure. Box V-6 provides a comprehensive 
strategy for protection of critical infrastructure 
in disaster-prone areas in the Republic of 
Korea. Guidelines for local government leaders 
in this area are developed and available.64
The challenge for municipal authorities will be 
to meet realistic and effective standards and 
acquire the necessary construction skills. A 
number of guidelines are available, for example, 
including a step-by-step approach for appraising 
a project for hazard-risk reduction.65   Some cities 
will benefit from greater levels of de-
centralization. If they have greater 
responsibilities for self-management they may 
be able to raise the necessary funds in domestic 
capital markets.66 
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iNterDepeNDeNcies amoNG  
critical sectors 
All the various forms of infrastructure are 
becoming increasingly interdependent. 67  68 Failure 
in one system can significantly affect many 
others – with the risk of cascade failure, where 
a breakdown in one system has knock-on 
effects on others. For example, relief operations 
require well-functioning systems for transport, 
electricity, communications, water supply and 
food supply. And many forms of infrastructure 
– from transportation to water supply and 
sanitation – are critically dependent on supplies 
of energy. Road links too can be critical. If in 
aftermath of a disaster a strategic hospital is not 
connected with a strategic road route, it might 
be operational but still unable to provide a 
service. It has been estimated that ‘lifeline’ 
systems that includes power, water, wastewa-
ter, communication and transportation need 
to be restored within four hours to support the 
emergency response operations.69 Improving 
overall resiliency thus involves recognizing and 
managing these interdependencies. 
fiNaNcial strateGY aGaiNst  
Disasters 
Governments can finance the cost of disasters 
in a number of ways. They can build up reserves, 
or they can pay the costs out of current budgets. 
They can also establish with lenders’ ‘contingent 
credit’ lines that enable them to borrow in the 
event of disaster. Or they, and private individuals 
and corporations, can take out insurance.
In practice, the developing countries of the 
region rely heavily on annual budget appropri-
ations and de facto post-disaster reallocations 
– both for immediate relief and recovery and for 
longer-term reconstruction.70 This is because 
they are unlikely to have reserves and if already 
indebted will find it difficult to get credit.
Countries that have more flexibility, however, 
can take a ‘layered’ approach, using different 
options according to the nature of the 
potential disaster. The World Bank is helping 
ASEAN countries with this kind of strategy 
(Figure V-5). For smaller lower-cost risks such 
Box  V-6
Republic of Korea – protecting critical infrastructure in disaster-prone areas
The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) of the Government of the Republic of Korea has a 
system for addressing disasters. This includes: i) pre-disaster impact assessments; ii) a disaster insurance 
programme; iii) a reinforcement project for disaster-prone areas; and iv) special disaster zoning, which has 
helped protect critical infrastructure.
With the operating system in place, NEMA is integrating disaster risk reduction into sustainable development. 
This includes a recovery programme for restoring facilities to their original functions or improving them. 
For this purpose, NEMA has identified 537 disaster-prone areas that are most susceptible to inundation, 
collapse and isolation. Under this plan, $141 billion has been invested in 488 areas.
Source: Republic of Korea, 2012.
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FIgure  V-5
A three-tier financial strategy against natural disasters
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as localized floods the government retains the 
risks and assumes that it can pay for this out of 
reserves or the current budget. But for more ex-
pensive events it aims for a degree of risk trans-
fer by paying for contingent credit or taking out 
insurance. 
For some small island economies in the 
Pacific the disaster could be on such a scale as to 
overwhelm the economy. In this case it may be 
possible to pool the risk with other countries in 
a similar position, since a disaster is only likely 
to hit one or two of them at the same time. The 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, 
for example, pools disaster risks regionally, and 
helps countries in such circumstances purchase 
insurance cheaper than otherwise (see Chapter 7).
Developing countries may also be able to get 
relatively inexpensive contingent credit through 
the World Bank’s Catastrophe Risk Deferred 
Drawdown Option. This is a new financial 
instrument available to countries that take a 
proactive stand towards reducing their exposure 
to disaster risk. In this case a loan is disbursed 
quickly upon the occurrence of a natural disaster 
in order to provide immediate liquidity. 
Governments can also become involved in 
providing insurance or acting as reinsurers. They 
can also regulate the private insurance market. 
This involves difficult choices, particularly 
when setting premiums. If the premiums are 
too high this will discourage buyers, or overly 
favour insurance companies. But if they are too 
low they will encourage risk taking – as with 
construction in hazard-prone areas.
The region has several innovative practices in 
insurance. Turkey, for example, has a pooled 
homeowner’s catastrophe insurance programme. 
The Government worked with a number of 
partners, including the World Bank to establish 
a compulsory earthquake insurance scheme: 
the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool 
(TCIP). The aim was to increase the uptake of 
insurance while building the capacity of the 
domestic insurance market to underwrite 
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earthquake risk, and isolating it from the risk 
of insolvency from an extreme event. Domestic 
insurers underwrite catastrophe risk, but pass it 
onto the pool which is supported by risk capital 
from the international reinsurance community, 
the Government and donors (Box V-7). 
costiNG resilieNce 
Making infrastructure more resilient requires 
significant investment. Generally this should 
be approached using a cost-benefit analysis, 
comparing different levels of investment with 
the costs of subsequent infrastructure failure. 
In the United States, for example, for such 
disaster risk reduction investments as structural 
mitigation, retrofitting and creating public 
awareness, it has been estimated that $1 spent 
on mitigation generates on average $4 in future 
savings.71  
The governments in most developing countries, 
although aware of the benefits of DRR, may 
not be able to justify such measures if the 
benefits seem unclear and can only be realized 
Box  V-7
Turkey – Catastrophe Insurance Pool
Turkey is highly exposed to severe earthquakes yet its private insurance market was previously unable 
to provide adequate cover. This left the Government with a significant contingent financial exposure.
In the aftermath of the Marmara earthquake in 2000, the Government worked to limit its financial 
exposure through the establishment of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP). This pool enables 
the Government to ensure that owners who pay property taxes on domestic dwellings can purchase 
affordable and cost-effective earthquake coverage. This transfers risk to the international reinsurance 
markets, thereby reducing pressure to provide post-disaster housing subsidies. 
TCIP is a public-sector insurance company which is managed on sound technical and commercial 
insurance principles. The pool operates as a genuine public-private partnership with most, if not all, 
operational functions outsourced to the private sector. TCIP purchases commercial reinsurance and the 
Government acts as a catastrophe reinsurer of last resort for claims arising out of an earthquake. The 
full capital risk requirements for TCIP are funded by commercial reinsurance (currently in excess of $1 
billion) and its own surplus capital (about $0.5 billion).
The TCIP policy is a stand-alone property earthquake policy with a maximum sum insured per policy of 
$65,000, an annual average premium rate of $46 and a 2 per cent of sum insured deductible. Premium 
rates are based on the construction type and property location and vary from less than 0.05 per cent for 
a concrete reinforced house in a low-risk zone to 0.60 per cent for a house located in the highest-risk 
zone. 
TCIP has sold over 3 million policies at market-based premium rates – achieving 23 per cent penetration 
by 2009, a considerable advance on the 600,000 households covered when the pool was established. 
To achieve this level of penetration, the Government invested heavily in awareness campaigns and 
made earthquake insurance compulsory for home-owners on registered land in urban centres. The 
legal framework for the programme envisages compulsory enforcement mechanisms in urban settings, 
while coverage is voluntary for homeowners in rural areas.
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2012.
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in the medium to long-term. Estimating the 
potential benefits may be difficult. This requires 
gathering historic data on disasters, assessing 
the probability that a disaster will occur, and 
then costing the potential damage. A study 
in Colombia, using a comprehensive and 
long-term risk management approach, suggests 
that governments should concentrate on 
retrofitting the most vulnerable and critical 
infrastructure rather than spreading their funds 
widely over many risk-prone assets.72 
Pilot projects in India and Bangladesh have 
used the Opportunities and Risks of Climate 
Change and Disasters methodology to help 
development organizations and their partners 
to integrate disaster risk reduction and adaptation 
processes into their programmes.73 UNDP 
and other organizations have developed 
methodologies for investments for climate- 
proofing infrastructure; these include economic 
analysis through market valuation as well as 
estimates of the cost of risks to human health.74 
The United Kingdom Department for 
International Development has argued that more 
research is needed on the complementarities 
between strengthening disaster resilience 
and other development goals and the cost - 
effectiveness of individual investments.75 At 
present few developing country governments 
have the capacity for such analyses, especially at 
subnational levels.
In some cases they should be able to seek 
support from international financing institutions 
such as the multilateral development banks. 
Many banks already incorporate disaster risk 
reduction into project assessment cycles – not 
just to protect the infrastructure but also 
because poor construction could cost lives. 
Furthermore, the multilateral development 
banks are often involved in financing rehabili-
tation and reconstruction after a disaster. 
Nowadays much of their investment is closely 
related to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. The Asian Development Bank, for 
example, is introducing climate adaptation to 
its projects and programmes.76 There are also 
a number of sources of finance for climate 
change adaptation that governments could tap. 
These include: the Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery, managed by the World 
Bank; the Climate Investment Fund; the Green 
Climate Fund; the multi-donor programme of 
the Global Climate Change Alliance; and the 
Climate Change Fund.77 There is also funding 
for projects in developing countries through 
the Global Environment Facility, the Special 
Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed 
Country Fund and the Adaptation Fund 
within the framework of UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Investing in infrastructure through 
stimulus packages
In normal circumstances strict budgetary 
regulations governing ordinary capital expen-
ditures preclude a high level of investment in 
new infrastructure. But these restrictions can 
be relaxed during a financial crisis, opening 
up opportunities for building more resilient 
facilities. Thus during the most recent financial 
crises, many countries have created large 
economic stimulus packages which include 
investment in major infrastructure projects 
(Table V-3). 
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Private-sector funding
Another potential source of financing for 
resilient infrastructure could be the private 
sector – via public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
Total PPP investment in the region over the 
period 1990 to 2011 was around $823 billion, 
with the largest share in the energy sector. 
Most investment was concentrated in a handful 
of countries such as China, India, Malaysia, 
Turkey, the Russian Federation, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. At a recent 
ministerial conference on public-private partnerships 
for infrastructure development in Tehran 
in November 2012, countries in the region 
reaffirmed their interest in this option and the 
Source: Bhattacharya, 2010.
tABle  V-3
Infrastructure investment in the stimulus packages of major Asian economies
(Billions of US dollars)
Country Total fiscal 
Stimulus 
Infrastructure 
Component 
Infrastructure 
as % of Total 
Stimulus 
Types of Infrastructure 
China 600.0 275.0 45.8 Railways, airports, electrical transmission technology, 
expressways, telecommunications technologies, rural roads, 
electricity, gas, water, and irrigation projects  
India  60.0 33.5 55.8 Highway, port, and power sectors  
Indonesia  7.7 1.3 16.9 Communications and transport infrastructure, rural 
infrastructure, and development of ports and shipping industry  
Viet Nam  8.0 4.8 60.0 Infrastructure spending  
Thailand  46.7 30.6 65.5 Water resource development and road construction in villages 
and rural areas along with transport, logistics, energy, and 
telecom improvements  
Malaysia  2.0 0.2 8.5 Low and medium cost housing, upgrade, repair, and maintain 
police stations and army camps, and public and basic 
infrastructure project maintenance  
Republic of 
Korea  
11.0 3.2 29 Roads, universities, schools, hospitals  
Japan  154.6 16 10+ Yen 1.6 trillion for fostering environmentally friendly 
technologies, including plans to provide cheaper solar power 
to homes and up to $2,500 as tax breaks to consumers on 
purchases of “green” cars; subsidies of 5% on energy efficient 
televisions and other appliances  
 
need to strengthen their policy frameworks 
accordingly (Box V-8).
Engaging the private sector in infrastructure 
development should help improve project 
design. The private sector can bring in new 
technologies, innovative management approaches 
and high-quality skills in engineering, 
planning and ICT systems. At the same time, 
there are benefits for the private sector in 
increasing employment and profit opportunities.
Nevertheless, there may be concerns that a 
PPP enables a private company to make profits 
while governments shoulder a disproportionate 
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amount of the risk. For example, one of the 
largest PPPs in the world, the Victorian 
Desalination Plant in Australia, was approved 
in 2007 because the Government believed 
that the State would soon face permanent 
water shortages. But this did not happen. By 
the time the project was completed in 2012, the 
local reservoirs were more than 80 per cent full 
and the plant was immediately put on standby. 
Nevertheless, the 30 year contract guarantees 
the private operating company a holding 
charge for building the plant and being ready to 
produce water. This has given the Government 
of Victoria an unexpected fiscal burden. 
A PPP will often leave the asset in private hands 
– which can be disadvantageous at times of 
disaster. Special clauses may therefore be 
required in PPP contracts to allow governments 
to use critical infrastructure, such as roads, for 
disaster response operations – if necessary 
compensating the enterprise for loss of revenues.
Disaster risk maNaGemeNt  
for protectiNG critical  
iNfrastrUctUre
Developing resilient infrastructure will demand 
coordination among many sectors and levels of 
administration. The focus should be not only on 
physical infrastructure but also on the associated 
policies, guidelines and by-laws. It is also 
imperative to engage communities and different 
stakeholders. The community can identify the 
infrastructure that is needed while engineers 
can come up with solutions. Strategies for 
disaster risk management should include the 
following elements:
1.  Reducing exposure
One of the most difficult tasks is to reduce 
the exposure of critical infrastructure. Even 
Bangladesh, which has good record of addressing 
disaster risks, has not been able to reduce 
Box  V-8
Asia-Pacific countries to increase private-sector participation in infrastructure 
development
In November 2012, the Third Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference on Public Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Development was organised by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with support 
from the ESCAP secretariat. The Conference, the third in a series following similar ministerial meetings 
organized in Jakarta in 2010 and Seoul in 2007, was attended by senior officials from 25 countries of the 
region. The Conference served as a regional platform for representatives of public-sector agencies 
involved in the development of PPPs for infrastructure development, to share knowledge and discuss 
new ideas on how to build their capacities in PPP projects. 
The Tehran Declaration on Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Development, adopted by the 
Conference, includes concrete actions for both governments and their development partners to ensure 
that such PPPs contribute to sustainable development.
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exposure. The percentage of GDP loss during 
disasters fell from 5.7 per cent during the 1998 
floods, to 0.31 per cent during cyclone Aila in 
2009, but the infrastructure loss as a percentage 
of total loss rose from 51 per cent to 84 per cent 
(Figure V-6). There are similar concerns about 
exposure in other countries. 
2.  Mapping critical infrastructure
The potential for mapping risks was 
demonstrated following the 2008 earthquake 
in Sichuan, China. Immediately after the 
earthquake, satellite images revealed 56 land-
slides and eight new lakes they had created. The 
largest, the Tangjiashan quake lake (Figure V-7) 
was the biggest ever discovered from a satellite 
image and contained 200 million cubic metres 
of water. Downstream, there were cities with 
more than 1.3 million people, along with critical 
infrastructure and economic assets worth 
billions of dollars. The satellite images enabled 
decision makers to assess the risk, issue urgent 
warnings and arrange for early response – helping 
save many lives and protect economic assets.
3.  Strategies for building resilience of critical in-
frastructure 
Governments typically have three strategic 
disaster risk management instruments at their 
disposal: prospective, corrective and compensatory. 
First, for hazards such as earthquakes or 
hurricane-force winds, mitigation measures are 
oriented primarily to reduce the vulnerability of 
the exposed components. Second, for hazards 
such as tsunami, storm surges or volcanic 
hazards, the interventions are oriented primarily 
towards relocation or restrictions on land use. Third, 
for hazards whose effects depend more on local 
conditions, such as flooding or landslides, structural 
interventions are oriented primarily towards 
prevention, through the construction of works 
such as dykes and embankments. 
FIgure  V-6
Damage to economic sectors due to major disasters in Bangladesh, 1998-2009 
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4.  Using existing knowledge and  
enhancing awareness
For this purpose there is a large body of 
research and many technical manuals. These 
include guidelines on resilient building construction, 
manuals on flash flood risk management, and 
guidelines for developing safer urban commu-
nities. Many were produced by the ProVention 
Consortium, a global coalition of govern-
ments, international organizations, academic 
institutions, the private sector and civil society 
organizations. Many universities have also 
initiated academic programme and research on 
resilient infrastructure.78  
5.  Review of standards, codes and guidelines
One major problem is inadequate design standards. 
During earthquakes inadequate standards in 
road construction can result in the collapse of 
elevated highways. In the case of large-scale 
floods or heavy precipitation, parts of roads can 
be seriously damaged or washed away. 
Incorporating new standards is easier during 
the planning stage rather than retrofitting 
after construction. There are many examples of 
projects in highly vulnerable locations that have 
adopted higher design standards.79 Countries 
like Japan provide incentives for retrofitting 
buildings in high-risk areas. But even what 
seems like resilient structures may not suffice 
under extreme conditions (Box V-9).
Many development banks have also realized 
the importance of climate change resilience 
and hence provide guidelines on a range of 
engineering solutions.80 They and bilateral donors 
are also integrating disaster risk reduction into 
their environmental and social impact assess-
ments of infrastructure projects. These include 
structural measures as well as public awareness, 
and land use planning. Many countries have 
FIgure  V-7
China – Tangjiashan lake formed after Wenchuan earthquake, 2008
Source: China Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application. 
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developed environmental impact assessment 
guidelines and strategic environmental assess-
ments. These guidelines should be extended to 
cover climate change impacts and incorporate 
risk assessments of natural hazards.
6.  Land use planning
Many Asian cities are located in coastal and 
low-lying areas, which are naturally vulnerable 
to natural disasters. This exposure to risk 
is further compounded by the absence of sound 
urban planning practices, poorly enforced 
zoning and land use regulations, and in some 
cases, lack of knowledge about potential 
hazards. 
While planning infrastructure, careful 
consideration should be given to identifying 
secure locations. Some local authorities in the 
United States are even planning to outlaw 
transport and infrastructure development in 
vulnerable coastal areas.81 But it is also possible 
to realign coastal roads or move them to higher 
locations. Local authorities should also provide 
warning signs, and designate emergency 
rescue routes. Makati City in the Philippines 
provides a good example of land use planning 
across different sectors and scales (Box V-10).
7.  Developing resilient local communities
Local government units and communities 
should take the lead in disaster risk reduction, 
in the relief and recovery efforts. They should 
therefore be given greater capacity to plan, 
implement and manage disaster risk reduction 
strategy and develop resilient infrastructure 
that responds to local needs.82 There should be 
greater level of coordination between national 
and local authorities as well as local agencies 
managing various critical infrastructure sectors.
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Box  V-9
Japan – earthquake and tsunami in 2011, damage to infrastructure
One of the world’s biggest breakwaters was in Kamaishi City – 8 metres high and 63 metres deep. 
However, in 2011 the breakwater collapsed and the tsunami reached 6.9 to 9 metres. The general belief 
that a three-storey building would serve as evacuation centre also did not hold as tsunami waves 
reached as high as the fourth floor at several locations.
The earthquake and tsunami also damaged 190 of the 300 kilometres of coastal structures. In some 
areas they did delay the arrival of the waves, giving extra minutes for people to evacuate. A structural 
assessment concluded that construction standards and stability performance under worst-case 
scenarios should be further investigated. As a result of strict and rigorously enforced building codes, 
reinforced infrastructure and buildings were not seriously damaged. 
Following the structural damage of elevated expressways by the 1995 Hanshin earthquake, Japan 
reviewed and increased the standards for bridge construction. Most of the bridges constructed applying 
these new standards were not damaged in 2011.
Box  V-10
The Philippines – disaster resilience across sectors and scales in Makati City
Makati City has a sophisticated and efficient disaster risk management system, in which disaster 
risk reduction, preparedness and emergency management are fully institutionalized, with dedicated 
organizations and direct funding for disaster risk management at the local government level. Disaster 
risk reduction is integrated into a number of sectors: urban planning, health, disaster response and risk 
governance, at different governance levels.
Urban planning – The Urban Development Department implements the Comprehensive Land Use Plan 
and Zoning Ordinance to ensure that new and existing facilities are compliant. The zoning ordinance 
requires, for example, engineering, geological and geophysical assessment reports for high-risk 
areas, although enforcement can be a challenge. Compliance with safe building codes is overseen by 
the Office of the Building Official, in cooperation with the private sector and professional ‘watchdog’ 
organizations that conduct annual inspections, provide training and support in risk-sensitive planning 
and construction, and manage a certification mechanism. 
Health – The Makati Emergency Medical Services System coordinates mass casualty operations. The 
Emergency Department of Ospital ng Makati serves as the pilot agency for mobilizing the flow of 
medical services, supported by Barangay health centres, which provide extension services. These have 
been assessed as ‘relatively safe’, meaning they will continue to function in case of disaster, and have 
contingency plans and trained personnel. 
Source: ADRC and IRP, 2011.
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As this chapter has demonstrated, governments 
aiming to promote greater resilience to shocks 
will need to direct their attention to critical 
sectors whose failure can reverberate across 
the whole country and cause other systems to 
collapse. But there are also many cost-effective 
measures they can take ensure that each sector 
instead serves as a source of strength – helping 
to sustain the others at times of disaster.
Source: Adapted from ISDR, 2012. 
Coordination of disaster response across sectors – The Makati Command, Control and Communications 
Centre (C3) is responsible for central coordination of early warnings and emergency response. C3 acts 
as the city liaison among national government agencies, NGOs, private entities and communities in 
times of disaster, it also issues warnings to communities, and coordinates medical, public safety, and 
technical rescue responses. 
Risk governance at all scales – A key factor in Makati’s resilience is the involvement of all sectors of society, 
particularly the Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committees which include young 
people and environmental and women’s groups. Information, Education and Communication 
(IEC) campaigns have been combined with regular drills and simulation exercises. In 
collaboration with the Makati Branch of the Philippines Red Cross, the C3 delivers community 
preparedness and emergency management training courses. In addition, the city publishes 
monthly publications, brochures, and posters with risk management messages in local 
languages and conducts regular Barangay Ugnayan (community dialogues) to discuss 
disaster risk management issues.
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CHAPTER 6
streNGtHeNiNG sUpplY cHaiNs
Supply of many goods now takes place through complex global supply chains 
connecting production and distribution centres in multiple countries. While these 
systems can be very efficient, they are also vulnerable to external shocks, particularly 
natural disasters. if just one node is damaged, the whole chain can be broken. in 
future, enterprises and governments will need to find ways of making supply chains 
more resilient to shocks.
Asia and the Pacific has seen a rapid expansion 
of global supply chains – using offshore activities 
and outsourcing to supply, manufacture and 
distribute goods across national boundaries. 
These enable firms to allocate scarce resources 
more efficiently and gain better access to 
foreign markets.1 Such arrangements are now 
widespread in various industries such as 
automobiles, electronics, office equipment and 
apparel.2 Toyota, for example, conducts its 
business in 26 countries with 50 overseas 
manufacturing operations, which supply vehicles 
to more than 170 countries and regions 
(Figure VI-1).3 Agriculture too, is increasingly 
reliant on imports of inputs and multi-tiered 
supply chain management. 
These supply chains have made it possible for 
many Asia-Pacific businesses, including small 
and medium enterprises, to establish strong 
manufacturing bases – and also enable developing 
countries to benefit from foreign direct 
investment and increase their exports. But these 
chains also embody risks. If a natural disaster, 
such as an earthquake, flood or fire, damage a 
production or distribution node in the chain, 
the effects can soon ripple across the whole 
network, both within and across national 
borders (Box VI-1). 
It is important, therefore, that global supply 
chains become more disaster resilient – with 
greater ‘buffer capacity’ that enables them to 
absorb such perturbations.4  This Chapter explores 
the potential for this, drawing lessons from the 
response to Japan’s earthquake and tsunami 
in 2011, Thailand’s floods in 2011-2012, and 
Australia’s floods in 2010-2011. 
asia-pacific sUpplY cHaiNs
Since the 1990s, global supply chains have 
created a new division of labour among 
Asia-Pacific economies, especially in North-
East and South-East Asia. 
Manufacturing
In the 1970s, Japanese Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs) in particular responded to high tariff 
protection in South-East Asia by investing in 
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Figure  VI-1
Toyota’s production network
Source: Toyota, 2012.
the automotive sector. And since the late 1990s, 
TNCs have progressively adopted a strategy 
of international production fragmentation. To 
achieve higher economies of scale and facilitate 
a subregional division of labour, Japanese 
automobile assemblers are now taking advantage 
of regional trade liberalization to consolidate 
duplicated production facilities in ASEAN 
countries.5 
By the 2000s, global supply chains were becoming 
more extensive in North-East and South-East 
Asia – in the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan Province of China and Hong Kong, 
China. Between 2001 and 2005, the first-tier 
newly industrialized economies accounted for 
24.5 per cent of global vertical intra-industry 
trade.6 The most impressive increase took place 
in China; between the periods 1986-1990 and 
2001-2005, China increased its average share 
of global vertical intra-industry trade from 2 to 
15 per cent. The current extent of Asia-Pacific 
integration in global supply chains is indicated 
in Figure VI-2. 
An increasing proportion of this trade is 
South-South. In the late 1980s, only 15 per cent 
of developing Asia-Pacific trade in intermediate 
goods was South-South, but since the 1990s, the 
proportion has been above 30 per cent. At the 
same time the developing countries have been 
increasing their intermediate-goods trade with 
the rest of the world. China in particular has 
now emerged as a ‘global assembly centre’ and 
since China relies significantly on parts and 
components imported from North-East and 
South-East Asia, this has further strengthened 
trade linkages within the region (Figure VI-3).
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Figure  VI-2
World trade flows of intermediate goods, 2008
Source: Miroudot and others, 2009. 
Note: The map represents imports of intermediate goods above $20 billion. Circles stand for intraregional imports and arrows for 
interregional imports. Arrows and circles are proportional to the value of the flows.
Box  VI-1
The impact of natural disasters on supply chains
The impact of natural disasters on a supply chain is illustrated by the figure below. When a disaster hits, 
supplier A suffers from direct losses in terms of destruction of physical assets, recovery expenditure and lost 
income. If the disaster severely hits public infrastructure, supplier A is likely to have indirect losses due to 
either damaged distribution facilities or disrupted power supplies.
For supplier A, either direct or indirect losses can result in production and distribution suspension and 
subsequent weak financial conditions and possible layoffs. Therefore, the losses of supplier A may cause 
an additional burden on the government due to lost tax revenue. Damage to financial institutions and 
insurance companies will be in the form of rising non-performing loans and a surge of compensation to 
private entities for their losses caused by the disaster.
The production suspension of supplier A or the damage to the distribution facilities can cause indirect losses 
to both upstream and downstream supply chain partners. The negative impact can be transmitted to the 
whole supply chain and affect the firms involved, regardless of their geographical locations. At the same 
This trend is confirmed by another measure, 
the Grubel-Lloyd index, which measures intra- 
industry trade of a particular product.7 The index 
shows that intra-regional trade of Asia-Pacific 
industrial products has been increasingly 
characterized by intra-industry trade 
(Figure VI-4). 
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Supplier A:
Direct Losses 
(physical assets, recovery 
spending and income);
Indirect Losses
(destroyed distribution 
facilities and/or power failure)
Government:
Social welfare / tax losses, 
unemployment
Financial institutions: 
Insurance loss, increased 
insurance premium, credit risk 
increase
Downstream supply 
chain partners:
Indirect losses due to supply 
shortage
Product 
substitution/
consumer 
behaviour 
changes
Consumer market: 
Price uctuation due to 
the shortage of nal 
products
Supplier B:
Gaining market share
Upstream supply 
chain partners: 
Indirect income losses
Relief actions aimed 
at the private sector 
and labour market
e.g. Thai soft loans, 
Australian NDRRA
Policy changes
Budget allocations, priority 
adjustments, political 
instability
Intergovernmental 
cooperation and 
action
Environmental treaties and 
agreements, green FTA 
clauses
Disaster funds, 
insurance schemes, 
etc.
Utilization of monetary 
resources through e.g. 
public-private partnerships
Natural
Disaster
time, consumer markets may experience price fluctuations with the shortage of final products due to the 
production suspension caused by supply chain disruption. After natural disasters, supply chains often 
experience severe delays, missed deliveries and even supplier defaults. In addition, disasters can make 
controlling the supply chain operation difficult, or temporarily impossible, due to disruptions in 
communications systems, destroyed equipment and lost information. 
The product shortage of the downstream partners of supplier A and of the end market may create an 
opportunity for supplier B who produces the substitute of supplier A’s product. This is more likely when the 
recovery pace of supplier A is slow and supplier B is flexible and able to compensate for the supply shortage 
quickly. In the long run, if supplier B is considered to be more disaster resilient, the partners of supplier A 
may permanently turn to supplier B and result in a business loss for supplier A. However, if supplier A is the 
single source in the market and halts the provision of products due to a disaster, its downstream partners 
may have no choice but to wait for its recovery. In such situations the effects can be international, as was 
the case with the Kobe earthquake in 1995 which left companies in San Francisco without access to parts 
and components.  
The effects of delays and disruptions can be felt in the long term, should other competitors who were able 
to avoid the disaster’s negative effects be able to gain market share due to the problems faced by supplier 
A. These problems are often manifested in failures to deliver to the markets or in higher consumer prices, 
potentially causing a fall in demand for the products. The risk of lost market share is particularly high in 
close-to perfectly competitive markets in which substitution of products is effortless and price elasticity 
high. In some cases, short-term product substitution can lead to consumer behaviour changes as they move 
from one competing product to another due to lower price or better availability. Recovering from changes in 
demand and retaking market share can prove to be difficult.
Source: Chopra and Sodhi, 2004.
150
Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises
Figure  VI-4
Intra-industry trade intensity of the Asia-Pacific industrial sector, 2002- 2011
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Source: ESCAP calculation based on United Nations Comtrade from WITS. Available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/Use-UN-Comtrade-via-World-Integrated-Trade-Solution-WITS (accessed September 2012).
Notes: 1. Intra-industry trade intensity is measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index at aggregated-sectoral level.
2. The list of industrial products follows WTO’s standard classifications based on HS-2002.
Figure  VI-3
Shares of selected partners in intermediate-goods trade, 1988-2011
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Source: ESCAP calculation based on United Nations Comtrade from WITS. Available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/Use-UN-Comtrade-via-World-Integrated-Trade-Solution-WITS (accessed September 2012).
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Agriculture
Modern agricultural supply chains are also 
increasingly reliant on imports and multi-tiered 
systems of supply management. Such chains 
encompass inputs, production, post-harvest, 
storage, processing, marketing and distribution, 
as well as retailing and final consumption.8 
These functions typically span over several 
sectors and can extend beyond national 
boundaries (Figure VI-5). In addition, they 
often involve a wide range of public and 
private sector institutions and organizations.  
Although agricultural supply chains often rely 
intensively on domestic inputs, they include many 
import inputs, such as fertilizers, chemicals and 
feedstock. As a result, participants can be located 
within or outside national boundaries and even 
within national borders their activities can be 
spatially dispersed. 
The expansion of agricultural supply chains has 
been accompanied by a rise in intraregional 
trade. Between 2001 and 2011, the proportion 
of Asia-Pacific agricultural exports that was 
intraregional rose from 55 to 59 per cent 
(Figure VI-6). Over the same period, the 
proportion of imports that was intraregional, 
however, increased more modestly, from 46 
to 49 per cent. Figure VI-7 shows the extent 
to which networks of intra-industry trade in 
agricultural products have become integrated, 
at both global and regional levels. 
One effect of incorporating agricultural 
businesses into global supply chains is a 
reduction in levels of inventory. For example, 
the overall food inventory of Australian frozen 
and chilled food producers was reduced to only 
five days in 2006 from the 2002 levels, which 
were 13 days for chilled food and 70 days for 
frozen food.9 
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Figure  VI-6
Intraregional trade intensity of Asia-Pacific agricultural trade, 2002 and 2011
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Source: ESCAP calculation based on United Nations Comtrade from WITS. Available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/Use-UN-Comtrade-via-World-Integrated-Trade-Solution-WITS (accessed September 2012).
Figure  VI-5
An illustration of agricultural supply chains
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Source: Adapted by ESCAP from Australia, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2012.
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Figure  VI-7
Intra-industry trade intensity of Asia-Pacific agriculture, 2002-2011
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Source: ESCAP calculation based on United Nations Comtrade from WITS. Available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/Use-UN-Comtrade-via-World-Integrated-Trade-Solution-WITS (accessed September 2012).
Notes: 1. Intra-industry trade intensity is measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index at aggregated-sectoral level; 2) the list of agricul-
tural products follows WTO’s standard classifications based on HS-2002.
VUlNerabilities of Global 
sUpplY cHaiNs 
Firms that use complex supply chains should 
be able to boost efficiency. But they are also 
running some risks. Particularly exposed are 
enterprises that rely for inputs or intermediate 
goods on a single source – one which might 
be located on a tectonic fault line or in an area 
subject to frequent storms and hurricanes. 
Chains are also vulnerable to sudden changes in 
demand. Faced with an economic downturn or 
recession in a major market, a highly complex 
supply chain might find it difficult and costly 
to react, particularly if it services numerous 
markets with different consumer preferences 
and circumstances. 
If companies are to make their supply chains 
resilient, they need control mechanisms that 
take into account the circumstances of each 
component – a task that becomes increasingly 
arduous as the chain becomes more complex. 
This will require careful planning and sufficient 
finance and resources – which the company 
concerned might not have. The focal firm may 
be able to recognize some production nodes 
or distribution links that might be at risk. But 
as the network becomes more fragmented, the 
focal firm will be less able to control and 
monitor all the possibilities.10  
Problems can occur, for example, for firms that 
use ‘just-in-time’ inventory management systems. 
Another common concern is that partners in 
the supply chain may be unable to settle their 
payables in time – leading to cash flow problems 
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among participating firms. This may raise 
concerns among financial institutions and make 
it more difficult for firms to obtain external 
financial resources during the recovery phase.
Most vulnerable are the small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Generally, they work as 
subcontractors, supplying basic services or 
labour-intensive parts and components. Few 
SMEs are prepared for natural disasters.11 
Typically, they lack insurance and do not 
carry out risk assessments nor have business 
continuity plans.12 This makes it difficult to 
recover from disasters and heightens supply 
chain disruption.13 
Agriculture
In the case of agricultural production, most of 
the risks are weather-related. Producers will 
always have to cope with varying and often 
extreme conditions. The natural disasters that 
most commonly disrupt agricultural supply 
chains are droughts, floods, storms, frosts and 
high winds.14 These can become more intense 
or frequent if human activity or economic 
development has diminished the region’s resilience. 
Natural disasters that hit agricultural supply 
chains will usually reduce short-term yields, 
and lead to price increases and destroy assets 
– disrupting the flow of goods, services and 
information. But they can also affect productivity 
and market relations in the longer term. 
The risks will vary depending on underlying 
climatic conditions, geography or topography, 
demographics and agrarian and industry 
structures. They will also differ from one 
commodity to another. For some producers, a 
major risk is the volatility of international market 
prices – as with grain and oilseed commodities, 
as well as traditional beverage and industrial 
crops. For other crops, such as perishable, 
higher-value products a greater concern will be 
logistics, and compliance with food safety or 
plant or animal health requirements.15
japaN eartHqUake, 2011
This and subsequent sections consider the 
impact on supply chains of three major 
disasters - the earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan in 2011, the floods in Thailand in 2011, 
and Australia’s floods in 2010-2011. 
In March 2011, an earthquake struck Japan and 
triggered a devastating tsunami, which led to 
the meltdown of nuclear reactors in Fukushima. 
The disaster caused a record $210 billion 
in  economic  damage,  representing 3.8 per cent of 
Japan’s GDP.16 Manufacturing was hard 
hit. Following the earthquake, Japanese 
automobile production fell by 48 per cent 
and electrical component production by 8 
per cent. And since production was highly 
integrated into the world economy, there was 
widespread disruption in supplies elsewhere, 
particularly among Japan’s ASEAN trading 
partners. As indicated in Figure VI-8 automobile 
production fell in a number of countries: in 
Thailand by 19.7 per cent; in the Philippines by 
24.0 per cent and in Indonesia by 6.1 per cent. 
There was also serious disruption in the production 
of electrical components. The impacts lasted about 
two months for electronic supply chains and three 
months for automotive supply chains.17
The global impact of the disruption differed 
according to industries, the locations of 
production, the nature of backward-forward 
linkages and the potential for substitution 
between suppliers in different countries. The 
impacts by sector are described below.
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Figure  VI-8
Automobile production in ASEAN countries after the Japanese earthquake, 2011 
Figure  VI-9
Electrical components production after the Japanese earthquake, 2011
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Automobiles
Many automobile producers around the world 
experienced shortages in electronics and car 
components normally produced in Japan. 
Automakers in the United States, for example, 
had to cut their second-quarter production in 
2011 by 350,000 to 400,000 units.18 General 
Motors and the French automaker Peugeot 
Citroën had to temporarily halt production of 
certain vehicles.19 There was also disruption in 
the production of Xirallic pigments which are 
used in a number of automobile paints. Merck 
Chemical International’s only production 
plant is situated near the Fukushima nuclear 
reactor, and automakers, including Ford Motor, 
Chrysler Group, Volkswagen, BMW, Toyota 
Motor and General Motors, had to reduce 
the production of automobiles that used this 
pigment. 
Overall, however, the impact lasted only around 
three months. By June 2011, Toyota’s production 
bases had returned to around 70 per cent of their 
normal production levels and by July were back 
on their original schedules – demonstrating that 
these chains were highly resilient.
Electronics
Japan produces about 60 per cent of the world’s 
silicon wafers for semiconductors. The earthquake 
shut down two factories that accounted for 
about 25 per cent of wafer shipments. The 
disaster also affected several factories that make 
computer chips. Renesas Electronic Corporation, 
for example, the world’s largest maker of 
microcontrollers for cars and many other 
products, had to close eight of its semiconductor 
factories. The shutdown in the Naka factory in 
Hitachinaka City, Ibaraki Prefecture reduced 
the world supply of microcontrollers by about 
10 per cent (Box VI-2). Even car producers like 
Toyota were hit, demonstrating how difficult 
it is to monitor and control procurement in 
multi-layer supply chains. Automotive 
microcontrollers have a high degree of product 
differentiation so it is difficult to transfer 
production to other factories.
Steel 
In 2010, Japan produced 109,599 million 
metric tons of steel20 – and was the world’s 
second largest producer, and the largest 
exporter.21 Following the disaster, in 2011 crude 
steel production decreased by 1.8 per cent.22 
But this did not greatly affect the world market 
because, as a result of the global recession, 
major mills in 64 countries were operating at 
about 82 per cent capacity and could easily 
make up for the decline in Japan’s exports.23 
Asia-Pacific shipbuilders, for example, shifted 
their orders to mills in the Republic of Korea, 
China, and Taiwan Province of China.
Relief and recovery measures 
Japan’s industrial value chains were hard hit 
by the 2011 earthquake, but recovered quickly. 
Much of this was thanks to government 
support to businesses, including SMEs, which 
were affected directly or indirectly. Rather than 
addressing specific supply chains, however, the 
Government targeted its assistance on restoring 
normal business functions in general. Measures 
included:
 Assistance in financing – The government 
requested that financial institutions give special 
consideration for the disposal of dishonoured bills 
and cheques and for longer repayment periods for 
SMEs. It also implemented measures to mitigate 
the rapid deterioration of cash flow, such as special 
grants, soft loans and repayment grace. 
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Box  VI-2
Supply chain disruption at the Renesas Electronics Corporation
The Japanese company Renesas Electronics Corporation (RENESAS) is the world’s largest manufacturer 
of microcontrollers – which manage various interlinked electronic functions of cars. In 2010, it had 29 per 
cent of the global market. Almost every car maker in the world relies on Renesas microcontrollers for their 
automotive electronics systems. Renesas supplies over 60 per cent of microcontrollers for cars produced 
by Toyota, Nissan and Honda, while it has a 20 per cent share for non-Japanese counterparts such as 
General Motors. 
Automotive microcontrollers are generally designed in close collaboration with other automotive parts 
suppliers for specific, and each requires a special production line. The following figure shows a simplified 
supply chain:
 Employment support – Measures included 
an ‘employment adjustment subsidy’ along 
with ‘employment benefits’ to enterprises that 
suspended their businesses after the disaster.
 Assistance in taxation – This involved 
special tax deductions for post-disaster 
reconstruction, including the refund of 
corporation tax, exemption from registration 
and license tax, vehicle weight tax and stamp tax. 
In addition, to encourage business preparation 
for future disasters, it offered tax incentives 
for investment in earthquake mitigation and 
provided special tax deductions for post- 
disaster reconstruction.
 Rehabilitation support – To help SMEs 
resume their businesses, the Government 
supported the establishment of temporary 
plants and stores and helped with radioactivity 
inspections to minimize reputational damage. 
 Local government support – The disaster 
caused devastation in Tohoku region of 
Honshu Island. Here, the local and regional 
governments of non-affected regions and 
municipalities were particularly active in 
providing support.24 
In addition, many companies received support 
from the manufacturers they were supplying – 
the ‘global value chain’ anchors. Executives and 
engineers from Toyota, for example, tried to help 
their suppliers solve problems at the plant level. 
Suppliers whose plants were still functioning 
were given temporary contracts to produce 
parts that a competitor could not build. 25
There were also relief efforts from other private 
entities. The Entrepreneurial Training for 
Innovative Communities (ETIC) is a former 
Waseda University student organization. Only 
one day after the disaster had struck, 
ETIC initiated a ‘Disaster Recovery Leader 
Development Project’ which aimed to support 
the afflicted communities by facilitating the 
emergence of entrepreneur-led innovations 
for disaster recovery. Over the next three years 
ETIC intends to train more than 200 entre- 
preneurs with the necessary skills to revitalize 
the region and support long-term recovery.26
tHailaND flooDs, 2011
During the fourth quarter of 2011, Thailand 
experienced one of its worst flooding crises 
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Sources: Rec, 2011; Tokahashi, 2011; Dishman, 2011; Wilson, 2011; REE, 2011; Inove, 2012; and Ye and Abe, 2012.
Eight Renesas factories were affected by the earthquake on 11 March 2011, particularly the Naka factory 
in Ibaraki Prefecture. Renesas not only lost half of its wafer-start capacity but also faced unreliable electric 
power supplies as a result of the closures of nuclear power plants. 
Renesas production lines make specific microcontrollers for individual car models. So neither other 
Renesas factories nor competitors could immediately take over their production. As a result, the automobile 
industry started to exhaust all the remaining stocks and many major motor vehicle companies had to stop 
operations. For instance, General Motors halted production at a pick-up truck factory in the United States, 
while Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Mazda shut down 22 plants.  
Renesas immediately established a damage assessment team, and by 22 March 2011 had restarted limited 
production in five out of eight affected factories. The company also prepared three other facilities for 
resumption but was hampered by power blackouts following the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
The Naka factory resumed mass production on 1 June 2011, and by the end of September 2011 Renesas 
was finally able to restore production to all its affected facilities.In the course of the recovery, Renesas had 
involved 80,000 people, including those from parent companies, suppliers, downstream producers, 
government and even from competitors – around twice the number of the company’s regular employees. 
Despite the rapid restoration of its main factories, Renesas experienced severe losses. Losses from 
earthquake damage totalled $615 million. Only one-third of the loss was covered by insurance.
This case provides some useful insights on supply chain disruption. One is that even large companies like 
Toyota can find it difficult to identify weak links in their supply chain. Another is that in the absence of 
industry standardization in just one of two custom-made components can cause a chain to break, even if 
they account for a very small amount of the final product value. This example also highlights the need to 
review practices, such as just-in-time production, and develop business continuity plans. 
Supplier A Supplier B Supplier C
Supplier D Supplier E Supplier F Supplier G
Car Assembler
Renesas Electronics
1st Tier Suppliers
Supply chains for Renesas automotive microcontrollers
2nd Tier Suppliers
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in 70 years. The immediate impact was a 
contraction of output in the last quarter of 
2011, reducing forecast GDP growth from 
2.6 to 1 per cent.27 The impact was particularly 
severe because the floods hit industries that 
had been concentrated in key central provinces 
including Ayutthaya, Pathum Thani, Nonthaburi, 
Samut Sakhon and parts of Bangkok. Damage 
was estimated at $40 billion.28 The floods also 
had a heavy impact on SMEs – hitting 550,000 
small businesses, causing the loss of 2.32 
million jobs, at least temporarily.29 
Thailand’s severe flooding resulted from a 
combination of factors: massive rainfall, poor 
planning of water management and drainage, 
and a lack of infrastructure for flood mitigation. 
But the damage was exacerbated by poor urban 
planning and by the inappropriate location of 
industrial estates. Seven severely affected estates 
in Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani were built on 
a major flood basin of the Chao Phraya delta. 
The production facilities and associated 
logistics systems were built there for two reasons. 
One was proximity to Bangkok, which allowed 
firms to tap into well-established infrastructure 
and gain easy access to suppliers and customers. 
The second reason was that Thailand’s Board of 
Investment had offered incentives for investing 
both in the central region and there and in 
the eastern seaboard – including 100 per cent 
foreign ownership and tax exemption.30 As a 
result, 97 per cent of all automotive factories 
were located in only three locations – Bangkok 
and the eastern and central provinces.31 Similarly, 
electronics manufacturers from Japan and the 
United States established their production 
facilities mainly in Bangkok and the central 
and eastern provinces.32  
The factories in the affected industrial estates 
amounted to 29.3 per cent of all production 
plants in industrial estates, and less than 0.5 
per cent of all production plants in Thailand.33 
Nevertheless, this had a major impact on global 
supply chains since these industrial estates were 
major sources of intermediate inputs in various 
manufacturing sectors including cars, computers, 
electronics, electrical appliances and optical 
instruments. Honda, for example, due to 
the shutdown of its plants and suppliers in 
Ayutthaya, had to cut production in plants 
around the world, from the Philippines to the 
United Kingdom.34 
The flooding caused a sharp decline in Thailand’s 
industrial exports (Figure VI-10). Japan’s earth-
quakes had already hit exports of electronics, 
automotive and electrical appliances in April-
May 2011, but the floods then caused a 
further dip. The most affected export sector was 
the automotive industry which in November 
2011 suffered a year-on-year export contraction 
of more than 50 per cent. Electronics exports 
fell similarly, by 47 per cent, and electrical 
appliances by 22 per cent. 
The effects were soon felt far beyond Thailand. 
In the automotive industry this was particularly 
evident for ‘knocked-down units’ – vehicle 
parts and components that are produced in one 
country to be exported for final assembly in 
another. The consequence for assembly in 
Japan is shown in Figure VI-11. While Japan’s 
total exports remained stable, those of 
knocked-down vehicles declined by 24 per 
cent in December 2011, a trend that persisted 
during January-February 2012. 
Automobiles 
Thailand is world’s 12th largest vehicle producer 
and is highly integrated into global supply chains. 
It includes the regional bases of Toyota, Nissan, 
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Figure  VI-10
Key industrial exports from Thailand, 2011
Figure  VI-11
Japan, monthly growth rates of automobile exports
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Source: Thailand, Office of Industrial Economics, Ministry of Industry, 2012.
Note: Based on value of exports in local currency
Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, 2012.
Note: A knocked-down unit refers to a semi-finished vehicle with a unit value less than 60 per cent of the unit value of a finished 
vehicle.
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General Motors, Isuzu and Ford. Over 90 per 
cent of automobile companies reported damage 
to production.35 As the floods ravaged Ayutthaya, 
Honda had to suspend operations at its 
assembly plant there on 4 October 2011. Nissan 
and Toyota plants in Thailand also had to 
suspend production; although they were not 
physically damaged they could not get parts 
from suppliers that had been directly impacted.36 
To make up for output losses in Thailand, 
Toyota had to step up production in Canada, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United 
States and Viet Nam.37 
Electronics 
The affected areas also had clusters of major 
hard disk and semiconductor producers such as 
Figure  VI-12
Global supply chains of a hard disk drive made in Thailand
Source: Baldwin, 2010. 
Seagate Technology, Toshiba, Western Digital and 
Hutchinson Technology. Thailand, after China, is 
the world’s second largest producer of hard disk 
drives (HDD) and is a major supplier of HDD 
parts. HDD production requires multiple parts 
and components imported from many countries 
around the world (Figure VI-12). 
Many HDD producers were affected by the floods 
and the world price of HDDs rose 20 to 50 per 
cent.38 During the flood period the retail prices 
of HDDs made by Seagate and Western Digital 
tripled.39 Some of these increases were, however, 
also a consequence of defensive purchases by 
consumers or inventory hoarding by resellers and 
wholesalers.
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Relief and recovery measures 
The Government, along with financial 
institutions and Global Value Chain (GVC) 
anchors, played important parts in the process 
of recovery. Support included:
 Financial assistance – SMEs and individuals 
affected by the floods were able to use a soft loan 
programme of 300 billion Thai Baht. The Small 
Business Credit Guarantee Corporation also 
provided loan guarantees of up to THB 120 
billion for seven years for businesses seeking 
reconstruction loans from commercial banks.
 Employment support – The floods 
affected around 990,000 workers of whom 
500,000 were re-employed or returned to 
their previous workplaces. To assist flood-
hit workers and maintain employment, the 
Ministry of Labour provided a subsidy of 
THB 2,000 for each employee for a certain 
period, providing participating workplaces 
maintained at least 75 per cent of each 
employee’s normal salary.  As of January 2012, 347 
manufacturers, covering 210,150 workers, had 
participated in the programme.40 The 
Government also provided a skill development 
scheme: participating workers received a food 
allowance of THB 120 per day for a period of 
10 days. In case of lay-offs, the affected workers 
received compensation in line with the labour 
protection law. 
 Public-private partnerships – The Government 
worked with companies to enable temporary 
relaxation of the regulations related to credits and 
insurance. Commercial banks and non-banks 
were allowed to maintain flooded customers’ 
loan classifications and consider credits to such 
borrowers as new loan approvals, with special 
interest rates and extended repayment periods. 
In addition, the Government facilitated 
insurance claims payments by temporarily 
allowing foreign surveyors to work in Thailand 
in order to relieve the shortage of surveyors. 
 Support from global value chain anchors 
– Some TNCs launched assistance to their 
employees. Flood-hit Japanese companies sent 
a number of their Thai workers to work in their 
Japan-based parent companies. This helped 
maintain employment while facilitating flows 
in supply chains (Box VI-3).
aUstralia flooDs, 2010-2011
From December 2010 until February 2011, 
Queensland experienced one of Australia’s worst- 
ever floods, compounded intermittently by major 
storms and cyclones (Table VI-1). 
The damage was extensive. Public infrastructure 
was severely affected, including more than 9,100 
kilometres of the state road network and approx-
imately 4,700 kilometres of the rail network. Power 
to 480,000 homes and businesses was disrupted. 
In addition, 11 ports, 139 national parks and 411 
schools were affected. Private assets were also 
damaged: there were 97,000 insurance claims, of 
which more than half were for residential properties. 
Businesses too suffered extensively, including 
damage or disruptions to 54 coal mines. 
But some of the greatest impacts were in 
agriculture with the loss of $1.6 billion-worth of 
crops. Australia is a major agricultural exporter, so 
this had a significant influence on world markets. 
Waterlogged fields reduced the quality of wheat, 
and cut Australia’s exports by around 1.5 million 
tons. This produced spikes in the world prices 
of wheat, cotton and sugar during late 2010 
until the first quarter of 2011 (Figure VI-13). This 
exacerbated rising world commodity prices. 
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Box  VI-3
Toyota’s assistance to suppliers 
Immediately after the earthquake in Japan, all Toyota companies, from suppliers to dealers and overseas 
operations, came together to provide support and to restore operations. The core measures for post-quake 
production restoration were:
1) On-site assessment and verification – Toyota conducted an investigation of all primary suppliers, including 
the impact at secondary and tertiary suppliers. Onsite investigation teams were despatched to confirm 
production items and inventory. The purchasing units confirmed the availability of overseas primary suppliers. 
2) Support for suppliers – Toyota provided onsite support to 200 suppliers. 
3) Finding substitutes – When restoring onsite production was not possible, the company would try to find 
substitute products.
As a result, production was restored more rapidly than had been anticipated. Domestic production had 
reached almost normal levels by July 2011 and was fully restored by September 2011.
There were similar measures following Thailand’s floods. By adjusting the operational levels of each 
production line according to the parts situation, Toyota was able to return to normal operation in North 
America by the first half of December 2011, and in Thailand by the beginning of 2012. Initially, it had been 
estimated that the two disasters in 2011 would cut Toyota’s output globally by 1 million vehicles, but the 
actual drop was 390,000 vehicles.
The lessons learned following the two events led the company to revise its business continuity plan. The 
company has also launched measures such as decentralizing sources for at-risk parts and converting to 
generalized designs. 
Source: Toyota, 2012
Cotton – Australia is a leading cotton exporter 
with around half of the production coming from 
Queensland. Global cotton supplies had already 
fallen in 2010 due to adverse weather across China 
and the United States, and flooding in Pakistan. 
But the floods in Queensland exacerbated the 
situation and in March 2011 drove the world price 
to a record high. 
Sugar – Australia is also a leading sugar exporter 
 – with around 95 per cent of the crop coming 
from Queensland. The flooding caused a 27 per 
cent decline in revenue for the sugar industry 
in 2010.41 The revenue also declined further 
in 2011 because water logging hampered the 
harvest. As a result, the world sugar price 
reached a 30-year high – to the benefit of 
other countries such as Brazil and Thailand 
which made up for some of the fall in 
Australian output.
Grains – Queensland accounts for about 10 per 
cent of Australia’s grain production. Grain losses 
were about 500,000 tonnes, including wheat, 
barley and sorghum with losses for the grain 
industry of about $400 million.42 A major 
problem for grain exporters was shipment 
delays due to port closure.
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Source: World Bank and Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2011. 
table  VI-1
Australia’s 2010-2011 floods timeline
January 1, 2011
September-November, 2010
Figure  VI-13
Movements of selected agro-product prices, 2007-2011
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Fruit and vegetables – Queensland supplies 
around one-quarter of Australia’s fresh fruit and 
vegetables. The flooding and consistent rainfall 
resulted in widespread damage and disrupted 
harvests for many crops. Overall the floods affected 
areas that account for 14 per cent of Australia’s 
supply of fresh fruit and vegetables. Revenue 
for Australia’s fruit and vegetable growers 
declined by 10 per cent for 2010-2011, 
representing a combined loss of $561 million.43
 
Relief and recovery measures
All levels of government pledged support for the 
recovery. Initially, this involved emergency 
assistance grants of up to 1,000 Australian dollars 
($A) per person. The Queensland Government 
pledged about $A2.1 billion funding for 
financing recovery and reconstruction. The national 
Government also has well-established relief and 
recovery measures which can quickly be activated 
when disasters hit – the Natural Disaster Relief 
and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA). The 
Government indicated that it would invest $A5.6 
billion for rebuilding flood-affected regions, 
including around $A3.9 billion as the 
Government’s share of NDRRA.44 
The NDRRA has a number of financial assistance 
packages. These include:
 Special grants – Businesses with fewer than 
20 employees could receive $A25,000 for cleaning, 
repairs and stock replacement, and concessional 
loans of up to $A250,000, as well as deferred 
repayment of existing loans with the Queensland 
Rural Adjustment Authority.
 Low-interest loans – Businesses with more 
than 20 employees could get low-interest loans of 
up to $A650,000 for cleaning, repairs and stock 
replacement – with a grant component of up to 
$A50,000.
Commonwealth and state governments gave 
priority to small businesses and individuals who 
could not survive on their own. In addition to 
loans, the Queensland Government provided 
support and advice and a range of services. 
For example, it published a series of simple 
guidelines: how to sort out business operations 
after the disaster; steps to business recovery; 
plans for longer-term recovery; managing and 
paying staff; advice on dealing with insurance, 
banks and tax offices; and establishing mobile 
offices equipped with wireless technology. The 
Australian Government Disaster Recovery 
Payment conducted recovery workshops involving 
small businesses in the affected areas.45
The private sector also helped individuals and 
small businesses. Individual banks had assistance 
packages including: deferring home loan 
repayments for up to three months; rescheduling 
or restructuring business loans without 
incurring fees; giving credit card holders an 
emergency credit limit increase; refinancing 
personal loans at a discounted fixed rate; 
waiving interest rate penalties if term deposits 
were drawn early; and deferring monthly 
repayments on equipment finance facilities for 
three months.
Australia’s recovery measures offer good 
practices for other countries. First, because the 
Government had pre-agreed recovery measures 
it could offer assistance quickly. Second, the 
Government ensured efficiency by limiting 
assistance to small firms who could not 
survive on their own. Third, it had public-private 
partnerships that enabled efficient recovery 
measures. Fourth, it offered incentives for 
mitigation by requiring businesses applying for 
concessional loans to take steps to minimize 
future losses. Finally, it offered technical 
advice and information, making good use of 
information technology.
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lessoNs for bUilDiNG resilieNt 
sUpplY cHaiNs
Just-in-time production and a high degree 
of product differentiation through global supply 
chains add to efficiency but can also be a source 
of fragility when there is a disruption. This 
highlights the importance of risk management 
strategies based on careful cost-benefit analysis 
and trade-offs. 
Enterprises that want to build in greater 
resilience to natural disasters can take a 
number of measures, for example: (a) invest more 
in each location to enhance resilience to natural 
disasters; (b) spatially diversify the locations 
of both production and supply; (c) hold larger 
inventories or stocks. 
All of these options incur extra costs. In 
addition to facing direct costs, enterprises that 
want to build greater redundancy into their 
systems may have to forego some economies 
of scale or opportunities for lower factor 
costs. Similarly, there will be extra costs from 
diversifying sources of supply, by increasing 
stocks of food for example. 
In making investment decisions, businesses 
now have to consider risks even if they are 
not located in a disaster-prone area. Devising 
the optimal strategy is not easy, particularly 
when dealing with rare but catastrophic events. 
Nevertheless, firms will need to assess risks 
and find ways to control them – for example, 
through business continuity plans (Box VI-4). 
In addition, governments can help minimize 
disaster risks and offset market failures such as 
the absence of adequate insurance. Developing 
countries generally have inadequate insurance 
markets.46 Even Japanese companies, who may 
be able to get coverage for production in Japan, 
will find it difficult to extend this to the 
whole of their supply chain in other countries. 
Insurance companies may also be reluctant to 
provide specific services such as microinsurance 
for small enterprises. And even where there is 
insurance it can be very expensive. After the 
Thailand floods, for instance, firms directly 
affected found on average that their insur-
ance premiums more than tripled. A number 
of them, particularly the smaller ones, decided 
not to renew their insurance or to exclude 
disaster risk coverage.47 Developing efficient 
competitive insurance would require improving 
the overall regulatory framework, providing 
better risk information and modelling systems, 
and exploring innovative new schemes such as 
disaster microinsurance.
While private agents bear the most of the costs of 
disasters in developing countries, governments 
also carry a substantial contingent liability. 
They thus have a strong motivation for ensuring 
that private incentives are appropriately 
aligned.48 For this purpose, developed countries 
use a combination of regulation and tax incentives. 
Japan, for example, provides tax incentives 
for investments in earthquake mitigation and 
has special tax deductions for post-disaster 
reconstruction. In developing countries, where 
compliance issues are problematic and enforce-
ment costs are higher, there is greater need 
to combine regulatory measures with more 
active interventions aimed at appropriately 
incentivizing private agents. 
There is also considerable scope for international 
cooperation. At present, most such efforts are ad 
hoc and there is little formalized cooperation. 
Further initiatives are needed to create standing 
funds and reserves – not only to bolster disaster 
resilience through improved infrastructure but 
also to provide relief and recovery assistance. 
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Box  VI-4
Business continuity plans
A business continuity plan assesses risks posed by natural disasters and codifies the practical responses. 
Such plans are relevant for the supply chain as a whole as well as for individual components. While drafting 
and upholding business continuity plans incurs some expense, they bring long-term benefits in the event of 
a disaster. Business continuity plans surged in popularity after the events of 11 September 2001. But even 
in developed markets like the United Kingdom, around half of SMEs have no formalized plans for managing 
disaster risks. In developing countries, the penetration of business continuity plans can be expected to be 
markedly lower.
The generic process of drafting a business continuity plan is illustrated in the figure below:
Identify risks
Conduct a threat and risk analysis
Develop continuity strategies
Implement the strategies and adjust business 
policies, infrastructure, human and financial 
resources and material assets accordingly
Review and update the continuity planImplement the strategies and adjust business policies, 
The first step is to identify potential risks and conduct a specific threat and risk analysis. This should 
consider, for example, the state of existing infrastructure, the susceptibility to natural disasters, the potential 
effects of disruptions and the extent of financial reserves. The next step is to develop a continuity strategy. 
For supply chains with high-risk components, this should involve buffer stocks and redundant supply sources 
from less risk-exposed areas. For supply chains relying on just-in-time delivery, it might be necessary to 
relocate production of key components to less risk-exposed areas. In all cases, insurance should be 
considered and taken as appropriate. The final step is to periodically rehearse the procedures and update the 
plan to reflect recent events and changes in the supply chain, external markets and the environment.
In the light of the growing complexity of supply chains in Asia and the Pacific, the local firm should require 
its suppliers to establish business continuity plans alongside its own. For this purpose, it can offer technical 
and financial assistance. 
Governments can also play a part. Governments of developed countries have used both regulatory and 
incentive approaches. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Civil Contingencies Act requires businesses 
to draft sufficiently comprehensive plans for dealing with disasters and emergencies. In this regard, the 
community authorities have the responsibility to advise and assist firms with regard to formulating business 
continuity plans. The state of Ohio in the United States, on the other hand, has taken an incentive approach 
– allowing the costs of such plans to be tax deductible. 
Sources: British Standards Institution, 2010; Denning, 2012.
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Existing funds such as the Natural Disaster 
Fund of New Zealand are typically nationally 
administered and their usage is too limited to 
address the needs of a disaster-struck supply chain. 
It would be better to have greater cooperation 
between international organizations, development 
banks, governments of developed countries 
and vulnerable countries. Examples include 
the recent joint Pacific Catastrophe Risk 
Assessment and Financing Initiative, piloted by 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, 
with financial support from the Government 
of Japan and the Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery. The first of a series 
of applications under the initiative is a Pacific 
Risk Information System which will include 
a regional geospatial database and country- 
specific catastrophe risk models.
Greater supply chain resilience will also rely 
critically on support from TNCs and especially 
the GVC anchors who can help their business 
partners in reconstruction and in improving 
resiliency. Intergovernmental cooperation can 
also facilitate such private initiatives.
policY recommeNDatioNs
Some of the following recommendations 
apply specifically to supply chain resilience; 
others are valid in a broader framework because 
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of the tight linkage between the supply chain 
resilience and the resilience of business and 
economy in general.
 
1.  Public interventions to enhance  
resilience and recovery
The most important areas for government 
interventions are in facilitating investments to 
improve general resilience to natural disasters 
and, when a disaster occurs , in facilitating rapid 
reconstruction. The public sector, including 
public-private partnerships, should be involved 
in reconstruction of physical infrastructure. 
There is also a case for temporary assistance to 
affected downstream industries and employees. 
Governments should consider subsidies for 
measures to improve long-term resilience and 
accelerate recovery processes such as:
 Measures to make property and other 
physical assets more disaster resistant – for 
example, earthquake-, fire- and flood-resistant 
construction, ‘green’ buildings and the 
conservation of forests and mangrove swamps;
 The development and use of new applications 
and information platforms for assessing and 
managing disaster risks in businesses;
 Advocacy for business continuity plans; and
offering special tax deductions to individuals 
and corporations who invest in post-disaster 
reconstruction and recovery efforts. 
2.  Public interventions to improve  
private-sector disaster risk management
Governments can use taxes and subsidies as 
part of risk management strategies but need 
to tailor these to individual communities and 
take into account potential problems of moral 
hazard. Governments could subsidise wider 
take-up of private insurance by: 
Assisting the development of affordable and 
sustainable insurance markets, and improving 
access to such markets by promoting cost- 
efficient marketing channels;
Cooperating with insurance providers to make 
insurance premiums reflect firms’ efforts on risk 
management, such as discounting premiums 
for firms with business continuity plans;
Increasing cooperation between governments, 
insurance providers, GVC anchors and GVC 
partners to establish: 
- group insurance schemes for businesses  
 involved in global production; 
- joint risk assessments, risk information  
 sharing and early warning systems; and
Encouraging insurance for vulnerable groups 
in the supply chains such as small-medium 
producers, including innovative microinsurance 
services and products.
Governments can also foster the development 
of business continuity plans by, for example: 
  
Imposing compulsory legal requirements for 
such plans;
Offering tax incentives for the establishment 
of such plans, for example, by allowing firms 
to count the costs of these plans in their tax 
deductible accounts; and
Providing technical support for drafting 
plans, through centralized agencies or local 
community offices.
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3.  Intergovernmental cooperation to support 
private sector recovery efforts 
Governments can encourage mutual arrangements 
between GVC anchors and business partners. 
For instance:
The government of the GVC home country can 
arrange with the government of the affected 
countries to temporarily relax labour 
movement restrictions so as to facilitate 
assistance to overseas subsidiaries, including 
for workers of their business partners; and 
Facilitate financial capital movements from 
GVC anchors and insurance companies 
during the period of reconstruction.
4.  International cooperation for disaster risk 
management 
International organizations can: 
 Provide forums and facilitate the emergence 
of formalized systems of international 
cooperation on disaster risk management or 
building resilience;
 
 Consider global initiatives which would 
limit man-made environmental risks such as 
cap-and-trade carbon credit schemes; and
 Help develop standardized safety codes and 
infrastructure standards for building more 
resilient supply chains.
There will also be opportunities through 
emerging comprehensive free trade agreements 
involving major GVC participating countries. 
These include the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
and the ASEAN agreements. These can:
Create standing funds and reserves; and
Open up broader cooperation for example, 
on reinsurance schemes jointly established by 
regional organizations, governments and funds.
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CHAPTER 7
mUtUal sUpport tHroUGH reGioNal cooperatioN
in an era of globalization, and ever closer links between countries in Asia and the 
Pacific, disastrous shocks in one country can soon reverberate across many others. 
These transboundary crises demand transnational solutions, so Asia-Pacific 
countries will need to intensify regional cooperation, for which a regional framework 
for building resilience is proposed.
The preceding chapters have shown how multiple 
shocks and their convergence have put 
economic, social and environmental systems 
simultaneously under stress. In 2008, ESCAP 
was already warning of these multiple threats 
at a High-level Regional Policy Dialogue in 
Bali, Indonesia – ‘The food-fuel crisis and 
climate change’.1  2 Here, Asia-Pacific countries 
recognized that the convergence of these 
interrelated and mutually exacerbating crises, 
together with climate change, threatened to 
undermine the region’s development gains and 
affect its future prospects – potentially slowing 
progress towards the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). 
The root causes and repercussions of these crises 
are often transboundary, which necessitates 
greater regional cooperation. By working 
together, governments can produce solutions 
that are greater than the sum of individual 
country responses. Regional cooperation also 
further intensifies and deepens interdependencies, 
so future cooperation through forums such as 
ESCAP becomes even more significant. 
It should also be emphasized that these crises 
are often global, so policy reforms are essential 
at the global level. Nevertheless, multilateral 
policies for economic governance are also 
evolving within multipolar frameworks so 
regional actions will in turn influence global 
reforms. 
Cooperation will be particularly important 
for the least developed countries. They already 
have many immediate pressures and priorities 
that might seem to take precedence over long-
term resilience building. Yet these are also the 
countries most vulnerable to multiple shocks. They 
should, however, also be able to rely on regional 
solidarity. This will not only assist individual 
countries, but in a closely interconnected 
world will also help avoid negative feedback 
loops that can quickly ensnare other countries. 
Cooperation can ensure that one country’s 
actions are not detrimental to another’s. 
coorDiNateD maNaGemeNt    
DUriNG ecoNomic crises 
The Asia-Pacific region is a global powerhouse 
driving economic growth, and in the current 
global economic crisis has been an anchor of 
stability. Even so, it remains vulnerable to 
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economic shocks originating both within and 
beyond the region – all of which will benefit 
from a regional response. 
Financial sector
The days are long gone when economic 
shocks could be dealt with solely by national 
authorities; no longer can individual governments 
rely on their own monetary and fiscal tools. 
Nor can international organizations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank respond solely by 
targeting their rescue or debt relief packages at 
individual countries. 
Instead, there needs to be much greater 
coordination at international and regional 
levels. This was demonstrated after the 1997 
Asian financial crisis which provided the 
impetus for a new model of regional self-help 
(Box VII-1). Regional bodies such as ASEAN+3, 
the Executives Meeting of East Asia Pacific 
Central Banks, ASEAN, APEC, the Asia- 
Europe Meeting and the South-East Asian 
Central Bank Research and Training Centre 
have initiated a number of forums and 
cooperation mechanisms. These have focused 
primarily on three objectives: i) providing 
regional emergency liquidity; ii) developing a 
regional bond market; and iii) cooperating on 
macroeconomic management and exchange 
rate policies. 
As the region recovered after the 1997 crisis, 
however, some of the political impetus for such 
mechanisms started to ebb. One test came in 
2009 when, rather than utilizing the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) (Box VII-2), countries 
seeking liquidity support – Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea and Singapore – instead 
approached treasuries in the United States of 
America and Japan for bilateral swaps.3 This 
was partly because CMI was linked to IMF 
conditionality. 
On a more positive note, this also stimulated 
another spurt in progress. Members expanded 
the CMI as the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM) to include a 
foreign exchange reserve pool of $120 billion. 
Box  VII-1 
The 1997 financial crisis: lessons in economic policy management 
 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis had a profound effect on the region, forcing policymakers to rethink economic 
strategies that were focused on maximizing economic growth driven by external borrowing. They resolved to 
deepen their regional cooperation, to better coordinate the management of speculative capital flows, and to 
build foreign exchange reserves that would protect against a similar type of crisis in the future. 
Policymakers from affected countries also stood resolutely in favour of expanding trade and investment, 
despite protectionist pressures from crisis-hit sectors. This helped restore growth through buoyant global 
demand for the region’s exports. Interestingly, at the height of the crisis, the region’s WTO members 
entered into further liberalization commitments under the WTO’s financial services agreement, which helped 
recapitalize banks, and showed that calibration, through sequencing and selection of the modes of 
liberalization, were important factors in liberalization policies. As a result, when the global financial crisis 
hit in 2008 the countries in Asia and the Pacific were more resilient – though they remained aware of how 
susceptible they still were to the financial contagion. 
Source: ESCAP, 2012a.
176
Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises
In addition, they raised the ceiling of currency 
swaps not subject to IMF conditionality from 
10 to 20 per cent. In a further encouraging 
sign of continued reform of the CMIM, 
leaders of ASEAN+3 have announced that in 
2014 member countries will be allowed to tap 
up to 40 per cent of their own quota without an 
IMF aid package.4
 
One continuing limitation of the CMIM is 
that when a member requests support, the 
participating countries need to agree to contribute 
on each occasion. This provision may ensure 
that countries only contribute when they are in 
a position to do so, but it also makes the system 
very slow.5 
Countries in the region have also been aiming 
to reduce their dependence on extra-regional 
funds by expanding Asian bond markets – 
through the Asian Bond Fund (Box VII-3) 
and the Asian Bond Market Initiative. Since 
1997, the region has seen a nearly 30-fold 
increase in the size of the bond market.6 
However, there are still concerns about the 
quality of the bonds, since issuers’ credit rating 
levels still do not meet investor expectations.7 
To address this, APEC has launched several 
initiatives such as the APEC Financial 
Development Programme and the Initiative on 
Strengthening Capital Markets in the APEC 
region. The bond markets would also be stronger 
if they had common substructures of credit 
guarantees and ratings. 
With regard to the third objective, on regional 
exchange rate policy coordination, most 
activities have remained at the stage of 
information exchange and dialogue. Countries 
recognize the deleterious effects of exchange 
rate volatility, particularly for the trade in parts 
and components in regional supply chains. 
They also appreciate the dangers of competitive 
devaluations. But as yet, no consensus has 
emerged on a collectively managed float or any 
other arrangement for currency stabilization. 
On this issue, there is no clear evidence, 
either theoretical or empirical; the crisis-hit euro 
being a case in point. 
Nevertheless, the region has created a strong 
foundation of regional cooperation in trade, 
investment and capital flows. As a result, many 
countries are in a better position to absorb 
external shocks than they were a decade and 
a half ago. This was demonstrated by their 
Box  VII-2
The Chiang Mai Initiative 
The Chiang Mai initiative (CMI), established in 2000 as a direct response the Asian financial crisis, is a set of 
bilateral agreements that established a pool of $200 million in foreign exchange reserves that was raised 
to $1 billion in 2005. In 2009, the CMI was transformed from a bilateral network into a multilateral foreign 
exchange reserve pool of $120 billion. Of this pool, 80 per cent is contributed by China, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea, while the ASEAN countries provide the remaining 20 per cent. An independent regional surveillance 
office, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was established in 2010 and is responsible for 
conducting surveillance of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) operations.
Source: ESCAP, 2012a.
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resilience during the 2008 global financial 
crisis. Although this differed in many ways 
from the 1997 crisis, the fundamental issue 
remained the same: a sudden stop in capital 
flows, leading to a general run for liquidity. 
This time, however, the damage was contained 
and the overall recovery was quick and strong 
(Box VII-4).
Box  VII-3
The Asian Bond Fund
The Asian Bond Fund was established by the Executives Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks, an 
association of central banks of 11 economies in the region (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong, China). The first stage of 
the fund was launched in 2003 with voluntary contributions of members to a dedicated fund, with an initial 
size of $1 billion, to purchase regional bonds denominated in US dollars.
Box  VII-4
The 2008 financial crisis: visible resilience and hidden vulnerabilities 
The 2008 global crisis caused a visible contraction. However, thanks to financial sector reforms after 1997 
and the willingness of policymakers to respond with aggressive fiscal stimuli and expansionary monetary 
policies, the overall damage was limited and the recovery was quick and strong. By 2010, most of the region’s 
economies appeared to be back on long-term growth trends. 
But apparent overall economic resilience masks underlying vulnerabilities. In particular it hides the impact on 
the poor. Vulnerable communities can see their life savings devastated by a spike in food prices, or the loss of 
a job that has disappeared forever. Moreover, any reduction of health and education expenditures will affect 
the quality of human development in both short and long terms. 
Those most resilient to crises are those with access to capital, knowledge, employment opportunities and 
the capacity to accumulate wealth. Widespread economic recovery at the macro level has not translated into 
increased security of jobs and livelihoods for the most vulnerable. 
The experiences of both the 2008 and 1997 financial crises have underlined the need for a much broader 
response. Rather than dealing solely with macroeconomic factors, such as public debt and fiscal balances, this 
has to address issues such as skyrocketing youth unemployment and the decline of government services. 
Even in Europe these seem to have been shifted to a later phase of the recovery process. 
Asia and the Pacific, with its strong macroeconomic fundamentals, has an opportunity to avoid the mistakes 
of other regions. It can take regional action that bridges the gap between visible resilience and hidden forms 
of vulnerability. 
Source: ESCAP, 2012a.
Source: ESCAP, 2012a.
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Trade and investment integration
Most Asia-Pacific economies have come to 
rely heavily on exports, often over 50 per cent 
of GDP – the bulk of which are destined 
for developed country markets. Indeed, in 
South-East and East Asia, in particular, exports 
are often a greater share of GDP than household 
consumption, investment and government 
consumption – and sometimes all three 
combined. Given that future global crises could 
also weaken export demand from the developed 
countries, Asia and the Pacific will thus rely 
more on regional export markets and will need 
to generate more demand for consumer goods 
from within the region. 
This will mean tackling remaining tariffs and 
the often complex measures on rules of origin. 
Countries also need to simplify customs and 
inspection procedures, improve transport links 
and reduce transaction costs. Indeed, given 
the current stalemate in the Doha Round of 
negotiations, economic integration reforms are 
likely to happen through the faster track that 
regional trade agreements provide.
At the same time, it will be important to 
improve the climate for investment. Further 
flows of FDI would boost domestic demand, 
increase access to credit and insurance, reduce 
inequality, and ultimately build greater resilience 
to external shocks. If investors are to risk their 
capital they will need predictable and secure 
mechanisms. Investment would also benefit 
from tighter regional coordination of such 
policies – creating common markets of 
production and consumption that produce 
economies of scale while ensuring a level 
playing field for competition. 
laND, Water aND eNerGY  
liNkaGes
Demand for water, food and energy is expected 
to rise by 30 to 50 per cent over the next two 
decades. This could put unsustainable pressures 
on natural resources with particularly harmful 
impacts for the poor. Policymakers increasingly 
recognize that land, water, and energy supplies 
and food security are interdependent – and 
the risks are correlated.8 Countries need to 
cooperate accordingly.
Food security
Countries across the region have cooperated 
for some years on food security. In 1975, in 
the aftermath of global market turmoil, the 
United Nations established an International 
Emergency Food Reserve. Then in 1979 at 
a subregional level, ASEAN agreed on the 
ASEAN Food Security Reserve. This arrangement 
proved ineffective because the reserves were too 
small and each disbursement required bilateral 
negotiations.9 In 2004, the ASEAN ministers 
therefore relaunched the scheme as the East 
Asia Emergency Rice Reserve which had clearer 
stock release guidelines. In March 2010, this 
reserve facilitated the transfer of 10,000 metric 
tons of rice from Viet Nam to the Philippines. 
It also developed programmes to help disaster 
victims in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Myanmar. 
In 2011, ASEAN+3 agreed to establish a 
permanent mechanism which, with three more 
participating countries, is able to earmark 
substantially greater reserves. 
There have also been food security 
arrangements among the SAARC countries. 
SAARC established the first reserve in 1998, 
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but this was not activated. It was relaunched in 
2008 as the SAARC Food Bank. Nevertheless, 
the scheme still has structural and procedural 
weaknesses. 
Food reserve systems need to operate with clear 
guidelines and on a sufficient scale. They should 
also establish ways of transferring stocks speedily 
across borders without excessively relaxing 
safeguards for plants, animals and humans. 
The ASEAN system, by clarifying questions 
related to prices, terms and conditions of 
commercial transactions, has addressed these 
issues effectively. It is also important that 
governments protect critical food reserves and 
stocks from both natural and man-made hazards.
Water resources
Countries across the region have a long history 
of cooperation on water resources. For over five 
decades, ESCAP has been at the forefront of 
promoting such collaboration. Indeed, during 
its founding days, the main environmental 
preoccupation for ESCAP (then known as 
ECAFE) was not land, but water.10 In May 1949, 
the Bureau of Flood Control was established, 
and it quickly prioritized the Mekong. This 
represented the United Nations’ first direct 
involvement in international river basin 
planning.11 Progress was subsequently slowed 
by  conflict but revived again in 1995 with the 
formation of the independent Mekong River 
Commission between the governments of 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
Since then the Commission has formulated 
the Basin Development Plan which integrates 
economic, social, and environmental issues in 
the management of water and related resources, 
energy generation and food production, as well 
as a regional flood management programme, 
and an agreement on data and information 
sharing. It also has an agreement with China 
on hydrological data exchange.
Table VII-1 lists some other frameworks 
of cooperation among the region’s major 
transboundary river basins. Such integration 
could be strengthened or expanded to include 
other critical natural resources. 
cooperatioN oN Disaster risk 
maNaGemeNt
The Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) 
encourages cooperation on disaster risk 
management. It calls on regional organizations 
to undertake the following ﬁve specific tasks: (a) 
promote regional programmes; (b) undertake 
and publish regional and subregional baseline 
assessments; (c) coordinate and publish periodic 
reviews on progress; (d) establish or strengthen 
specialized regional collaborative centres; 
and (e) support the development of regional 
mechanisms and capacities for early warning.12 
More recently, the Rio+20 outcome document 
reaffirmed the international community’s 
commitment to the HFA and called on 
subregional and regional organizations to 
urgently accelerate implementation of the HFA 
goals in the context of sustainable development 
and poverty eradication. 
Many initiatives for regional cooperation have 
been initiated or supported through ESCAP. 
One of the most significant, as mentioned 
earlier, is the Mekong River Commission. 
Another is the intergovernmental ESCAP/
WMO Typhoon Committee which was 
established in 1968 to coordinate measures 
for minimizing the loss of life and 
material damage caused by typhoons.13 
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The Japan Meteorological Agency 
provides support and advice to 
members through the Regional Specialized 
Meteorological Centre in Tokyo. A third example, 
established in 1972, is the intergovernmental 
WMO/ESCAP Panel on Tropical Cyclones 
which provides a cyclone warning service for 
the Bay of Bengal.14 In this case, the Regional 
Specialized Meteorological Centre is
the Indian Meteorological Department.
All three cases have demonstrated the value 
of regional cooperation, but the intensity of 
cooperation varies. Cooperation is most 
advanced in the Mekong River Commission 
– where there is clear political commitment 
and members, development partners and 
donors provide the Commission with substantial 
resources. In the two other arrangements, 
cooperation tends to be looser: governments 
commit fewer resources and activity is typically 
confined to typhoon-related early warning and 
information exchanges. 
There are also international and regional 
cooperation mechanisms for emergency 
responses that are supported by ESCAP. The 
International Charter on Space and Major 
Disasters, for example, which became operational 
in 2000, provides countries affected by 
disasters with a unified system of satellite data 
acquisition and delivery. Currently, 14 of the 
world’s space agencies are members, offering 
more than 21 earth observation satellites; 
China, India and Japan together have 
more than six. At the regional level, another 
Source: ESCAP, 2011d. 
table  VII-1
Major transboundary river basins in Asia
River basin  Riparian countries Total 
population in 
river basin 
(million) 
Intergovernmental 
framework of 
cooperation  
Member countries Principal cooperation areas  
Amu Darya Afghanistan, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
43.3 
 
Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination 
(ICWC); International 
Fund for saving the Aral 
Sea (IFAS) 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Water quantity, water quality, 
joint management 
Amur  China, Mongolia, 
Russian Federation  
63.9 Amur River Coordination 
Committee  
China, Mongolia, 
Russian Federation 
Joint management 
Ganges-
Brahmaputra-
Meghna 
Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, China, 
India, Myanmar, 
Nepal 
581 Mahakali River 
Commission;  
 
Indo-Bangladesh Joint 
Rivers Commission 
India, Nepal 
 
 
Bangladesh, India 
Water quantity 
 
 
Joint management 
Indus Afghanistan, China, 
India, Pakistan 
219 Indus Waters 
Commission 
India, Pakistan Water quantity, joint 
management  
 
Mekong Cambodia, China, 
Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Thailand, 
Viet Nam 
57.2 Mekong River 
Commission  
Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, Thailand,  
Viet Nam 
Hydropower, irrigation, 
navigation, fishing, flood 
control and relief 
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mechanism is Sentinel Asia which provides 
disaster-related information and products from 
satellites operated by India, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea and Thailand. 
ESCAP has also been working to enhance 
regional cooperation in space applications. 
In 1994, it established the Regional Space 
Applications Programme for Sustainable 
Development (RESAP) which provides capacity 
building programmes on space applications 
for disaster risk management. In addition, 
UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications 
Programme will use RESAP’s framework to 
provide access to near-real-time satellite-based 
information during disasters and emergencies. 
This collaboration should help provide data in 
a more timely and efficient manner.
Recently, the ESCAP secretariat facilitated 
the formulation of the Asia-Pacific Plan of 
Action for Applications of Space Technology 
and Geographic Information Systems for 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Sustainable 
Development, 2012-2017 (Plan of Action). 
This was adopted by member States at the 
intergovernmental meeting held in December 
2012. ESCAP is tasked to take the lead in 
implementing the Plan of Action at the 
regional level.
Cooperation in disaster risk management 
has also evolved at the subregional level. In 
1976, ASEAN leaders identified disaster 
management as one of their eight principles 
and objectives for cooperation. Since 
then progress has been steady, albeit slow. 
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Of note is the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster 
Management and Emergency Response, which 
came into force in December 2009. This is the 
world’s first, and only, HFA-related binding 
instrument. In South Asia, SAARC at its 14th 
Summit adopted the ‘SAARC Comprehensive 
Disaster Management: A Framework for 
Action 2006-2015’. 
Integrated early warning systems 
In recent years, early warning systems have 
become more people-centred. These rely on 
four inter-related elements: knowledge of risks; 
monitoring and warning services; dissemination 
and communication; and response capability. 
All are equally important: failure in one will 
result in a collapse of the entire system. All four 
elements are now benefiting from advances in 
technology and communications which are 
allowing people-driven forms of cooperation 
to transcend geographical boundaries. The 
ESCAP Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster and 
Climate Change Preparedness contributed 
to the development of an integrated regional 
early warning system comprising a network of 
collaborative centres connected to subregional 
and regional centres (Box VII-5).
Sharing also lowers costs – particularly for 
systems that address infrequent but catastrophic 
events, such as tsunamis. One study has 
concluded that if individual countries each 
developed their own early warning systems for 
tsunami warnings in the Indian Ocean this 
would cost around $50 million – in addition to 
$5 million to $10 million per year for operating 
multiple systems. A collective system, on the 
other hand, would require no more than $1.5 
million operating expenditure. Moreover 
for a further $1 million a year this could also 
incorporate warnings on hydro-meteorological 
hazards.15 Such a collective system, the Regional 
Integrated Early Warning System (RIMES) 
was established with the support of the Trust 
Fund (Box VII-6). It is now providing a range 
of cost-effective early warning and climate 
application services to members.
A more recent initiative is the Regional 
Cooperative Mechanism for Disaster Monitoring 
and Early Warning, Particularly Drought. 
Established under ESCAP’s RESAP programme, 
this mechanism receives technical support from 
member countries in the region. While still at an 
early stage this should provide an information 
portal for national strategies and mitigation 
experiences. It will also serve as a technical 
support platform for no- or low-cost space-based 
products for drought analysis – and as a 
platform to encourage technology transfer and 
capacity building.
Disaster preparedness
Countries can also work together to agree on what 
to do when disaster strikes. ASEAN, for example, 
has established standard operating procedures 
for coordinating disaster relief and emergency 
responses between member countries. These 
systems were put to the test in May 2008 when 
cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, and ASEAN was 
able to act as a bridge between Myanmar and 
the international community. In 2011, ASEAN, 
in order to link national disaster management 
agencies and provide early warnings and 
response, launched the ASEAN Coordinating 
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster 
Management. This came into action, for 
example, in July 2012 when it monitored the 
effects of an earthquake in Aceh, Indonesia. 
Search and rescue teams stood by in Jakarta and 
in Malaysia. Fortunately, after a few hours of 
monitoring, it was clear they would not be 
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Box  VII-5
ESCAP Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Preparedness 
The ESCAP Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Tsunamis in the Indian Ocean and South East Asian Countries was 
established in 2005 through a $10 million contribution from the Government of Thailand. The overall 
objective was to build and enhance tsunami early warning capacities at various levels in the Indian Ocean. 
The Fund helped establish RIMES, which now covers over 26 countries from the Asian and African 
continents, and feeds into the overall Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System which went live 
in 2011. Under this system, Australia, India and Indonesia have been mandated by UNESCO/IOC to act as 
Regional Tsunami Service Providers, with the specific task of issuing tsunami warnings in the Indian Ocean. 
A study commissioned by ESCAP estimated that nearly 160,000 lives could have been saved had this warning 
system been in place on 26 December 2004. As for preventing future losses, a conservative estimate is that 
this system will help save about 1,000 lives every year for the next 100 years. 
The scope of the Fund was later expanded to include coastal hazards and climate change preparedness. 
An evaluation in 2011 concluded that the Fund had made a significant contribution to the establishment 
of an Indian Ocean tsunami early warning system. It also reconfirmed the relevance of focusing on early 
warnings for coastal hazards and recommended actions to strengthen the Fund based on the comparative 
advantages of ESCAP.
Box  VII-6
RIMES: the cost effectiveness of regional cooperation 
The Regional Integrated Multi-hazard Early Warning System (RIMES) has three characteristics that make it 
cost effective:
 Economies of scale – Countries pool their resources to monitor infrequent events. The annual recurring 
cost for maintaining the regional tsunami component of RIMES is about $1.5 million. 
 Multi-hazard scope – RIMES also includes other, more common, hazards, such as floods, thunderstorms 
and tropical cyclones – which is attractive for countries where tsunamis are not a major concern. Integrating 
these services in RIMES has an added recurring cost of less than $0.5 million. Integrating such value-added 
and special services into the regional system also has the benefit of ensuring constant engagement of 
member countries. 
 Faster responses – This makes the early warning information more effective and increases the benefits.
Source: ESCAP, based on Subbiah and others, 2010.
Source: Aysan, 2011.
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needed. Shortly after typhoon Bopha struck 
the Mindanao region of the Philippines in 
December 2012, the Centre launched an 
ASEAN Disaster Emergency Logistic System.
Knowledge sharing 
Policymakers will be in a better position to 
integrate disaster resilience into national 
planning processes if they can broaden and 
deepen their exchange of knowledge. To assist 
these flows, ESCAP is collaborating with the 
Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) 
on the Asia-Pacific Gateway for Disaster Risk 
Management and Development. This web portal 
provides information and knowledge products 
that enable government ministries, as well as 
other institutions and the general public, to 
integrate DRR principles, concepts and practices 
into development processes (Box VII-7). As 
each country gains experience on disaster risk 
management, the Gateway platform should 
help accelerate the uptake of good practices. 
In the Pacific, the most comprehensive 
information resource on disaster risk 
management is the Pacific Disaster Net. 
Established in 2008, this was developed 
by SOPAC, IFRC,UNDP-Pacific Centre 
and UN-OCHA. In South Asia, the SAARC 
Disaster Management Centre established the 
South Asia Disaster Knowledge Network in 
2011 to provide a  common platform and easy 
access to real-time disaster data from different 
providers using a map-based system. The 
network is linked to portals within and 
beyond the governments of the SAARC 
member countries. 
Regional networking has also helped build 
resilience at the community level. The ‘Making 
Cities Resilient Campaign’, for example, has 
organized international city-to-city learning 
events to share disaster risk information. 
This has resulted in partnerships between 
Bonn in Germany and six cities: Bukhara in 
Uzbekistan, Chengdu in China, Cape Coast in 
Ghana, La Paz in Bolivia, Minsk in Belarus and 
Box  VII-7
The Asia-Pacific Gateway for Disaster Risk Management and Development  
Launched by ESCAP in November 2010, the Asia-Pacific Gateway for Disaster Risk Management and 
Development is an interactive web platform that provides unprecedented opportunities to share information 
and knowledge products about disaster risk management (DRM) across the Asia-Pacific region. The Gateway 
acts as a knowledge broker that connects the various hubs of DRM knowledge in the region to develop an 
extensive database of policies, plans and assessments. These ‘knowledge configurations’ connect 
government ministries, particularly national development and disaster management authorities, and 
enable them to benefit from centralized access to hundreds of policies, strategies and studies across the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
The Gateway is a regional initiative supported through key partnerships with the Asian Disaster Preparedness 
Center (ADPC), the UNISDR, the United Nations Asian and Pacific Training Centre for Information and 
Communication Technology for Development, and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. The 
Gateway builds on existing initiatives in disaster risk management, such as ADPC’s DRR Project Portal for 
Asia and the Pacific, and relies on the active participation of users to provide value-added content. 
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Ulaanbaatar in Mongolia. The common 
element is Bonn’s challenge in dealing with 
flooding from the river Rhine. These cities 
are also cooperating on projects on climate 
adaptation, biodiversity and water quality.16 
Regional risk insurance
Small developing countries, with limited 
budgets, cannot absorb the financial impact 
of natural disasters. As a result, they run into 
problems of short-term liquidity. Nor individually 
are they in a position to arrange contingency 
credit or arrange insurance. However, they 
could join regional risk insurance pools.
Small economies in the Caribbean, for example, 
can take advantage of the Caribbean Catastrophe 
Risk Insurance Facility (Box VII-8). Building 
on this experience, the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community with the support of the World 
Bank in January 2013 launched the Pacific 
Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing 
Initiative.17 The pilot programme, funded 
principally by the Government of Japan, has 
successfully placed catastrophe risk with four 
international reinsurance companies, Sompo 
Japan Insurance, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance, 
Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance, and 
Swiss Re. The programme covers major tropical 
cyclones and earthquakes. Five Pacific island 
countries, namely the Marshall Islands, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu 
are participating, and coverage is expected to 
be $45 million. This regional mechanism could 
generate savings of up to 50 per cent compared 
to individual risk transfer solutions (Figure VII-1).
Resilient infrastructure
Natural disasters weaken or destroy critical 
infrastructure, and the cascading effects can 
produce wider systemic failures that could lead 
to an economic crisis. The reverse is also true: 
prolonged economic stagnation can result in a 
neglect of infrastructure. For the period 2010 
to 2020, it has been estimated that the Asia- 
Pacific region needs to spend about $8 trillion 
on national infrastructure.18
 
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
countries that had invested in infrastructure 
recovered faster than others.19 As a result, in 
response to the 2008 global financial crisis, 
many Asia-Pacific countries responded with 
large fiscal stimuli much of which they invested 
in infrastructure projects. This was partly to 
create income and employment through public 
works, but also to strengthen subregional 
infrastructure in anticipation of future threats 
and disasters. 
There are also infrastructure investment funds 
at the subregional level. In 2010, SAARC 
established the SAARC Development Fund 
with paid-up capital of $300 million to 
finance infrastructure projects in energy, power, 
transportation, telecommunications, environment 
and tourism.20 Also in 2010, ASEAN created 
the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, which 
is co-financed by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) with major contributions from 
Malaysia and Indonesia; it funds many of the 
projects related to the Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity. In addition, there is infrastructure 
investment from other, overlapping subregional 
groups. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), 
for example, with support from the ADB and 
other donors, has targeted projects in 
transport, energy, telecommunications, trade, 
tourism, agriculture and environment worth 
approximately $10 billion.21   
Many of these investments aim to create more 
resilient regional ICT infrastructure. ADB has 
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Box  VII-8
The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility  
The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) provides participating governments of the 
Caribbean Community with the opportunity to purchase insurance coverage at rates 45 to 50 per cent 
lower than if they were to purchase insurance individually in financial markets. This is because participating 
countries can pool their country-specific risks into one diversified portfolio. The facility then transfers risks it 
cannot retain to the international financial markets through reinsurance or through other financial coverage 
instruments such as catastrophe bonds. 
Parametric insurance products are priced for each country based on their individual risk profiles. Annual 
premiums typically vary from $200,000 to $4 million, for coverage ranging from $10 million to $50 million. 
Bermuda, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the Caribbean Development Bank and the World Bank have 
pledged a total of $47 million to the CCRIF reserve fund. Participating governments contribute resources to 
the pool according to their respective risk exposure. With 16 governments currently members of the CCRIF, 
participation is regarded as high.
Source: Small Island Developing States Network, 2012.
Figure  VII-1
Benefits of risk pooling in the Pacific
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provided funding of $65 million for the GMS 
Information Superhighway Network. ADB 
has also approved about $16 million in grants 
and loans for the South Asia Subregional 
Economic Cooperation Information Highway 
initiative. This aims to improve data connectivity 
across Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal 
and may serve as a preliminary phase for 
an extended SAARC information highway. 
Also of note, ASEAN, in its Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity,22 has designated the 
development of broadband corridors as a 
key component of its regional infrastructure 
development plan. Another regional initiative 
is the Trans-Eurasian Information Super 
Highway (TASIM) project spanning more 
than 20 countries between Central Asia and 
Europe.23 The TASIM initiative is a collaborative 
project that involves a connectivity alliance led 
by the ITU, as well as telecom operators from 
the participating countries which are jointly 
responsible for the construction of the 
backbone network.
Nevertheless, many of these programmes 
still do not suffficiently address disaster risks 
and are missing opportunities to maximize 
resilience. Governments may therefore wish to 
review their policy and regulatory frameworks 
to ensure that disaster risk reduction is 
integrated into current and future infrastructure 
programmes. 
ESCAP can also promote cooperation by 
building resilience into regional infrastructure 
initiatives. ESCAP has long taken the lead 
in coordinating and promoting regional 
infrastructure agreements, notably the 
Trans-Asian Railway Network and the Asian 
Highway Network, both of which were forged 
through decades of regional cooperation. A 
similar approach can also be taken for other 
critical infrastructure. To benefit from cross- 
sectoral and transnational synergies, however, 
what is needed is a regional framework that 
will reduce costs by sharing resources and 
develop infrastructure in ways that promote 
regional integration and long-term sustainable 
development. The real value of the Asian 
Highway Network, for example, is not so 
much its overall scale, but the standardization 
that enables traffic to move more easily across 
neighbouring countries.24 Through mutuality 
of interests and sharing of risk, countries can 
now build on the Asian Highway Network and 
the Trans-Asian Railway Network with other 
forms of critical infrastructure. 
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a reGioNal frameWork for 
bUilDiNG resilieNce
The multiple shocks that affect the Asia-Pacific 
region are increasingly interconnected and 
converging, bringing with them complex 
linkages. While the region has adopted 
numerous multi-country mechanisms and plans 
of actions, for the most part they are disparate, 
ad hoc or event driven, and lack a region-wide 
coordinated approach.   This calls for a new 
regional framework for resilience-building 
– one that rebalances economic, social and 
environmental systems. This framework, rather 
than addressing the consequences of recurring 
crises addresses the root causes. Rather than 
pursuing individual goals it is comprehensive – 
cutting across countries, sectors and institutions 
with coordinated regional initiatives. The 
framework is also inclusive – meeting the needs 
of the region’s poorest who are often the least 
responsible for causing crises and disasters, but 
the hardest hit by them.25 
The framework gives a central role to 
governments – as the planners of long-term 
socio-economic development. Indeed, the 
recurrence of shocks should be an opportunity 
for governments to re-enter economic, social 
and environmental systems and use their fiscal 
resources to build resilience. The key question 
is whether the governments of the region are 
willing or able to prioritize these objectives. All 
countries find it difficult to finance investment to 
protect economic activity, critical infrastructures, 
and their people from future shocks – whose 
timing, likelihood and magnitude are unknown. 
Furthermore, in the current climate of slow 
economic growth, they are likely to give priority 
to immediate growth-enhancing objectives, 
over building long-term resilience. However, 
coordinated policymaking at the regional level 
can address these very challenges.  The proposed 
regional framework builds on the four-pronged 
action agenda outlined in the study entitled 
“Growing together: economic integration for 
an inclusive and sustainable Asia-Pacific 
Century” that was prepared for the 68th session 
of the Commission in 2012. The framework 
consists of three pillars, three enablers and one 
integrator, as set out below in Figure VII-2.
Pillar 1 – Coordinated investment in inclusive 
development
Coordinated macroeconomic policies can 
help move countries in Asia and the Pacific 
towards crisis-resilience. Macroeconomic policy 
coordination enhances financial sector stability 
by reducing the volatility of key macroeconomic 
variables, thereby mitigating the risk of a 
financial crisis. Policy coordination is also 
needed to minimize negative spillovers 
and to maximize positive spillovers, 
especially since shocks are multiple and 
business cycles are becoming increasingly 
coordinated. Thus, macroeconomic policy 
coordination can contribute to sustaining 
growth by reducing volatility and strengthening 
financial stability. Coordinated policies shore up 
market confidence and build overall resilience.   
 Fiscal policy – Countries can maximise the 
social returns on public investment by taking 
advantage of regional synergies. Each country 
makes its own fiscal choices according to 
national priorities. But countries can also 
work together in setting regional agendas that 
prioritize public investments in such areas as 
regional infrastructure,   disaster preparedness, 
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and climate change adaptation. In this way, they 
coordinate their long-term policy planning 
horizons – and strategically target their fiscal 
resources towards development that is based on 
principles of resilience-building. 
 Monetary and exchange rate policies – Short 
term capital flows are often a source of financial 
sector fragility and financial crisis. Countries 
may also lose competitiveness through inflation 
rate differentials and serious misalignment of 
bilateral exchange rates. Coordination of 
monetary and exchange policies may thus help 
preventing monetary policy spillovers as well 
as competitive devaluations. 
Figure  VII-2
A regional framework for building resilience
 Financial policies – Financial reform at the 
global level has turned out to be a long haul. 
Consequently, governments have been turning 
to multi-polar configurations, among which 
regional policy coordination has made 
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prevent enterprises by-passing regulation 
through regulatory migration. Member States 
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 Regional risk financing – Neighbouring 
countries facing common hazards should consider 
regional cooperation in risk financing. They can 
thus pool resources and spread the risks across 
a wider group of countries. This is of particular 
value to small and disaster-prone countries; if 
they tried to obtain insurance on their own they 
would face exorbitant premiums. Similarly, 
during times of economic crisis, a coordinated 
regional approach could also provide emergency 
liquidity support and protect against sudden 
reversals of capital flow. National governments 
would then feel less pressure to build up large 
foreign exchange reserves.
 Trade policy coordination – Asia and the 
Pacific should also rationalize its preferential 
trading agreements. At present, regional trading 
partners belong to multiple agreements, each 
with their separately negotiated terms. Two 
initiatives that aim to be more comprehensive 
are the trans-Pacific Partnership led by the 
United States of America, and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
led by ASEAN. RCEP should be of particular 
benefit to countries participating in production 
networks centred in China, as well as to Asian 
countries in that depend heavily on intraregional 
trade.26 
Pillar 2 – Coordinated economic management
The second pillar of resilience-building is 
investment in inclusive development. Asia 
and the Pacific has achieved rapid growth and 
economic recovery but has not translated this 
progress into increased security of jobs and 
livelihoods. As a result, income inequalities are 
on the rise while more than 80 per cent of the 
region’s poor are estimated to be without any 
basic security against the risks associated with 
multiple shocks. Development thus needs to be 
more inclusive and it should build more resilient 
livelihoods. Foremost, this will involve greater 
investment in social infrastructure – particularly 
in education and health services that will lead 
to more resilient human development. 
Resilient human development also entails 
establishing social protection floors –  not as 
a handout, but as investments in supporting 
the poor and other vulnerable groups against 
the risks of multiple shocks. ESCAP estimates 
that the costs of providing a social protection 
system by 2030, would range between 5 to 8 per 
cent of GDP per year. 27  28 States should be able 
to afford this, and yet, coverage remains very 
low. For least developed countries and other 
low-income countries, the very countries that 
are most in need of expanding social protection 
programmes, this problem is not trivial. More 
often than not, they are also the countries with 
high vulnerabilities to multiple shocks with 
a large portion of the population vulnerable 
to the same risks of economic crises, natural 
disasters, epidemic diseases or extreme food 
price increases. The main disincentive in 
introducing a comprehensive social protection 
system is therefore the risk that multiple shocks 
will result in surges in public expenditures at the 
same time that revenues decline. 
This wide divergence in States’ “ability to pay” 
opens up the opportunity for a multi-country 
cooperative approach. A regional social 
protection fund based on the principles of 
regional solidarity in the face of multiple shocks 
is worth further consideration. Besides the 
political groundswell that builds up from 
regional solidarity, there are also numerous 
economic synergies. One need only consider 
how the absence of social protection and 
extreme vulnerabilities act as push factors for 
economic migration to countries that offer 
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better opportunities and economic security. 
Millions of vulnerable people often take 
extreme risks to flee hopeless situations and 
invariably fall prey to crime, trafficking and 
other extreme forms of exploitation. Richer 
countries both within the region and further 
afield spend millions of dollars to protect 
their borders. Instead they could address these 
problems collectively at a fraction of the costs 
by contributing to a regional fund for social 
protection that mitigates the push factors in 
economic migration. 
Three points related to the proposed fund would 
need to be stressed. One is that the regional 
fund would complement and support current 
discussions underway at the global level that 
are spearheaded by the Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food, and supported by the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights, among others. The global 
fund that has been proposed would help poorer 
countries to establish their social protection 
floors with a provision to act as a reinsurance 
provider if social protection systems are 
overwhelmed by unexpected shocks. Both 
global and regional solidarity are needed as they 
work in mutually supportive ways. Second, the 
existence of such a fund would not pre-empt the 
control of governments in the administration 
of their national social protection systems. 
Rather, it would augment a government’s ability 
to implement national programmes in more 
sustainable ways. Third, numerous aspects 
related to the contribution scales, adminis-
tration and operation of such a regional fund 
would need to be worked out and agreed to. 
As a minimum, there should be more 
cooperation in the planning, coordination and 
tracking of such social protection systems. 
Drawing on global norms, the region could 
also develop its own norms on social protection. 
This would improve implementation and 
trigger further multiplier effects making the 
region as a whole more resilient. For this 
purpose, experiences emanating from the EU, 
the region that has made the most headway 
in coordinating social policies could be useful 
(Box VII-9). 
More needs to be done. Asia-Pacific as the 
most disaster-prone as well as the most diverse 
region of the world could provide a leading 
example of regional solidarity.  ESCAP stands 
ready to provide the platform for such a 
dialogue. 
Pillar 3 – Sustainable resource management 
Asia and the Pacific has 52 transboundary 
river basins covering around one third of the 
region’s territory and population.29 Of these 
basins, 14 cover between three and six 
countries. Governments need to strengthen 
existing integrated river basin management 
frameworks by tapping into the new dynamism 
of South-South cooperation. To address the 
water-food energy linkages, this should extend 
beyond existing basin-wide cooperation. 
Comprehensive frameworks such as those that 
have evolved under ASEAN and SAARC 
would enable regional cooperation and 
policy coordination. They can help countries 
sustainably manage shared water, energy and 
land resources – all of which are critical for 
food security. 
Enabler 1 – Investing in technological innovation
Modern ICT, along with space technology 
applications, are providing unprecedented 
opportunities for building resilience. But they 
do not reach everyone. Governments will 
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therefore need to enter the scene more 
proactively with forward-looking visions and 
long-term development plans.  
Governments should support the development 
of technological innovations that have yet to 
reach their peaks. This can require massive 
public investment in infrastructure that 
supports affordable, reliable and universal 
access to these technologies. At the same time, 
Governments will need to manage the overall 
impacts of innovation – ensuring that the 
benefits spread to everyone, especially vulnerable 
groups, while also taking measures to minimize 
potential risks, both for people and the 
environment. This will require collaboration 
between the public and private sectors as well 
as regional cooperation. 
Enabler 2 – Monitoring and early warning
Governments should continue to strengthen 
regional monetary and financial monitoring 
and surveillance. The main objective would 
be to detect and assess the symptoms of 
potential crisis and make early corrective 
policy recommendations. The establishment 
of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research 
Office (AMRO) in Singapore in April 2011 
can provide guidance on how to achieve this. 
Similarly, in disaster-prone areas, governments 
will need to support people-centred risk 
knowledge, monitoring and warning services. 
For this they can work more effectively through 
regional cooperation. This would enable them 
to pool scientific knowledge and technical 
expertise and take advantage of economies of 
scale. Governments, development partners and 
donors should further strengthen and expand 
regional multi-hazard monitoring and 
early warning systems – such as the integrated 
regional early warning system for tsunami, 
coastal hazards and climate preparedness.
Enabler 3 – Pooling resources for better  
preparedness
Governments who are preparing their disaster 
responses have to acquire the necessary 
information and expertise. For this purpose, 
ESCAP could serve as a bridge – bringing 
together regional cooperative mechanisms 
that have similar expertise and mandates, such 
as the Typhoon Committee and the Panel on 
Tropical Cyclones. 
Data sharing, monitoring and surveillance are 
not just important when disasters are underway; 
they are also vital beforehand. These should be 
continuous processes. Countries participating 
in cooperative mechanisms such as RESAP 
and Sentinel Asia, for example, can commit to 
providing access to near-real-time satellite data 
and products in support of preparedness – as 
well as for damage assessments and recovery 
planning. And collaboration in research and 
policy analysis needs to be strengthened by 
making better use of existing institutional 
arrangements. Governments should be 
prepared to undertake damage and loss 
assessments for resilient recovery and 
reconstruction planning across all sectors. 
Institutions need to be willing to undergo 
continuous reforms that make them adaptable 
to situations and allow for streamlined 
decision-making and implementation. 
Supply chains could also be made more 
resilient by determined regional action that 
pulls resources for better preparedness. 
This could include joint supply chain risk 
assessments, targeted development aid and 
more institutionalized forms of cooperation 
that have more impact on the stability of global 
markets.
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Box  VII-9
Social protection coordination in the European Union  
The experiences of the European Union (EU), the Nordic Council and the Nordic Centre for Welfare and Social 
Issues offer useful pointers and lessons in policy cooperation that economies of the Asia-Pacific region could 
adapt. In the EU, the open method of coordination (OMC)30 on social protection and social inclusion provides 
a framework for coordinating policies between EU countries. 
The OMC is a mechanism for policy areas which remain the responsibility of national governments, 
such as employment, health and social protection. Through the OMC, national governments establish 
common objectives on social protection and translate these objectives into national plans. Countries regularly 
report data that is used by the EU to monitor progress towards the common objectives. In this way, through 
commonly agreed objectives and indicators, and data that is directly comparable across the EU, the OMC 
aims to develop a mutual learning process that assesses the relative effectiveness of key policies or 
programmes at the country level.31 Furthermore, the EC also uses the OMC framework to help countries that 
have applied to join the EU and would like to reform their social welfare systems. 
Another example of regional cooperation in social protection is the Nordic Council, an inter-parliamentary 
body for welfare and social issues between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The Council 
promotes a set of common values, while recognizing that each country will have a unique social protection 
system, and aims to boost dialogue and cooperation within the region as well as internationally.32
The integrator – Synergizing regional 
initiatives
Having set out the three pillars and discussed 
the enablers of resilience-building, the final 
issue concerns how best to integrate the various 
initiatives into a comprehensive whole. 
The Asia-Pacific region has a number of 
regional organizations and cooperative 
mechanisms. None of these institutions have 
the legal or political power to bind countries’ 
national policies to the regional policy 
coordination process. For the most part, therefore, 
coordination consists of  one, sharing the 
knowledge and good practices that have been 
developed over decades, and two, advocating 
for new areas of cooperation that transcend 
traditional areas and tackle contemporary 
challenges such as resilience-building. 
For this purpose, ESCAP can provide a 
regional sharing platform for ASEAN, 
SAARC and other regional and subregional 
organizations in resilience-building. ESCAP 
can also provide a region-wide forum for learning 
in the above mentioned pillars and enablers of 
resilience building. This would allow member 
States to address the inter-linkages between 
the pillars. For example, through coordinated 
macroeconomic management, countries will be 
in stronger positions to enhance investments 
in inclusive development, in particular through 
the provision of social protection, as well as 
ensure sustainable resource management. The 
enablers that form the foundation strengthen 
the mutually reinforcing role of the pillars of 
resilience and in that way enable countries to 
reduce risks to disasters and economic crises, 
and address climate change concerns. 
194
Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major Economic Crises
The emphasis is on softer forms of policy 
coordination and consensus-building. For these 
purposes, member States can draw upon the 
expertise of relevant committees in the 
Commission. For example, the Committee 
on Disaster Risk Reduction would provide 
the intergovernmental platform for a regional 
voice on global issues pertaining to disaster 
risk management in preparation for the post-
2015 development agenda. The Committee 
on Macroeconomic Policy, Poverty Reduction 
and Inclusive Development could provide the 
platform for governments to build a regional 
voice on the ways to build on a more resilient 
regional macroeconomic and financial 
architecture. A related forum that plays a useful 
role is the Asia-Pacific Regional Coordination 
Mechanism chaired by ESCAP’s Executive 
Secretary, in which agencies related to the 
United Nations could exchange views and 
devise coherent regional programme strategies in 
support of member States policymaking processes.
Notwithstanding the region’s strengths, it 
faces considerable risks – most countries are 
regularly exposed to multiple shocks that 
could jeopardize future economic security 
and social progress. Countries across the 
region need therefore to work together to 
consolidate and extend their achievements 
– by ensuring that their economic, social 
and environmental systems are sufficiently 
robust, flexible and resilient to deal with the 
uncertainties of what lies ahead. 
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READERSHIP SURVEY  
The Information and Communications Technology and Disaster Risk Reduction Division of ESCAP is 
undertaking an evaluation of this publication, Building Resilience to Natural Disasters and Major 
Economic Crises , with a view to making future issues more useful for our readers. We would appreciate it 
if you could complete this questionnaire and return it, at your earliest convenience, to:  
  Director  
  Information and Communications Technology and 
    Disaster Risk Reduction Division  
  ESCAP, United Nations Building 
  Rajadamnern Nok Avenue  
  Bangkok 10200, THAILAND 
 
 
 
  QUESTIONNAIRE 
   
 Very 
              Excellent       good      Average      Poor 
 
1.  Please indicate your assessment of the quality  
 of the publication on:  
 
• Presentation/format       4    3      2        1  
• Readability        4     3       2        1  
• Timeliness of information      4     3      2         1  
• Coverage of subject matter      4     3       2         1  
• Analytical rigour      4     3      2        1  
• Overall quality        4     3       2         1  
 
2.  How useful is the publication for your work?  
 
• Provision of information      4     3       2         1  
• Clarification of issues       4     3      2            1  
• Its findings       4     3       2        1  
• Policy suggestions       4     3      2         1  
• Overall usefulness       4     3       2         1  
 
3.  Please give examples of how this publication has contributed to your work:  
 
         ............................................................................................................................................................  
         ............................................................................................................................................................  
         ............................................................................................................................................................  
         ............................................................................................................................................................ 
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4.  Suggestions for improving the publication:  
............................................................................................................................................................  
............................................................................................................................................................  
............................................................................................................................................................  
............................................................................................................................................................  
 
5.  Your background information, please:  
 Name: ................................................................................................................................................ 
 Title/position: ...................................................................................................................................... 
 Institution:........................................................................................................................................... 
 Office address: ...................................................................................................................................
 .............................................................................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
Please use additional sheets of paper, if required, to answer the questions. 
 
Thank you for your kind cooperation in completing this questionnaire. 
 
  
 


